Owens-Ali v. Pennell

• Decision Date: 04 December 2009
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 09-556-JJF.
• Citation: 672 F.Supp.2d 647
• Parties: Ushango OWENS-ALI, Plaintiff, v. Chaplain Frank C. PENNELL, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

672 F.Supp.2d 647

Ushango OWENS-ALI, Plaintiff, v. Chaplain Frank C. PENNELL, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 09-556-JJF.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

December 4, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ushango Owens-Ali, Smyrna, DE, Pro se Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FARNAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Ushango Owens-Ali ("Plaintiff"), an inmate at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center ("VCC"), Smyrna, Delaware filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5. (D.I. 2, 3.) He appears pro se. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss the claims against Defendants Warden Perry Phelps ("Phelps"), Deputy Warden Klein ("Klein"), Matthew Dutton ("Dutton"), Jeanie E. Coventry ("Coventry"), Lise M. Merson ("Merson"), Dr. Claudia Parker ("Dr. Parker"), Debra Crapella ("Crapella"), Thomas Aiello ("Aiello"), Lieutenant Salas ("Salas"), Richard Kearney ("Kearney"), and Carl Danberg ("Danberg") as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1), and will allow Plaintiff to proceed against Defendants Chaplain Frank C. Pennell ("Pennell"), Ron Hosterman ("Hosterman"), Major Scarborough ("Scarborough"), Joe L. Kadtke ("Kadtke"), and C. Senato ("Senato"). The Court will deny without prejudice Plaintiff's Request for Counsel. (D.I. 4.)

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a Moorish American National adherent, sought a diet to accommodate his religious beliefs and dietary needs and, on July 14, 2008, requested a diet consistent with those beliefs. He alleges that he was denied his requests for a vegan/vegetarian diet between July 14, 2008 and February 6, 2009. Plaintiff submitted grievances and wrote numerous letters to Pennell, Hosterman, Scarborough, and Senato seeking the religious diet, to no avail. Plaintiff alleges that Kadtke made statements that led to the denial of his grievance.

On August 5, 2008, Plaintiff was transferred from the Howard R. Young Correctional Institutional ("HRYCI"), Wilmington, Delaware to the VCC. He alleges the transfer was in retaliation for his attempts to exercise his religious rights.

Plaintiff also submitted grievances complaining of: (1) missing legal and personal property following his transfer from the HRYCI to VCC; (2) unsanitary conditions and infested mattresses; and (3) medical staff who failed to provide adequate service, were uncooperative, and discriminatory to inmates. Plaintiff's grievances were either unresolved or returned as nongrievable.

Plaintiff sues Defendants in their individual and official capacities. He seeks injunctive relief, compensatory, and punitive damages.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma pauperis and prisoner actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir.2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his Complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (citations omitted).

An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1), a court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S.Ct. 1827; Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); see, e.g., Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir.1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an inmate's pen and refused to give it back). The Court is "especially careful when assessing frivolousness in the case of in forma pauperis complaints, for `prisoners often must rely on the courts as the only available forum to redress their grievances, even when those grievances seem insignificant to one who is not so confined.'" See Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1090.

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on 12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.1999)(applying Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Court must grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3rd Cir.2002).

"To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when its factual content allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are `merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it `stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of `entitlement to relief.''" Id. The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements." Id. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983

Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his civil rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988).

B. RLUIPA

To state a claim under RLUIPA, an institutionalized person must allege a "substantial burden on [his] religious exercise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Under RLUIPA, "[a] plaintiff-inmate bears the burden to show that a prison institution's policy or official practice has substantially burdened the practice of that inmate's religion." Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir.2007). "A substantial burden exists where: "1) a follower is forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates versus abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit; OR 2) the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs."" Heleva v. Kramer, 330 Fed.Appx. 406, 409 (3d Cir.2009) (not published) (quoting Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d at 280).

C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Plaintiff sues Defendants in their individual and official capacities, and seeks injunctive relief and compensatory damages. The claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities are essentially claims against the State of Delaware and are barred by the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity.¹ See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir.1990); see also Scott v. Beard, 252 Fed.Appx. 491, 492-93 (3d Cir.2007) (not published).

Defendants may, however, be subject to federal suit in their official capacities where a plaintiff seeks prospective, injunctive relief from an ongoing violation of federal law. Kretchmar v. Beard, 241 Fed.Appx. 863, 865 (3d Cir.2007) (not published) (citing Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir.1996); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908)). Accordingly, Defendants are immune from all claims in their official capacities except those alleging ongoing violations of RLUIPA, and of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights as protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

D. Respondeat Superior

Danberg, Phelps, Klein, and Kearney are named as defendants, apparently because of their supervisory positions. There are no allegations directed...