Tran v. State of Tn
| Decision Date | 04 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | W2000-00739-SC-R11-PD |
| Citation | 66 S.W.3d 790 |
| Parties | HECK VAN TRAN v. STATE OF TENNESSEE |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by denying the petitioner's motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. In his motion, the petitioner asserted that new evidence establishes that he is mentally retarded and, therefore, ineligible for the death penalty under Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-203, which prohibits the execution of the mentally retarded. The petitioner also argued on appeal that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, 16 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibit the execution of mentally retarded individuals.
After careful consideration, we conclude that the General Assembly did not clearly intend to apply Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-203 retroactively and that the statute therefore provides no basis to reopen a post-conviction suit for a petitioner who was sentenced before its effective date. We also conclude, however, that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, 16 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibit the execution of mentally retarded individuals because such executions violate evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society, are grossly disproportionate, and serve no valid penological purpose in any case. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Tenn. R. App. P. 11; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Reversed;Remanded to Trial Court
Brock Mehler, Nashville, Tennessee, and William D. Massey, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Heck Van Tran.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Alice B. Lustre and Jennifer L. Smith, Assistant Attorneys General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
E. RILEY ANDERSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J., and ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., join. WILLIAM M. BARKER, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., joined.
In 1989 the petitioner, Heck Van Tran, was convicted of three counts of felony murder and sentenced to death on each count for his role in killing three people during a robbery at a Memphis restaurant. On appeal, this Court affirmed all three of the murder convictions and one of the death sentences. State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465 (Tenn. 1993). 1
While this case was pending on direct appeal, the General Assembly enacted Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-203 (1991), which provided in part as follows:
(a) As used in this section, "mental retardation" means:
(1) Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning as evidenced by a functional intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of seventy (70) or below;
(2) Deficits in adaptive behavior; and
(3) The mental retardation must have been manifested during the developmental period, or by eighteen (18) years of age.
(b) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, no defendant with mental retardation at the time of committing first degree murder shall be sentenced to death.
(c) The burden of production and persuasion to demonstrate mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence is upon the defendant. The determination of whether the defendant was mentally retarded at the time of the offense of first degree murder shall be made by the court.
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(e) If the issue of mental retardation is raised at trial and the court determines that the defendant is not a person with mental retardation, the defendant shall be entitled to offer evidence to the trier of fact of diminished intellectual capacity as a mitigating circumstance pursuant to 39_13_204(j)(8).
This statute became effective on July 1, 1990. 2
On March 7, 1995, Van Tran filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief that relied in part upon this statute as a basis for setting aside his sentence of death. An evidentiary hearing was conducted in October of 1997. Prior to this hearing, Dr. Andrew J. Adler, a licensed psychologist, tested petitioner using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised ("WAIS-R") 3 and a Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale. Dr. Adler testified at the post-conviction hearing in 1997 that petitioner had a full scale I.Q. of 67 and that he had deficits in adaptive behavior that had manifested during the developmental period before the age of eighteen (18). Dr. Adler concluded that the petitioner was mentally retarded as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-203(a).
Dr. Lynn Zager, a psychologist called as a witness by the State, testified that the petitioner's I.Q. was actually 72 with a standard error measurement of plus or minus three, rather than 67 as testified by Dr. Adler. Dr. Zager testified that Dr. Adler had made a clerical error in applying the conversion chart. The trial court credited Dr. Zager's testimony and dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief. The dismissal was affirmed both by the Court of Criminal Appeals and by this Court without addressing the statutory or constitutional issue of executing a mentally retarded defendant. See Van Tran v. State, No. 02C01-9803-CR-00078, 1999 WL 177560, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 1999); Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257 (Tenn. 1999).
In December of 1999, Dr. Adler again tested the petitioner's I.Q., this time using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale -Third Edition ("WAIS-III"), an updated version of the WAIS-R. Dr. Adler determined that petitioner's full-scale I.Q. is 65. Relying upon this data, petitioner filed a motion on February 7, 2000 seeking to reopen his previous post-conviction petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 40-30-217 (1997), which provides in pertinent part:
(a) A petitioner may file a motion in the trial court to reopen the first post_conviction petition only if the following applies:
(1) The claim in the motion is based upon a final ruling of an appellate court establishing a constitutional right that was not recognized as existing at the time of trial, if retrospective application of that right is required. Such motion must be filed within one (1) year of the ruling of the highest state appellate court or the United States supreme court establishing a constitutional right that was not recognized as existing at the time of trial; or
(2) The claim in the motion is based upon new scientific evidence establishing that such petitioner is actually innocent of the offense or offenses for which the petitioner was convicted; or
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(4) It appears that the facts underlying the claim, if true, would establish by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is entitled to have the conviction set aside or the sentence reduced.
The motion was accompanied by an affidavit from Dr. Adler stating both the results of the WAIS-III and Dr. Adler's conclusion that the petitioner is mentally retarded as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-203(a).
The trial court issued a preliminary order denying the petitioner's motion to reopen, and the Court of Criminal Appeals denied the petitioner's application for permission to appeal. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application for permission to appeal which this Court granted. Following oral argument, this Court entered a unanimous order directing the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing an issue of first impression for this Court: whether the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I, 16 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits executing a mentally retarded defendant. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgments of trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Although the statutory definition of mental retardation in Tennessee adopts the nationally accepted definition of mental retardation, see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 308 n.1, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2941 n.1, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989), no commentary or background is provided on the nature of mental retardation. As one writer has observed, "mental retardation is a debilitating mental defect that is understood by few and accepted by even fewer." Juliet L. Ream, Capital Punishment for Mentally Retarded Offenders: Is it Morally and Constitutionally Impermissible?, 19 Sw. U. L. Rev. 89, 106 (1990). To provide some understanding and context, we will briefly discuss the general characteristics and background of mental retardation before turning to the precise issues in this case.
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) 4 defines a mentally retarded person as one who has "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning" accompanied by "significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/ interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety." American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 39 (4th ed. 1994). Like the statutory definition, the DSM-IV requires that the intellectual and adaptive deficits manifest themselves by the time the person is eighteen years of age. Id.
The first part of the definition - subaverage general intellectual functioning - is based on Intelligence Quotient ("I.Q.") scores that are obtained through the use of standardized intelligence tests. The DSM-IV uses the following scales:
IQ of 50-55 to approximately 70: mild mental retardation
IQ of 35-40 to 50-55: moderate mental retardation
IQ of 20-25 to 35-40: severe mental retardation [and]
IQ below 20-25: profound mental retardation.
Id. at 40....
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