Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Gode

• Decision Date: 22 June 1982
• Citation: 187 Conn. 386,446 A.2d 1059
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: NATIONWIDE INSURANCE COMPANY v. John H. GODE, Jr., et al.

Page 1059

446 A.2d 1059

187 Conn. 386

NATIONWIDE INSURANCE COMPANY v. John H. GODE, Jr., et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 9, 1982.

Decided June 22, 1982.

George E. McGoldrick, New Haven, for plaintiff.

Steven R. Rolnick, New Haven, with whom were Edward J. Berns, New Haven, and, on the brief, Michael Jainchill, West Hartford, for defendants.

Before SPEZIALE, C. J., and PETERS, HEALEY, ARMENTANO and SHEA, JJ. ARTHUR H. HEALEY, Associate Justice.

This action seeking an injunction and a declaratory judgment was reserved for the advice of this court on a stipulation of the following facts. On October 14, 1979, the defendant Christopher Gode, a minor child of the defendant John H. Gode, Jr., was a passenger in a car operated by Timothy Dolan which was involved in a two-car accident in Clinton. At the time of the accident, the defendant Christopher Gode resided in the household of the defendant, John H. Gode, Jr. As a result of the accident, Christopher Gode was seriously injured and has been paid $20,000 by Timothy Dolan's liability insurance carrier. This was the entire limit of the insurance liability policy on the Dolan automobile and is the minimum liability insurance required by General Statutes §§ 38-175b and 14-112(a).

The damages from the injuries sustained by Christopher Gode, which include the loss of sight in one eye, could exceed $20,000. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff, Nationwide Insurance Company, had in force an automobile liability policy covering the two automobiles owned by the defendant, John H. Gode, Jr. A premium was paid to the plaintiff for insurance on each of the two vehicles covered under the policy. This policy provided the minimum uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $20,000 for each person and $40,000 for each accident.

The defendant Christopher Gode was within the definition of an "insured" under the insurance policy as a relative living in the household of the defendant John H. Gode, Jr. On February 19, 1980, the defendants made a claim against the plaintiff for additional payments under the uninsured motorist provision of their policy. The plaintiff denied the defendants' claim and on April 8, 1980, the defendants filed for arbitration of the claim with the American Arbitration Association. The parties have agreed to refrain from proceeding with the arbitration proceeding pending a determination of two questions by this court. ¹

The questions reserved for the advice of this court are: (1) Was the Dolan vehicle "underinsured" under § 38-175c(b)(2) of the General Statutes? (2) For the purposes of determining the applicability of § 38-175c(b)(2) of the General Statutes, was the liability coverage on the Dolan automobile "less than the applicable limits of liability under the uninsured motorist portion" of the Gode policy? The determination of the second of these questions is decisive of the issues presented.

The basic issue presented is whether, under our statutes, an insured can aggregate or "stack" ² the uninsured motorist coverage limits of liability applicable to each motor vehicle covered by his policy to determine whether he can claim underinsured benefits as provided by General Statutes § 38-175c(a) and (b)(2). The defendants claim that the Dolan auto was "underinsured" in that the limit of liability on that auto was less than the "applicable limits of liability under the uninsured motorist portion" of their policy with the plaintiff. General Statutes § 38-175c(b)(2). They contend that since they received only $20,000 from Dolan's insurer and since the aggregate of their uninsured motorist coverage on both vehicles totals $40,000, they are entitled to claim an additional $20,000 as "underinsured motorist benefits." The plaintiff claims that the defendants cannot "stack" or aggregate the limits on their two uninsured motorist coverages in order to determine any underinsured motorist benefits because the defendants are limited, by statute, to the highest level of coverage purchased on any one automobile. Since the defendants' uninsured motorist coverage on both automobiles was for the same amount as the liability coverage on the at-fault vehicle, i.e., $20,000, the plaintiff alleges that no underinsured motorist claim will lie.

General Statutes § 38-175c, as amended by Public Acts 1979, No. 79-235, provides in relevant part: "(a) Every such policy shall provide insurance, herein called uninsured motorist coverage, in accordance with such regulations, with limits for bodily injury or death not less than those specified in subsection (a) of section 14-112, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles or of insured and underinsured motor vehicles .... (b) .... (2) For the purposes of this section, an 'underinsured motor vehicle' means a motor vehicle with respect to which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the applicable limits of liability under the uninsured motorist portion of the policy against which claim is made under subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of this section." ³ The 1979 amendment to the statute added subsections (b)(1) and (2) and the reference to the underinsured motor vehicle coverage contained in § 38-175c(a). The purpose of this amendment was to remedy the "anomalous situation" which we noted in Roy v. Centennial Ins. Co., 171 Conn. 463, 475, 370 A.2d 1011 (1976), and Simonette v. Great American Ins. Co., 165 Conn. 466, 471, 338 A.2d 453 (1973), ⁴ where an injured party could find himself in a better position if the tortfeasor had no liability insurance than if he had only the statutory minimum amount. See also State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 38 Ill.App.3d 709, 348 N.E.2d 491 (1976) (injured insured not able to recover under his uninsured motorist coverage because tortfeasor's insurer had paid out limits of liability to other injured victims). The legislative history behind Public Acts 1979, No. 79-235 elucidates this legislative intent.

In the senate proceedings, ⁵ Senator James J. Murphy, Jr., commented: "Mr President, what this bill does is require that hereafter, when one has purchased uninsured motorist coverage, that if that coverage exceeds any insurance coverage which a responsible party has in causing injuries, that once the liability insurance of the so-called responsible or negligent party has been exhausted, if there is additional coverage under one's uninsured motorists plan, then payment under that program would be triggered and allow for the greater recovery for the insured ...." 22 S.Proc., Pt. 5, 1979 Sess., p. 1354. In the house of representatives, Representative Silvio A. Mastrianni stated: "Mr. Speaker, the present law requires automobile liability policies provide a minimum uninsured motorist protection in the amount of $20,000 per person and $40,000 per accident. The law further states, Mr. Speaker, an insured may purchase higher limits of uninsured motorist protection not to exceed the limit of bodily injury liability coverage purchased on the policy. An uninsured vehicle is generally defined as a vehicle to which no bodily injury bond or policy applies at the time of the accident. Mr. Speaker, this bill requires coverage be provided against the underinsured motorist. It also requires [the] insurance company of an innocent driver to pay up to the full amount of the uninsured motorist coverage when the at fault driver's insurance has been exhausted and a deficiency remains. Mr. Speaker, I move the passage of this bill as amended by Senate Amendment 'A'." 22 H.R.Proc., Pt. 16, 1979 Sess., p. 5341. ⁶ While the legislative purpose may be clear upon an examination of these comments, we can find no indication in the amendment's history as to the legislature's view concerning the "stacking" of coverages.

We now turn to the actual language of the statute, which, the plaintiff claims, is determinative of the issues presented. The plaintiff points to the legislature's selective use of singular and plural terms contained in the definition of "underinsured motor vehicle" to support its argument. The plaintiff contends that § 38-175c(b)(2)'s use of the phrase "sum of the limits of liability under all ... insurance policies applicable" (emphasis added) to describe the yardstick against which the insured's uninsured motorist coverage is measured clearly implies a singular, non-aggregated meaning to the phrase "applicable limits of liability under the uninsured motorist portion of the policy against which claim is made ..." which describes that coverage. The plaintiff concludes by stating: "If the statutory language had said 'policies,' the position advocated by defendants herein might have some slight credibility. Since 'policy' is singular, however, it is apparent that the wording is designed to carry out the intent of the legislature and of the proponents of the bill as previously noted; namely, that 'underinsured' coverage refers only to the purchase of higher limits of coverage, and not to the purchase of multiple policies with minimum coverage. When the language of the statute is clear and unequivocal, there is no need for statutory construction."

We cannot agree with the plaintiff. "In interpreting the meaning of a statute, we attempt to determine the intent of the legislature as expressed by the common and approved usage of the words in the statute. General Statutes § 1-1(a); Waterbury Teachers Assn. v. Furlong, 162 Conn. 390, 406, 294 A.2d 546 [1972]; Hartford Electric Light Co. v. Water Resources Commission, 162 Conn. 89, 100, 291 A.2d 721 [1971]. General Statutes § 1-1(f) provides that '[w]ords importing the singular number may extend and be applied to several persons or things and words importing the plural may include the singular.' " Winchester v....