Davis v. State

Decision Date09 May 1983
Docket NumberF-78-141,No. F-78-140,F-78-140
Citation665 P.2d 1186,1983 OK CR 57
PartiesCharles William DAVIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

An Appeal from the District Court, Oklahoma County; David M. Cook, District Judge.

Charles William Davis, appellant, was convicted of Murder in the First Degree, in Oklahoma County District Court, Cases No. CRF-77-2905 and CRF-77-2906. He was sentenced to death and appeals. AFFIRMED.

Robert A. Ravitz, Asst. Public Defender, Oklahoma County, Oklahoma City, for appellant.

Jan Eric Cartwright, Atty. Gen., Susan Talbot, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tomilou Gentry Liddell, Legal Intern, Oklahoma City, for appellee.

OPINION

POWERS, Special Judge:

The appellant was convicted of Murder in the First Degree and sentenced to death in Oklahoma County cases no. CRF-77-2905 and 2906. The jury assessed the death sentence after finding the following three (3) aggravating circumstances in each case: that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel; the defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person; the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person. On March 16, 1978, the Honorable David M. Cook imposed the judgments and sentences, and the sentences of death were stayed by this Court in its Order of March 23, 1978, pending the resolution of this appeal. Oral argument was heard by this Court on August 31, 1981.

The two victims of an early morning shooting on August 13, 1977, at the appellant's apartment in Oklahoma City, were Dennis McLaughlin and Robert Wayne Jones. Wounded but not killed during that same incident were Kathy Jones Rogers, also known as Kathy Jones Davis, and Henry Jones. A total of six (6) bullets were fired from the .38 caliber revolver.

Three days prior to the homicide, the same four individuals met with the appellant at a Humpty Dumpty store parking lot in Sapulpa, apparently with reference to the marital separation of Kathy Rogers and the appellant. Robert Jones and Henry Jones, Kathy's brothers, and Dennis McLaughlin, their friend, accompanied Kathy to the Sapulpa meeting.

The group then appeared at the appellant's apartment early on Saturday morning, August 13, to remove Kathy's possessions from the apartment of her estranged husband. Kathy Rogers and Henry Jones testified that the four first stopped by the Oklahoma City Police station to obtain protection in their visit to the appellant's apartment, but they were unsuccessful. After all of Kathy's property had been removed from the premises, the four returned to the apartment for a final survey, and it was at this point that the appellant shot them.

In his first proposition of error, the appellant maintains that the trial court denied him his right to present mitigation in his behalf and deprived him of due process and equal protection of the laws when the court failed to provide funds for expert witnesses or to give him a presentence investigation.

This Court has held that there is no right to State funds to hire an investigator or a psychiatrist to present mitigating factors on behalf of a defendant. Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159 (Okl.Cr.1980). The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution, but that right has not been interpreted to include expert assistance in the determination of appropriate punishment. Furthermore, the appellant's assertion that the court should have granted the requested presentence investigation report is without merit. The purpose of the presentence investigation is to provide "... a recommendation as to appropriate sentence, and specifically a recommendation for or against probation." Laws 1975, ch. 369, § 1; now 22 O.S.Supp.1980, § 982. That statute specifically excludes those cases in which the death penalty is imposed. And this Court has held that the denial of pretrial motions for a presentence investigation report and appointment of a psychiatrist in a case in which a defendant has been sentenced to death was not error under this statute. Irvin v. State, 617 P.2d 588 (Okl.Cr.1980), reaffirming Bills v. State, 585 P.2d 1366 (Okl.Cr.1978).

The appellant alleges, in his second argument, that the jury was selected in violation of the standards mandated by the United States Supreme Court. Certain jurors were excluded for cause, over the objection of defense counsel, as a result of their beliefs regarding the death penalty.

In Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held "... that a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction." 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), at 391 U.S. at 521-522, 88 S.Ct. at 1776, 20 L.Ed.2d 784-85. In a footnote to that opinion, the Court said, "The most that can be demanded of a venireman in this regard is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law, and that he not be irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge...." Footnote 21, at 391 U.S. 522, 88 S.Ct. 1777, 20 L.Ed.2d 785.

In the case before this Court, the trial court systematically asked the jurors two questions as follows:

In a case where the law and the evidence warrant, in a proper case, could you, without doing violence to your conscience, agree to a verdict imposing the Death Penalty?

If the juror's reply was negative, the court asked:

If you found beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant in this case was guilty of Murder in the First Degree, and if under the evidence, facts and circumstances of the case the law would permit you to consider a sentence of death, are your reservations about the Death Penalty such that regardless of the law, the facts and the circumstances of the case, you would not inflict the Death Penalty?

The appellant contends that in excluding several of the jurors the trial court violated the rule in Witherspoon. A review of the record indicates that Juror Rockel was properly excluded due to her inability to positively answer that she could inflict the death penalty under the appropriate circumstances. Furthermore, the following jurors were properly excluded: Hood, Childress, Silloway, Derrick and Hearst. However, the exclusion of three others requires a more thorough analysis.

The court conducted the following voir dire of Juror Metivier:

THE COURT: I ask you: In a case where the law and the evidence warrant, in a proper case, could you, without doing violence to your conscience, agree to a verdict imposing the Death Penalty?

MS. METIVIER: I have problems with that.

THE COURT: You what?

MS. METIVIER: I have problems with that.

THE COURT: You have problems with the Death Penalty? And I ask you a second question: If you found beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was guilty of Murder in the First Degree, and if under the evidence and the facts and the circumstances of the case the law would permit you to consider a sentence of Death, are your reservations about the Death Penalty such that regardless of the law, the facts and the circumstances of the case, you would not inflict the Death Penalty?

MS. METIVIER: No.

THE COURT: You would not inflict the Death Penalty in spite of the evidence, the law and the circumstances of the case? Do I understand you?

MS. METIVIER: Right.

MR. STUART: May I be allowed to ask an additional question?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. STUART: Ms. Metivier, my question, and I am asking you, do I hear you right? Are you saying that you could never impose the Death Penalty in any case? You are not saying that under a proper case, that you couldn't consider imposing the Death Penalty?

MR. COATS: I object to the form of the question, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The form of the question is improper. It is sustained.

MR. STUART: Ms. Metivier, you are not saying you would automatically refuse to impose the Death Penalty in any case, are you?

MS. METIVIER: No, I'm not.

MR. STUART: That's all I have.

THE COURT: I ask you again: If you found beyond a reasonable doubt that this Defendant was guilty of Murder in the First Degree, and if under the evidence and facts and circumstances of this case, the law would permit you to consider a sentence of death, are your reservations about the Death Penalty such that regardless of the law, the facts and the circumstances of the case, you would not inflict the Death Penalty?

The reason I repeat the question is because you answered that you would not under any circumstances inflict the Death Penalty when I first asked the question. How do you answer the question now?

MS. METIVIER: I just don't believe in taking one's life. I'm not--You know,--

THE COURT: You are excused for cause.

MR. STUART: May I approach the bench?

THE COURT: Come to the bench.

(The following proceedings were had out of the hearing of the jury.)

MR. STUART: I am going to object to excusing this Juror for cause. I will move for a mistrial on the basis of this. This Juror answered my questions of: Would you automatically refuse to impose the Death Penalty? And she said No.

THE COURT: The objection is overruled.

The Juror Metivier answered "I have problems with that" when asked if she could, in a proper case, agree to imposing the death sentence. She answered "Right" when asked if she would not inflict the death penalty in spite of the evidence, the law, and the circumstances. When that question was repeated by the Court, she answered "I just don't believe in taking one's life."

Although the Juror gave conflicting answers to questions by the Court and Counsel, her answers, when viewed in their entirety, clearly indicated her inability to consider the death sentence under any circumstances.

We now examine the excusing for cause of Juror Dragus. While...

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