Stevens v. Stevens, 93-1077
| Decision Date | 17 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-1077,93-1077 |
| Citation | 651 So.2d 1306 |
| Parties | 20 Fla. L. Weekly D696 Brenda Gayle Batton STEVENS, Appellant, v. Edward Brian STEVENS, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Wm. Bruce Muench of Wm. Bruce Muench, P.A., Jacksonville, for appellant.
Stephen H. Donohoe of Donohoe and Kendrick, Jacksonville, for appellee.
The former wife urges as error the trial court's failure to treat as a marital asset any portion of an encumbered parcel of real estate her former husband brought into the marriage; the judgment's scheme of equitable distribution generally; the amount and duration of the rehabilitative alimony the trial court awarded her; and the failure of the trial court to require her former husband to pay her attorney's fees and costs for the dissolution proceeding. We conclude that the trial court erred in failing to award the appellant all of the reasonable attorney's fees and trial costs she incurred; and in failing to award the appellant an equitable portion of the appreciated value of the non-marital real property.
At the time of his marriage to Ms. Batton, Mr. Stevens owned improved real property (the Robbie Road parcel) which he had mortgaged to secure a debt of $20,000. After the marriage, the couple lived first on the Robbie Road property, then elsewhere. During the marriage, as before, Mr. Stevens' income was the source of all mortgage payments. Mrs. Stevens did not work outside the home during the marriage. Title to the Robbie Road property remained at all times in Mr. Stevens' name only. The trial court found that the Robbie Road parcel was not a marital asset, and did not include the property or any portion of its value in the plan of equitable distribution.
Equitable distribution of marital assets should take into account the appreciated value of a non-marital asset caused by the expenditure of marital funds or labor, including the parties' management, oversight, or contribution to principal, Young v. Young, 606 So.2d 1267, 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Massis v. Massis, 551 So.2d 587, 589 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), as well as an appropriate portion of any appreciation of a non-marital asset caused by the effects of inflation and market conditions, where "some portion of the current value ... must reasonably be classified as a marital asset." Sanders v. Sanders, 547 So.2d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
An asset brought by one party to a marriage, which appreciates during the course of the marriage, solely on account of inflation or market conditions, becomes in part a marital asset, if it is encumbered by indebtedness which marital funds service. Each spouse's income is deemed marital funds. Here the trial court erred in excluding from the equitable distribution plan the entire amount by which the Robbie Road property appreciated in value during the marriage, since marital funds were used to make the mortgage payments and pay the taxes. The appreciation, if any, should be allocated between the parties by a "reasonable proration of the appreciated value." Sanders, 547 So.2d at 1016.
If a separate asset is unencumbered and no marital funds are used to finance its acquisition, improvement, or maintenance, no portion of its value should ordinarily be included in the marital estate, absent improvements effected by marital labor. If an asset is financed entirely by borrowed money which marital funds repay, the entire asset should be included in the marital estate. In general, in the absence of improvements, the portion of the appreciated value of a separate asset which should be treated as a marital asset will be the same as the fraction calculated by dividing the indebtedness with which the asset was encumbered at the time of the marriage by the value of...
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Oxley v. Oxley
...is a marital asset if the court had found that the increase was attributable in part to marital effort. 1 E.g., Stevens v. Stevens, 651 So.2d 1306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Becker v. Becker, 639 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Here, the trial court was not required to make this decision, because......
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...home due to market forces was not. The Second District affirmed but certified conflict with this court's decision in Stevens v. Stevens, 651 So.2d 1306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). In Stevens, this court had concluded that both types of increased value should be equitably distributed.Equitable dist......
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Rainforth v. Rainforth, No. A-06-1285 (Neb. App. 4/8/2008)
.... must reasonably be classified as a marital asset." Sanders v. Sanders, 547 So.2d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Stevens v. Stevens, 651 So. 2d 1306, 1307 (Fla. App. 1995). The Stevens court went on to state that "[a]n asset brought by one party to a marriage, which appreciates during the......
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Oldham v. Oldham
...or to pay taxes, the property then becomes marital even if the enhanced value is due solely to market forces. See Stevens v. Stevens, 651 So.2d 1306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). In the instant case, the record shows that the former husband maintained the land, paid the property taxes, and made cons......
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§ 7.05 Using Marital Funds to Pay a Premarital Mortgage or Using Separate Funds to Pay a Mortgage Loan Obtained During Marriage
...653 A.2d 1017 (1995) (discussing a new statute which applies to all actions filed after October 1, 1994).[216] See Stevens v. Stevens, 651 So.2d 1306 (Fla. App. 1995). See also, Stefanwitz v. Stefanowitz, 586 So.2d 460 (Fla. App. 1991). See N. 116 infra.[217] See Stefanowitz v. Stefanowitz,......