Lockwood v. Professional Wheelchair Transp., Inc., 12780
| Decision Date | 17 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 12780,12780 |
| Citation | 654 A.2d 1252,37 Conn.App. 85 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 10 IER Cases 584 Dewey LOCKWOOD v. PROFESSIONAL WHEELCHAIR TRANSPORTATION, INC., et al. |
Thomas W. Meiklejohn, with whom was Jonathan L. Gould, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Peter M. Appleton, with whom was Morton W. Appleton, Hartford, for the appellees (defendants).
Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., and Charles A. Overend and Maria C. Rodriguez, Asst. Attys. Gen., filed a brief for the State Dept. of Labor, as amicus curiae.
Before LANDAU, SCHALLER and SPEAR, JJ.
The plaintiff, Dewey Lockwood, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered, after a jury trial, on a directed verdict for the defendants, Professional Ambulance Services, Inc. (Professional Ambulance) and Professional Wheelchair Transportation, Inc. (Professional Wheelchair). The trial court denied the plaintiff's request for a directed verdict against both defendants. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1) directed a verdict for the defendant Professional Ambulance, (2) failed to direct a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant Professional Ambulance, (3) directed a verdict in favor of the defendant Professional Wheelchair, and (4) permitted the defendants to introduce evidence with respect to an issue that had already been litigated and decided against the defendants. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. Lockwood was employed by Professional Ambulance as an emergency medical technician. On May 18, 1988, he was involved in a car accident that resulted in $7000 property damage to the ambulance he was driving. Lockwood was issued a citation for driving at an unsafe speed for the conditions in violation of General Statutes § 14-218a(b).
On July 15, 1988, Lockwood was disciplined by Professional Ambulance for his involvement in the accident. He was issued a warning, suspended from work for three days, and his driving privileges were suspended for six months. After the three day suspension, Lockwood was allowed to return to work as an ambulance attendant, pending reinstatement of his driving privileges.
In June, 1988, Professional Ambulance, pursuant to its policy manual, requested that Lockwood pay it $1000, the amount of the deductible on its insurance policy. 1 Lockwood informed Professional Ambulance that he did not think that the accident was his fault and therefore did not owe the money.
In July, 1988, Lockwood appeared in court with respect to the citation for operating at an unsafe speed. Following a trial, he was found not guilty. Lockwood reported the not guilty verdict to the defendant and repeated his refusal to pay. Professional Ambulance continued to demand the $1000 from Lockwood.
In late September, 1988, Lockwood took a leave of absence from his employ with Professional Ambulance. 2 On October 11, 1988, Professional Ambulance instituted an action against Lockwood in the Small Claims Session of Superior Court seeking payment of the $1000 deductible. Lockwood denied liability and counterclaimed against the defendant for interfering with his employment with a separate corporation, Professional Wheelchair. 3 After about two weeks of employment with Professional Wheelchair, Lockwood was terminated for refusing to pay the money to Professional Ambulance.
On November 25, 1988, a trial was held in Small Claims Court. The magistrate judge rendered judgment for Lockwood on Professional Ambulance's claim for the $1000 and for Professional Ambulance on Lockwood's counterclaim of interference with employment.
In December, 1988, after his welding classes were completed, Lockwood informed Professional Ambulance that he was ready to return to work for Professional Ambulance. Harvey Kagan, principal owner and CEO of both Professional Ambulance and Professional Wheelchair informed Lockwood that he would have to pay the $1000 in order to return to work for Professional Ambulance. Lockwood reminded Professional Ambulance that the Small Claims Court had determined that he did not owe the money. Professional Ambulance continued to demand the money as a prerequisite to employment. Lockwood refused to pay the money and did not return to work for Professional Ambulance.
Lockwood filed suit against both defendants, Professional Ambulance and Professional Wheelchair. At the close of evidence, Lockwood and the defendants filed requests for a directed verdict. The trial court denied Lockwood's motion, but granted the defendants' motions and directed the jury accordingly. Lockwood now appeals from the judgment rendered on that verdict.
As a preliminary matter, we must discuss Lockwood's apparent noncompliance with Practice Book § 4059. 4 The appellant bears the responsibility of providing this court with an adequate record for review. Practice Book § 4061; see also Dime Savings Bank of Wallingford v. Cornaglia, 33 Conn.App. 549, 554-55, 636 A.2d 1370, cert. granted, 229 Conn. 907, 640 A.2d 120 (1994); State v. Rios, 30 Conn.App. 712, 622 A.2d 618 (1993). The appellant has the responsibility of ensuring that the trial court has signed a copy of the transcript when the decision has been rendered orally. Practice Book § 4059. Here, the trial court neither issued a written memorandum nor transcribed and signed its oral decision. Askinazi v. Askinazi, 34 Conn.App. 328, 333 n. 4, 641 A.2d 413 (1994); see also Lambrakos v. Carson, 74 Conn. 482, 485, 391 A.2d 142 (1978); State v. Beauton, 170 Conn. 234, 237, 365 A.2d 1105 (1976). Lockwood moved for an articulation pursuant to Practice Book § 4051. The trial court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. In its ruling, the trial court indicated that "it fully and clearly stated the reasons" for its decision when it decided the motions for directed verdict at trial. By so indicating and then signing the order on the motion for articulation, the trial court openly adopted the reasoning contained in the transcript as its findings of fact and conclusions of law. We find this to be sufficient to satisfy the purposes of Practice Book § 4059.
As a second preliminary matter, we must decide whether Lockwood has satisfied his responsibility by providing us with an adequate record with which to review this case. Practice Book § 4061; see also Barnes v. Barnes, 190 Conn. 491, 493, 460 A.2d 1302 (1983). We must determine whether the articulation, which incorporated the reasoning from the transcript, is adequate for review. If the trial court has not sufficiently articulated the factual or legal basis of its decision, the appellant may move for articulation pursuant to Practice Book § 4051, in order to ensure an adequate record for review. Lockwood did so in this case.
The trial court granted in part and denied in part the motion for articulation, essentially relying on the reasons it gave at trial for directing the verdict. The trial court's reasoning, included in the appendix of Lockwood's brief, is sufficient to provide an adequate record for review.
Lockwood first claims that the trial court improperly directed a verdict for the defendant Professional Ambulance. Lockwood argues that he was discharged in violation of public policy, where there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded that he was discharged in violation of General Statutes § 31-73(b) 5 and where Professional Ambulance demanded money from him despite a court decision that he did not owe the money. We agree.
Directed verdicts are disfavored by the courts. A directed verdict is proper only "if on the evidence the jury could not reasonably and legally reach any other conclusion than that embodied in the verdict as directed ... or if the evidence is so weak that it would be proper for the court to set aside a verdict rendered for the other party." (Citation omitted.) Boehm v. Kish, 201 Conn. 385, 389, 517 A.2d 624 (1986). In deciding a motion for a directed verdict, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 388, 517 A.2d 624.
At the close of evidence, sufficient facts existed to allow a jury to find that Lockwood was discharged from his employment with Professional Ambulance because he refused to pay the $1000. A finding of these facts by the jury would support the conclusion that Professional Ambulance terminated Lockwood in violation of public policy as set forth in § 31-73.
Section 31-73(b) provides that "[n]o employer ... acting by himself or by his agent, shall, directly or indirectly, demand, request, receive or exact any ... sum of money or contribution from any person ... upon the representation or the understanding that such ... sum of money ... is necessary to secure employment or continue in employment...." The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. It prohibits an employer from demanding any sum of money from an individual as a requirement of employment or as a requirement for continued employment.
The trial court relied on two Attorney General Opinions in limiting the application of § 31-73 to preventing "a ... kick-back ... system from being used to exact a payment from an employee to an employer in return for that employee's hiring." The trial court's interpretation of § 31-73 is not in accord with the clear language of the statute and therefore runs afoul of the well recognized rules of statutory construction adopted by our Supreme Court. See Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179, 186-87, 592 A.2d 912 (1991).
Ordinarily, the construction of a statute by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to...
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