Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank

Decision Date21 December 2011
Docket NumberNo. 11–60102.,11–60102.
Citation665 F.3d 632,114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 118
PartiesCarol L. VAUGHN, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. WOODFOREST BANK, Defendant–Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Jim D. Waide, III (argued), Ronnie Lee Woodruff, Waide & Associates, P.A., Tupelo, MS, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Paula Graves Ardelean (argued), Butler, Snow, O'Mara, Stevens & Cannada, P.L.L.C., Ridgeland, MS, Carlyle Creswell White, Butler, Snow, O'Mara, Stevens & Cannada, P.L.L.C., Memphis, TN, for DefendantAppellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:

On February 20, 2009, Carol L. Vaughn was fired from Woodforest Bank for “Unsatisfactory Conduct.” Vaughn brought suit claiming racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Because Vaughn has presented a genuine issue of material fact concerning Woodforest's proffered reason for firing her, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment and remand for a trial on the merits.

I.

On September 9, 2008, Carol L. Vaughn, a white woman, was hired by Woodforest Bank to be the assistant manager of the soon-to-be-opened Starkville, Mississippi branch. The Starkville branch, like dozens of others throughout Mississippi and the southeastern United States, is located inside a Walmart store. During the weeks prior to the grand opening, Vaughn underwent management training and assisted Woodforest Regional Manager Misty Gaskamp in hiring four retail bankers (Rhonda Williams, Sade Gore–Burgin, Tocarra Key, and Kalliah Vickers), all black women. A New Branch Opening Team (NBOT) assisted in training employees and opening the branch. The NBOT included Linda Young, a black woman.

On the day the branch officially opened, Gaskamp fired the manager, a white male. Following an application and interview period in which Vaughn and Williams were candidates, Vaughn was promoted to Starkville branch manager in November or December 2008. Around the same time, after the NBOT had left the branch, Young returned to Starkville as the new assistant branch manager. As regional manager, Gaskamp lived in a different city in Mississippi but had ultimate supervisory responsibility for each of the Starkville branch employees and visited the branch about every three weeks.

Gaskamp approved three pay increases for Vaughn between September 2008 and February 2009 and gave Vaughn a generally positive performance evaluation on February 3, 2009. However, on February 20, 2009, Gaskamp fired Vaughn after conducting a brief “climate survey” of the Starkville branch and after a human resources representative conducted a brief follow-up investigation over the phone. Gaskamp checked the box “Unsatisfactory Conduct” on the termination form and gave the following written description as the specific reasons for firing Vaughn:

During a branch visit conducted by [Gaskamp], employees indicated concerns regarding inappropriate comments made by Carol Vaughn [and concerns about] the environment. HR conducted an investigation of the employee complaints and determined that Carol Vaughn ... made inappropriate comments in the presence of employees and customers that created a perception of racial discrimination and uncomfortable work environment due to lack of confidentiality. As a member of the Woodforest National Bank management team, it is expected that Carol uphold the highest degree of professionalism.

In her deposition, Gaskamp testified that we cannot talk about race in the workplace” and that “if you talk about race in the workplace it's racial discrimination.” She also elaborated on Vaughn's “unsatisfactory conduct,” stating that there were three “racial” occurrences that formed the basis of her decision to fire Vaughn. She described each occurrence as follows.

First, Vaughn told Williams as they watched television coverage of the Presidential Inauguration on January 20, 2009, that she wished the media would stop making President Obama's election a “black and white issue.” As part of the same occurrence, Vaughn later told Williams and Gore–Burgin that her Sunday School class had prayed that nothing would ever happen to President Obama; that the class discussed his perceived religious conversion from Islam to Christianity; and that the class hoped if anything were to happen to him it would be done by “his own people rather than “Americans.”

Second, Vaughn returned from being away from the branch and discovered that human resources was investigating an incident where Gore–Burgin allegedly used the N-word at work during a phone conversation with her husband. Later that day Vaughn told one retail banker—Key—that employees should not use the N-word at work. She stated that she had been reprimanded by a former employer for using the N-word many years before, but that she no longer used the N-word.

Third, Vaughn and Gaskamp separately interviewed two applicants in late January 2009 for a retail banker position—Amanda (last name unknown), a black woman, and Racheal Burnett, a white woman. While talking with Gaskamp after the interviews, Vaughn said that she told Burnett that she was not a “prejudiced person” and confirmed that Burnett could work with the team “as is.” Gaskamp called Vaughn's comment “extremely unprofessional.”

Other than what Gaskamp said in her deposition testimony and wrote on Vaughn's termination form, Woodforest did not document any employee or customer complaint against Vaughn or provide any other evidence of unsatisfactory conduct.

Shortly after Vaughn was fired, Woodforest promoted Young to the position of Starkville branch manager. This made the racial make-up of the branch one black manager, four black retail bankers, and one white retail banker.

Vaughn brought suit against Woodforest alleging racial discrimination under Title VII and now appeals the district court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of Woodforest.

II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 308 (5th Cir.2004). Summary judgment is proper if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Vaughn, Woodforest shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In reviewing the evidence, we draw all reasonable inferences in Vaughn's favor and do not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations. Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 896 (5th Cir.2002) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)). We also disregard any evidence favorable to Woodforest that the jury is not required to believe. Id.

III.

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to fire an employee because of the employee's race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). Moreover, an employer's action will be found unlawful if the employee can demonstrate that her race was “a motivating factor” for her firing, even if the employer was also motivated by other lawful factors. Id. § 2000e–2(m). Vaughn alleges that her race—white—was either the real reason or a motivating factor for Woodforest's decision to fire her.

We apply the modified McDonnell Douglas approach in racial discrimination cases under Title VII. Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under this approach, Vaughn must first make a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Davis v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 317 (5th Cir.2004). Then, Woodforest must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing Vaughn. Id. If Woodforest provides a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the presumption of discrimination disappears. Id. Vaughn must then “offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact either (1) that [Woodforest's] reason is not true, but is instead a pretext for discrimination (pretext alternative); or (2) that [Woodforest's] reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another ‘motivating factor’ is [Vaughn's] protected characteristic (mixed-motives alternative).” Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312 (internal marks and citation omitted). We will conduct our analysis in the order described.

A.

To make a prima facie case Vaughn must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified to be the Starkville branch manager, (3) she was fired, and (4) she was replaced by someone outside of her protected class. See Byers v. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir.2000). Woodforest does not contest that firing Vaughn because of her race would be contrary to Title VII and that Vaughn has made a prima facie case of racial discrimination.

B.

After Vaughn establishes a prima facie case, Woodforest must proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing Vaughn. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Sandstad, 309 F.3d at 897. It is a burden of production, not persuasion. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097. To meet its burden, Woodforest “must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for [Vaughn's firing].” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089. Woodforest is allowed to be incorrect in its assessment of the facts it relies on to justify firing Vaughn, but it is not allowed to have any discriminatory animus against her in making its decision. See Sandstad, 309 F.3d at 899; Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 579 (5th Cir.2003).

To meet its burden of production, Woodforest submitted Vaughn's termination form and Gaskamp's deposition testimony. The termination form provided that Vaughn had “Unsatisfactory Conduct” which was described as “inappropriate comments in the presence of...

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