U.S. v. Moore

• Decision Date: 29 July 2011
• Docket Number: 05–3064.,Nos. 05–3050,05–3051,05–3054,05–3053,05–3052,s. 05–3050
• Citation: 397 U.S.App.D.C. 148,651 F.3d 30
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appelleev.Rodney L. MOORE, also known as Rasoo, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

651 F.3d 30

397 U.S.App.D.C. 148

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee

v.Rodney L. MOORE, also known as Rasoo, Appellant.

Nos. 05–3050

05–3051

05–3052

05–3053

05–3054

05–3064.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued March 24, 2011.Decided July 29, 2011.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:00–cr–00157).Stephen C. Leckar, appointed by the court, John Kenneth Zwerling, Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, and Charles A. Murray argued the cause for appellants. With them on the briefs were A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, and Deborah A. Persico, appointed by the court.Leslie Ann Gerardo, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, Roy W. McLeese III and Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and Angela M. Miller, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney.Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and ROGERS ¹ and KAVANAUGH, ² Circuit Judges.Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.Opinion concurring in part in Part I filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.PER CURIAM:

+-----------------+
                ¦Table of Contents¦
                +-----------------+
                

                I.     Batson                                                           40
                

      A.   Batson   Framework                                           40
                      B.   Strike–by–Strike Analysis                                    42
                

                II.    Stun Belts                                                       44
                III.   Anonymous Jury                                                   48
                IV.    Prosecutorial Misconduct                                         50
                

      A.   Opening and Closing Arguments                                50
                      B.   Overview Witness                                             54
                      C.   Cumulative Error                                             61
                

                V.     Rule 404(b) Evidence                                             63
                VI.    Brady                                                            64
                VII.   Statute of Limitations                                           65
                VIII.  Joinder                                                          68
                IX.    Confrontation Clause                                             69
                X.     Jencks Act                                                       74
                XI.    Religious Conversion Testimony                                   75
                

                XII.   Testimony Of Steve Graham                                        76
                XIII.  Destruction Of Evidence                                          78
                XIV.   Multiple Conspiracies Instructions                               78
                XV.    Moore's Conviction for Continuing Criminal Enterprise            80
                XVI.   Merger Of Moore's Murder Convictions                             81
                XVII.  Exclusion of Antoine Ward Confession                             81
                XVIII. Smith's Conviction for Murder of Anthony Dent                    83
                XIX.   Smith's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim                  85
                XX.    Conspiracy Withdrawal Instruction                                89
                XXI.   Aiding and Abetting Instruction                                  90
                XXII.  Severance                                                        94
                XXIII. Handy's New Trial Motions                                        96
                

      A.   Sufficiency of Evidence                                      97
                      B.   Brady                                                        98
                

                XXIV.  Conclusion                                                       102
                

Six defendants appeal from judgments of conviction in the district court on multiple charges, including drug conspiracy, RICO conspiracy, continuing criminal enterprise, murder, and other related charges in violation of federal and District of Columbia laws. They assert a wide variety of alleged errors covering, among other things, evidentiary issues, both as to admission and sufficiency; conduct of the trial; prosecutorial misconduct; and jury instructions. Upon review, we conclude that most of the asserted errors either were not erroneous or were harmless. As to one category of issue involving alleged violations of the Confrontation Clause of the Constitution, a Supreme Court decision intervening between the trial and our consideration of the case compels us to remand convictions of some drug charges (Counts 126–138) for further consideration by the district court in light of the Supreme Court's opinion. We also remand for further proceedings a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised by appellant Smith (Counts 4 and 5). We vacate one murder conviction as to appellant Moore that, as the parties agree, merges with another conviction (Count 32).

* * *

According to the indictment in the district court and the evidence of the United States at trial, during the late 1980s and 1990s, appellants Rodney Moore, Kevin Gray, John Raynor, Calvin Smith, Timothy Handy, and Lionel Nunn, along with others, some of whom were also indicted but tried separately, conspired to conduct and did conduct an ongoing drug distribution business in Washington, D.C. In the course of conducting that business, various of the co-conspirators committed a wide-ranging course of violence including 31 murders. The United States obtained a 158–count superseding indictment upon which the defendants were tried by a jury. After a trial lasting over ten months, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on several of the charges, including the drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. § 846, the RICO conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), continuing criminal enterprise (Moore and Gray), 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)-(b), murder, D.C.Code § 22–2401, –3202; D.C.Code § 22–2101; 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 1512, assault with intent to murder (Moore and Gray), D.C.Code § 22–503, –3202, illegal use of a firearm (Moore, Gray, Raynor, Handy, and Nunn), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), distribution of cocaine base and heroin (Gray), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), possession with intent to distribute heroin (Raynor), id., and tampering with a witness (Handy), 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). The trial court entered judgment imposing substantial criminal sentences generally amounting to terms in excess of life imprisonment from which the defendants now appeal.

Further details of the facts, evidence, and proceedings will be set forth as necessary for the discussion of the issues raised by appellants.

I.³

The Constitution's equal protection guarantee bars prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the basis of race. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In this case, although 9 of the 12 jurors were African–American, appellants argue that the prosecution unconstitutionally used its peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors who were African–American. The district court rejected appellants' challenge. We affirm the district court's decision.

A Batson challenge proceeds in three steps: First, the defendant must establish “a prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection by the totality of the relevant facts about a prosecutor's conduct during the defendant's own trial.” Second, “the State [must] come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging jurors within an arguably targeted class.” Third, the “trial court then will have the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.” Miller–El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). In the district court, appellants argued that the prosecution's use of 34 peremptory strikes to remove African–Americans from the venire for regular jurors established a prima facie case of discrimination. Accepting that the prima facie hurdle was cleared, the district court required the prosecution to explain each of its peremptory challenges of African–Americans. After the prosecution provided those explanations, the district court required further argument from both sides as part of Batson's final stage. The court allowed the defense counsel to dispute the validity of each government explanation and required the prosecution to individually respond to the defense's argument on each disputed strike. The court actively engaged in the entire process, consulting its notes and correcting and questioning counsel. At the conclusion of the multi-hour hearing, the district court ruled that appellants had not “established purposeful discrimination.” Miller–El, 545 U.S. at 239, 125 S.Ct. 2317; see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (“[T]he ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.”).

In this court, appellants dispute the district court's conclusion that there was no Batson violation.

A.

Appellants' challenge to the district court's Batson decision faces a demanding standard. “On appeal, a trial court's ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous.” Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008). The Supreme Court has emphasized that the “trial court has a pivotal role in evaluating Batson claims.” Id. The Court has explained that the demeanor of the prosecutor exercising a challenged strike is often “the best evidence of discriminatory intent.” Id. (alterations omitted). The district court, unlike this court, observed the prosecutor's demeanor firsthand. Further, when the asserted basis for a strike is a prospective juror's behavior in court, the trial court will have observed and evaluated that juror's demeanor as well. See id. For those reasons, the Supreme Court has stated that “in the absence of exceptional circumstances, we would defer to the trial court” in resolving a Batson claim. Id. (alterations omitted); see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365–66, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (...