Hudspeth v. State
| Decision Date | 04 December 1933 |
| Docket Number | Crim. 3864 |
| Citation | 67 S.W.2d 191,188 Ark. 323 |
| Parties | HUDSPETH v. STATE |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Boone Circuit Court; J. F. Koone, Judge; modified and affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Edward H. Coulter, for appellant.
Hal L. Norwood, Attorney General, and Robert F Smith, Assistant, for appellee.
The appellant, managing officer of the Citizens' Bank & Trust Company at Harrison, Arkansas, was indicted by the grand jury on a charge of knowingly accepting deposits in the Citizens' Bank & Trust Company of Harrison, while said institution was in an insolvent condition. He was also indicted on numerous other charges growing out of the bank failure. His son, also an official in the bank, was indicted as were several other officers of the banks, both in Boone County and in other counties.
At the July term, 1932, of the Boone Circuit Court, appellant filed his verified petition for a change of venue. The petition was in proper form, and supported by the affidavits of seven persons, each of whom stated that he was a qualified elector; was an actual resident of Boone County; not related to the defendant; that he had read the petition for a change of venue, and was familiar with the facts therein contained, and that he believed the statements to be true.
The petition for a change of venue was overruled without any evidence being taken. Thereafter appellant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of receiving deposits in an insolvent bank, and the cause was continued until the January, 1933, term. At the July, 1933, term, appellant filed his verified petition for permission to withdraw his plea of guilty theretofore entered, and stated that, after the court had overruled his motion for change of venue, he was approached by the officers of the court for a compromise of all the cases, those against himself, and other officers of the bank at Harrison, and the banks elsewhere. He alleged that an agreement was made between the prosecuting attorney, the court, and appellant, to the effect that all the indictments except the one in this cause should be dismissed against all the defendants upon appellant's payment of costs in each action, including a prosecuting attorney's fee of $ 25 in each ease; that no further indictments or prosecutions would be instituted in the judicial district; that appellant would enter his plea of guilty in this particular case, which plea was at said time entered; that he should receive a sentence in the penitentiary of this State for a term of one year, and that, prior to the procurement of said sentence, all the above-mentioned cases should be dismissed, and that the appellant might elect to receive his sentence at an adjourned term of court, 1932, or at the January, 1933, term of said court, at appellant's option; that at the January, 1933, term of the court, it was published in the newspaper at Harrison that the court did not intend to abide by certain portions of the agreement which had been entered into; that the agreements entered into by the officials of the court have not been performed, and the statements of officials indicated that they did not intend to perform said agreement; that appellant desired to withdraw his plea of guilty; that he was innocent of the charge, and entered said plea of guilty solely for the purpose of protecting his friends and former business associates; that he was entitled to withdraw said plea of guilty because, first, said plea was conditional; second, because the agreement, on the part of the court officials, had not been performed or kept.
After filing petition to withdraw plea of guilty, appellant filed his verified petition to disqualify the trial judge in the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty. Testimony was then taken on the motion to disqualify the judge. The trial judge denied the petition to disqualify, and denied appellant's petition to withdraw plea of guilty, and sentenced appellant to three years in the penitentiary.
The court then dismissed the cases against the parties who had been indicted in connection with the bank failure in Boone County. Motion for new trial was filed and overruled, and the case is here on appeal.
Appellant urges a reversal, first, because he says the court erred in overruling his motion for change of venue. We agree with appellant that it was error for the court to overrule the motion for change of venue. The application for change of venue was in compliance with §§ 3087 and 3088 of Crawford & Moses' Digest. Ward v. State, 68 Ark. 466, 60 S.W. 31; Spurgeon v. State, 160 Ark. 112, 254 S.W. 376.
While it was error to overrule the petition for change of venue, this error was waived, and the petition abandoned by entering a plea of guilty. The plea of guilty is wholly inconsistent with motion for change of venue. A plea of guilty waives any defect not jurisdictional, and which may be taken advantage of by motion to quash or by plea in abatement.
The right to a jury is waived also, and with, of course, the constitutional guaranties with respect to the conduct of criminal prosecutions. 16 C. J. 403, 404, § 738; People v. Popescue, 345 Ill. 142, 177 N.E. 739, 77 A. L. R. 1199; People v. Beesly, 119 Cal.App. 82, 6 P.2d 114; State v. Brinkley, 193 N.C. 747, 138 S.E. 138; Kachnic v. United States, 53 F.2d 312, 79 A. L. R. 1366.
Appellant contends that the plea of guilty was conditional. The law authorizes but three kinds of pleas to an indictment: First a plea of guilty; second, a plea of not guilty; and, third, a former conviction...
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Collins v. State
...information about the defendant, both favorable and adverse. Meyers v. State, 252 Ark. 367, 479 S.W.2d 238. See also, Hudspeth v. State, 188 Ark. 323, 67 S.W.2d 191. When the defendant appears for sentencing, he must be asked if he has any legal cause why sentence should not be pronounced a......
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Smith v. State
...prejudiced against a defendant and does not disqualify him from serving in the absence of a showing of actual prejudice. Hudspeth v. State, 188 Ark. 323, 67 S.W.2d 191; Hulen v. State, 196 Ark. 22, 115 S.W.2d 860; Ashcraft v. State, 208 Ark. 1089, 189 S.W.2d 374. No such showing was Where i......
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Weir v. United States
...140 Cal.App. 616, 36 P.(2d) 194; Miggins v. State, 170 Md. 454, 184 A. 911; Spoo v. State, 219 Wis. 285, 262 N.W. 696; Hudspeth v. State, 188 Ark. 323, 67 S.W.(2d) 191; and waives all defects not jurisdictional. Roberto v. U. S., 60 F.(2d) 774 (C.C.A.7); Kachnic v. U. S., 53 F.(2d) 312, 79 ......
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Carson v. State, 4120.
...a death sentence would be waived, as such a sentence can be imposed only upon the verdict of a jury. In the case of Hudspeth v. State, 188 Ark. 323, 67 S.W.2d 191, 192, the defendant asked to be allowed to withdraw a plea of guilty previously entered. He alleged an agreement between himself......