Rivera Fernandez v. Chardon
Decision Date | 08 May 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 80-1237,80-1237 |
Citation | 648 F.2d 765 |
Parties | Rafael RIVERA FERNANDEZ, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Carlos CHARDON, etc., et al., Defendants, Appellees. * . |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Sheldon Nahmod, Chicago, Ill., with whom Hiram R. Cancio, Harry R. Nadal-Arcelay, Jaime R. Nadal-Arcelay, Blanca I. Mera-Roure, Jesus R. Rabell-Mendez and Cancio, Nadal & Rivera, San Juan, P. R., were on briefs, for plaintiff, appellant, Rafael Rivera-Fernandez, Angel L. Arzon-Mendez, Ramon A. Vega Cruz, Laura L. Santos-Roa, Angel L. Allende-Velazquez, Evelyn Irizarry-Escobar, Enrique Diaz-Maldonado, Jose D. Nieves-Rivera, Aida L. Sanchez De Negron, Herminia Ortiz-Ortiz, Jose R. Munoz-Rivera, Eduardo Tarafa-Gonzalez, Gladys Rosado-Acevedo, Roberto Velazquez-Nieves, Sara Velazquez-Concepcion, Cecilio Alvarez-Plajas, Enrique Rosado-Alverio, Julia Martinez Vda. De Calderon, Saquia Azize-Mawad, Isaias Torres-Sanchez, Miguel Alvelo-Rodriguez, Irma L. Baldoni De Valencia, and Manuel Rosas-Lebron.
Roberto L. Cordova, San Juan, P. R., with whom Brown, Newsom & Cordova and Ines Equia Miranda, San Juan, P. R., were on brief, for defendants, appellees.
Before CAMPBELL, BOWNES and BREYER, Circuit Judges.
Each of these 23 cases raises the issue of when the statute of limitations began to run on an employee's claim that he or she was wrongfully demoted or fired because of political affiliation: the precise question is whether the limitations period began upon receipt of advance notification of demotion or discharge, or whether it dated from the time the employee stopped working at the job from which he or she was removed.
The plaintiffs in these 23 cases were all employed during the 1976-1977 school year as non-tenured administrators in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Department of Education. The plaintiffs were all active members of the Popular Democratic Party which was in power in Puerto Rico in the fall of 1976. A gubernatorial election was held in that year, in which a candidate of the New Progressive Party was elected. In March 1977 the new governor appointed defendant Carlos Chardon as Assistant Secretary of Public Education in charge of personnel. Sometime between June 3 and June 17, 1977, each plaintiff received a letter advising him or her that "the appointment to the position you now occupy expires with the termination of the present school year." The letters received by 20 of the plaintiffs indicated that they would be reinstated to tenured positions they had previously held as teachers or lower level administrators. The other three, who had not previously held tenured positions, were told that their employment with the Department would cease. Each of the 23 letters indicated a date, between June 30 and August 8, when the action would take effect. The plaintiffs responded, most within a few days of receiving the notice, by a letter to defendant stating that "I am not in agreement with your decision To this effect I have remitted copy of the same to the Puerto Rico Teachers Association so that said organization may instruct its Legal Division to take the necessary action." The demotions and terminations all occurred as scheduled.
On June 19, 1978, one Jose Ortiz Rivera, another Department of Education employee who had suffered similar treatment, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ortiz Rivera claimed that the action had been taken because of his political affiliation, in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. He purported to represent a class of over 100 persons, including these 23 plaintiffs. Class certification was denied, and each of these plaintiffs then filed a separate complaint, making essentially the same substantive allegations. The district court dismissed all 23 complaints on the ground that they were barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to section 1983 actions under 31 L.P.R.A. § 5298(2).
On appeal, the parties are agreed that section 5298 is the applicable statute of limitations, 1 and that the present actions were commenced, for limitations purposes, on June 19, 1978, when Ortiz Rivera filed his complaint. If the one-year limitations period began to run when plaintiffs received notice of demotion or discharge (in each case before June 19, 1977), the current actions are untimely (unless the statute was interrupted, see note 2, infra ). However, if the limitations period began later, when the demotion or discharge took effect (in each case after June 19, 1977), the present cases are not time barred. We hold that plaintiffs' cause of action accrued, and the limitations period began, on the date when the demotions or discharges took effect. 2
Since section 1983 fixes no limitations period of its own, federal courts in section 1983 actions apply the limitations period provided by state law for the most closely analogous type of action, along with any state tolling rules. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980). When the cause of action accrues, however, is a question of federal law. Rubin v. O'Koren, 621 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980); Briley v. State of California, 564 F.2d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 1977); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975); Kaiser v. Cahn, 510 F.2d 282, 285 (2d Cir. 1974). Cf. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464, 67 S.Ct. 1340, 1341, 91 L.Ed. 1602 (1947) ( ); Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96, 98, 61 S.Ct. 473, 474, 85 L.Ed. 605 (1940) (same). In the instant cases, the district court held that a cause of action accrues "when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." The court found that the plaintiffs knew of the harm when they received the letters more than one year before the suit was filed. The court relied on two federal cases, United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) ( ) and Mitchell v. Hendricks, 431 F.Supp. 1295 (E.D.Pa.1977) ( ). In both of these cases, the plaintiff had no reason to know of the physical harm underlying his claim until sometime after it had occurred. The rule of accrual at the time of notice therefore served to extend, rather than to shorten, the limitations period. Similarly, a rule based on notice was applied to extend the limitations period in Lavallee v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1980) ( ); Briley v. State of California, 564 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1977) ( ); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975) ( ); and Young v. Clinchfield Railroad, 288 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1961) ( ).
We are aware of only one case which has applied this rule prospectively, Bireline v. Seagondollar, 567 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842, 100 S.Ct. 83, 62 L.Ed.2d 54 (1979). In that case a nontenured university instructor was notified in May 1970 that her contract would not be renewed at the end of the 1970-71 school year. Citing Cox v. Stanton and Young v. Clinchfield Railroad, the court held that the instructor's cause of action under section 1983 had accrued when she received notice, even though her termination had not yet occurred. The court did not discuss the policies underlying the notice rule, nor did it explicitly consider whether those policies should properly be applied where notice precedes the challenged action. 3
In Egleston v. State University College at Geneseo, 2 Cir., 535 F.2d 752 (1976), the Second Circuit took the opposite view on similar facts. The plaintiff, a non-tenured faculty member, was notified in May 1972 that her contract, due to expire in June 1973, would not be renewed. In her suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the court held that June 1973 was the crucial date, since her "primary grievance is rooted in her discharge," and "Appellant's discharge was consummated only when she left the university or, possibly, when a replacement was hired." Id., at 755. 4
Four other circuits have indicated agreement with Egleston, although in none of these cases was the same issue directly presented for decision. Rubin v. O'Koren, 621 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980) ( ); Kryzewski v. Metropolitan Government, 584 F.2d 802, 806 (6th Cir. 1978) ( ); Bonham v. Dresser Industries, 569 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821, 99 S.Ct. 87, 58 L.Ed.2d 113 (1978) ( ); Moses v. Falstaff, 525 F.2d 92, 95 (8th Cir. 1975) ( ). See also Greene v. Carter Carburator Co., 532 F.2d 125, 127 (8th Cir. 1976) (Title VII claim).
We think the court in Bireline, and the district court in the present cases, misconstrued the notice rule. In our view, that rule has developed as a safeguard against unfairness to plaintiffs who, through no fault of their own, are unaware of their injuries until after the tortious...
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