State v. Jenkins
| Citation | 673 A.2d 1094 |
| Decision Date | 17 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-590-M,94-590-M |
| Parties | STATE v. Kimberly JENKINS. P. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
Before the court is the petition of Kimberly Jenkins (Jenkins) for certiorari. Jenkins seeks review of a decision of an Appeals Panel (appeals panel) of the Administrative Adjudication Court (AAC) affirming an administrative trial judge's finding that Jenkins had violated G.L.1956 § 31-27-2.1 by refusing to submit to a chemical test. We deny the petition for certiorari and affirm the decision of the appeals panel. The facts and the procedural history of the case which give rise to the instant petition follow.
On May 2, 1994 Jenkins was arrested by South Kingston police and charged with several motor-vehicle offenses including, inter alia, driving under the influence of liquor 1 and refusal to submit to a chemical test.
On June 16, 1994 Jenkins was tried on the charge of driving under the influence of liquor in the District Court, wherein she filed a motion to suppress the evidence against her on the basis that the police had stopped her vehicle without probable cause. Because the police lacked probable cause to stop her vehicle, Jenkins argued, all evidence flowing from the search should be suppressed. In the District Court her motion to suppress was combined with the trial on the merits. Following a trial a District Court trial judge found Jenkins not guilty of the offense of driving under the influence of liquor. However, there is no stenographic record of the District Court proceedings, and the judgment entered by the trial judge merely states a finding of not guilty after a trial. Nevertheless, Jenkins maintains that the trial judge explicitly found that the police lacked probable cause to stop her vehicle and that, therefore, all evidence flowing from the stop was suppressed.
Subsequently, on September 14, 1994, a hearing was held in the AAC on the charge of refusal to submit to a chemical test. Prior to the hearing Jenkins moved to dismiss the charge on the basis of collateral estoppel. Jenkins argued that because the District Court trial judge found that the police had lacked probable cause to stop her vehicle and she was found not guilty of the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, the state was precluded from prosecuting her on the charge of refusal to submit to a chemical test in the AAC. Jenkins's motion to dismiss the charge was denied.
After a hearing an AAC trial judge sustained the charge of refusal to submit to a chemical test and imposed a ninety-day license suspension against Jenkins. Jenkins filed an appeal of the trial judge's finding with the appeals panel of the AAC and also sought a stay of her license suspension. The request to stay the license suspension was denied by an AAC trial judge on October 3, 1994.
Subsequently, on October 12, 1994, Jenkins filed a petition for issuance of a writ of certiorari and a motion to stay her license suspension in this court, which were granted on October 20, 1994.
In her instant petition Jenkins raises one issue. Specifically she contends that the appeals panel erred in denying her motion to dismiss the charge of refusal to submit to a chemical test. It is Jenkins's contention that her acquittal in the District Court of driving under the influence of alcohol, and the trial judge's finding that the police had lacked probable cause for the original stop, collaterally estops the state from prosecuting her for the charge of refusal to submit to a chemical test in the AAC.
This court's review of judgments of the appeals panel is authorized by G.L.1956 § 31-43-4(j), and it must conform to the standards embodied in § 31-43-4(f). Accordingly this court must determine whether the appeals panel exceeded its authority under § 31-43-4(f). The appeals panel's decision will not be reversed unless we determine that the panel "misapplied the law, misconceived or overlooked material evidence, or made findings that were clearly wrong." Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I.1993) (quoting Brum v. Conley, 572 A.2d 1332, 1335 (R.I.1990)).
As we have previously stated, "The doctrine of collateral estoppel makes conclusive in a later action on a...
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Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island
...against whom collateral estoppel is asserted is the same as or is in privity with a party in the prior proceeding." State v. Jenkins, 673 A.2d 1094, 1096 (R.I. 1996). For an identity of issues to exist, "(1) the issue sought to be precluded must be identical to the issue determined in the e......
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State v. DiStefano
...that the DUI and the refusal statutes are two separate and distinct offenses for which there is no double-jeopardy bar, State v. Jenkins, 673 A.2d 1094, 1097 (R.I.1996), there is nonetheless an important temporal distinction between the two. The offense of refusal under § 31-27-2.1 can aris......
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Bilida v. McCleod
...against whom issue preclusion is asserted or someone with whom he is in privity was a party to the prior proceeding. State v. Jenkins, 673 A.2d 1094, 1096 (R.I. 1996); E.W. Audet & Sons, Inc. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 635 A.2d 1181, 1186 (R.I. 1994); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgm......
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State v. Pacheco, 2014–229–C.A.
...refusal can be supported by evidence that is not relevant to an operator's refusal to submit to a preliminary test. See State v. Jenkins , 673 A.2d 1094, 1097 (R.I. 1996) (holding that a finding that the motorist was arrested without probable cause was unrelated and irrelevant to the issue ......
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Search and seizure
...swerving and speeding. The court held that the o൶cer had rea-sonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated. State v. Jenkins (1996) 673 A.2d 1094. Jenkins drifted over to the center line of the highway twice, and when he entered and exited a parking lot, Jenkins turned his vehicle too......