Zell v. Meek
| Citation | 665 So.2d 1048 |
| Decision Date | 05 October 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 83806,83806 |
| Parties | 20 Fla. L. Weekly S515 Samuel ZELL, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. Gaylynn Sue MEEK and Barry M. Meek, Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Jack W. Shaw, Jr. and Michael J. Obringer of Osborne, McNatt, Shaw, O'Hara, Brown & Obringer, Jacksonville, for petitioners.
Christopher C. Hazelip and Clinton A. Wright, III of Rogers, Towers, Bailey, Jones & Gay, Jacksonville, for respondents.
Sharon Lee Stedman of Sharon Lee Stedman, P.A., Orlando, Amicus Curiae for Florida Defense Lawyers Association.
Arnold R. Ginsberg of Perse, P.A. & Ginsberg, P.A., Miami, Amicus Curiae for Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers.
Gaylynn Sue Meek (Meek) and her husband Barry M. Meek sought review in the district court of a summary final judgment entered against them on their claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court reversed and certified the following question as one of great public importance:
IS THE INTERVAL OF TIME BETWEEN A PSYCHIC TRAUMA AND THE MANIFESTATION OF PHYSICAL TRAUMA MERELY ONE ISSUE FOR THE TRIER OF FACT'S CONSIDERATION IN DECIDING WHETHER THE CAUSE OF ACTION RECOGNIZED IN CHAMPION V. GRAY [478 So.2d 17 (Fla.1985) ] HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED [part I]; OR IS THERE SOME ARBITRARY PERIOD AFTER WHICH THE MANIFESTATION OF PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT WILL BE CONCLUSIVELY PRESUMED NOT TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY THE PSYCHIC TRAUMA [part II]?
Meek v. Zell, 636 So.2d 105, 108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We approve the decision of the district court and answer part I of the certified question in the affirmative, but qualify our answer by holding that the interval of time between the psychic trauma and the physical manifestation is one factor in proving causation. We answer part II of the certified question in the negative and hold that the factual question of causation is to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
The facts underlying the Meeks' claim are set out in the district court opinion. Their claim is based on injuries allegedly sustained by Gaylynn Meek after she witnessed her father's death at the hands of an anonymous bomber at the father's apartment. The Meeks sued Samuel Zell (owner of the apartment complex) and First Property (apartment management company) alleging that they were negligent in failing to take reasonable steps to protect their tenants and invitees, including Meek's father, from foreseeable criminal conduct. The Meeks' complaint alleged a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
It is undisputed that Zell and First Property received bomb threats prior to the bombing but did not warn their tenants or invitees, or otherwise take any reasonable steps to provide for their safety and security against the threats. Following an overnight boating trip, Meek and her parents returned to the latter's apartment home. Upon entering, they noticed a small box on their doorstep. Meek and her mother stepped over the box and into the kitchen, leaving Meek's father behind. Immediately thereafter, a tremendous explosion rocked the entire apartment. The force of the explosion shattered windows and light fixtures and blew a smoke detector and thermostat from the wall. A glass light fixture suspended from the kitchen ceiling shattered and the debris fell on Meek and her mother. Meek screamed and then made her way through the smoke to the front door where she saw her father, who lay scorched, mutilated, and dying.
Meek did not suffer any significant physical injuries as a direct result of the smoke or shattered pieces of glass that fell on her. However, immediately after witnessing her father's death, Meek began having insomnia (for which she took prescribed medication), coupled with depression (for which she continues to take prescribed medication), short-term memory losses, an extreme fear of loud noises, bad dreams, and an inability to stop reliving the event. Within three weeks of the bombing, she began psychological treatment which continued intermittently for a period of two years with three different psychologists. Meek's sexual relationship with her husband also suffered during this time.
Approximately nine months after the bombing, Meek began experiencing physical impairment in the upper area of her stomach. Thereafter, the pain below her rib cage became worse and she became very ill, with pain spreading into her chest area. This pain was eased somewhat with prescription ulcer medication. Eventually, Meek experienced a blockage in her esophagus, was unable to swallow, and had difficulty in breathing. Meek also developed joint pain in her hips and elbows, which she treats with Ibuprofen. Meek's treating physician expressed the following opinion regarding her condition:
I have treated [Meek] for anxiety with depressed mood, orodental dysphagia [esophageal contractions], fibromyalgia [pain in hip and elbow joints], dyspepsia [stomach pains] and irritable bowel symptoms. In my medical opinion, within a reasonable degree of probability, the psychological trauma she suffered as a result of her father's death has contributed to her physical symptoms and increased [her] need for medical care. Additionally, in my medical opinion, within a reasonable degree of probability, she has suffered from insomnia and anxiety with depressed mood, with situational depression secondary to her father's death.
On this record, the district court held that under Champion v. Gray, 478 So.2d 17 (Fla.1985), the Meeks had produced sufficient evidence to entitle them to a trial on their claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In Champion v. Gray, 478 So.2d 17 (Fla.1985), we held that persons who suffer a physical injury as a result of emotional distress arising from their witnessing the death or injury of a loved one may maintain a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Prior to Champion, Florida adhered strictly to a requirement that some physical impact to a claimant must be alleged and demonstrated before the claimant could recover damages for personal injury. This rule is referred to as "the impact rule." Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So.2d 593, 595 (Fla.1974); Crane v. Loftin, 70 So.2d 574, 575 (Fla.1954). 1
The impact rule has not been without its critics and has been abolished in most jurisdictions. 2 In 1972, the Fourth District, believing that the impact rule was "at variance with modern-day needs and with concepts of justice and fair dealing," held that a plaintiff may recover for the demonstrable physical consequences of a mental or emotional disturbance caused by the negligent act of another, even in the absence of an actual physical impact to the claimant. Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So.2d 466, 472 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972), quashed, 291 So.2d 593 (Fla.1974). To support its decision, the court discussed and rejected the "three basic arguments which have served as the underlying reasons for adhering to the impact doctrine": (1) the difficulty in proving causation between the claimed damages and the alleged fright or shock; (2) the fear of fraudulent or exaggerated claims; and (3) the possible flood of litigation. Id. 3
In Stewart, the plaintiffs sued two drivers for negligently operating their motor vehicles so as to collide with each other, and then to collide with the plaintiffs' house where Jane Stewart was in bed, but not asleep. The complaint alleged that Jane Stewart suffered "shock to her nervous system which resulted in a coronary insufficiency and myocardial infarction and a left lateral cerebellar lesion." Id. at 467. The Fourth District held that these allegations were sufficient to state a claim despite the absence of any physical impact to Mrs. Stewart.
On review, however, we quashed the Fourth District's decision and reaffirmed the validity of the "impact rule," finding that there was no "valid justification to recede from the long standing decisions of this Court in this area." Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So.2d 593, 595 (Fla.1974). We cited with approval the dissenting opinion authored by Judge Reed in the district court which opined that "[t]he impact doctrine gives practical recognition to the thought that not every injury which one person may by his negligence inflict upon another should be compensated in money damages." Stewart, 271 So.2d at 477.
In Champion, we reconsidered our holding in Gilliam and our continuing strict adherence to the impact rule. Walter Champion, as personal representative of his wife's estate, brought an action for damages against a drunk driver whose negligence caused Mrs. Champion's death. The complaint alleged that a drunk driver ran his car off the road, striking and killing Karen Champion, the daughter of Walter and Joyce Champion. Karen's mother heard the impact, came immediately to the accident scene, and, upon seeing her daughter's body was so overcome with shock and grief that she collapsed and died on the spot. 478 So.2d at 18. Considering these compelling facts, we concluded:
[T]he price of death or significant discernible physical injury, when caused by psychological trauma resulting from a negligent injury imposed upon a close family member within the sensory perception of the physically injured person, is too great a harm to require direct physical contact ["impact"] before a cause of action exists.
Accordingly, in Champion, we retreated from our strict adherence to the impact rule and recognized for the first time a negligence action for physical injuries occurring without an actual impact:
We hold that a claim exists for damages flowing from a significant discernible physical injury when such injury is caused by psychic trauma resulting from negligent injury imposed on another who, because of his relationship to the injured party and his involvement in the event causing that injury, is...
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