Link v. State
| Decision Date | 24 November 1993 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 92-569-M,s. 92-569-M |
| Parties | Claire I. LINK v. STATE of Rhode Island. P, B 92-0096. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This case comes before the Supreme Court on the petition for writ of certiorari of Claire I. Link (Link). Link seeks review of the order of an Appeals Panel (appeals panel) of the Administrative Adjudication Court (AAC) that sustained an appeal brought by the State of Rhode Island (state). The order of the appeals panel had reversed an AAC trial judge's dismissal of a charge of refusal to submit to a chemical (breathalyzer) test and remanded the matter for a new hearing.
The primary question is whether the appeals panel misapplied G.L.1956 (1982 Reenactment) § 31-27-2.1, P.L.1990, ch. 329, § 1, in reversing the trial judge's decision to dismiss the charge against Link. We conclude that it did not, and we affirm the decision of the appeals panel.
Although the trial judge dismissed the refusal charge without making extensive findings of fact, the following events may be gleaned from the record before this court.
On the fourth of July 1992, South Kingstown Police Officers Paul J. Horoho and Brian O'Hara responded to a car accident on Curtis Corner Road in the town of South Kingstown where they found a vehicle driven by Link with its front end "smashed against a large tree." At the scene of the accident, Officer Horoho observed that Link's eyes were bloodshot and watery, that her speech was mumbled and slow, that her breath smelled of alcohol, and that her balance was unstable. The officers therefore administered a field sobriety test which Link failed.
Officer Horoho advised Link of her "on scene DWI rights" and arrested her. Link was then transported to the South Kingstown police station where, upon arrival, she was informed of her "in station DWI rights." Subsequently, the officers asked Link to submit to a breathalyzer test. Link declined and signed a rights form that reiterated her oral refusal. She was charged in summons No. G-07685 with refusal to submit to a chemical test and with a laned-roadway violation. A law-enforcement report stating, inter alia, that Link had refused the test was prepared by Officer Horoho pursuant to § 31-27-2.1(a).
As a result, the Administrative Adjudication Division of the Rhode Island Department of Transportation, on or about July 20, 1992, issued an official order stating that, pursuant to § 31-27-2.1, Link's Rhode Island driver's license was suspended for a minimum of three months. 1
It also notified her that failure to request a hearing within fifteen days would result in final disposition of the matter. Link, through her attorney, denied the violation on July 30, 1992, and requested a hearing pursuant to § 31-27-2.1.
A hearing was scheduled for September 16, 1992. On that date, Link appeared with counsel before an AAC judge. Also present were Officers Horoho and O'Hara. At the start of the proceedings the officers were sworn in. Before they could present testimony, however, Link's counsel moved to dismiss the refusal charge. He argued that the South Kingstown police department's law-enforcement report pursuant to § 31-27-2.1 was defective because it did not reflect the true amount of the criminal/juvenile justice information systems fee (fee) imposed for refusal to take a chemical test. The report incorrectly listed the $147 fee as $115.
After listening to arguments on both sides, the hearing judge granted the motion and dismissed the refusal charge.
In response, the state, pursuant to G.L.1956 (1982 Reenactment) § 31-43-4, P.L.1992, ch. 453, § 4, filed an appeal with the appeals panel on September 16, 1992. The appeal was heard on September 30, 1992. In a decision issued on October 28, 1992, the appeals panel reversed the AAC judge and remanded the case for a new hearing. The AAC eventually scheduled the second hearing for February 2, 1993. Prior to the hearing date, however, Link filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted on December 17, 1992.
Before addressing the main issue presented on appeal, we must respond to several ancillary contentions that have been raised.
Link first contends that the appeals panel impermissibly failed to enumerate the grounds for its decision. Relying upon Levada v. Levada, 116 R.I. 600, 604, 359 A.2d 701, 704 (1976), Link maintains that the appeals panel could not disturb the AAC judge's decision without showing that the court had "overlooked or misconceived material evidence" or made findings that were "clearly wrong." Levada does not stand for this proposition, however. Rather, it requires the party seeking to disturb a trial justice's decision to show error. Id. Nothing in Levada requires an appellate court to make such a showing in its written decision. Furthermore, although the issuance of a decision without supporting reasons is discouraged, such a practice clearly comports with § 31-43-4(3), which simply requires the appeals panel, after reviewing an appeal, to file "an appropriate order " in the court records. (Emphasis added.)
Link also argues that because the appeals panel's decision states that it was written by a judge, Chief Judge Casey, who did not hear her appeal, she has been deprived of her right to due process. In support of her position, Link cites Landrigan v. McElroy, 457 A.2d 1056 (R.I.1983); Genereux v. Pelosi, 96 R.I. 452, 192 A.2d 630 (1963); and Carr v. Brown, 20 R.I. 215, 38 A. 9 (1897). These cases, however, do not sustain Link's proposition, for Link was afforded a meaningful opportunity to defend herself at the hearing before the appeals panel. Indeed, the appeals panel's order indicates that Link's appeal was considered by a panel of four judges. Section 31-43-4(1), which provides for review by a three-judge appeals panel, requires nothing more.
Although this court is unpersuaded by Link's contentions about the form and content of the written order in this case, her objections illustrate the hazards of issuing stock decisions devoid of supportive reasoning. We are of the opinion that stock decisions should be avoided and that to ensure intelligent appellate review, decisions should "articulate adequately the[ir] factual foundations and legal reasoning." Fitzpatrick v. Pare, 552 A.2d 1185, 1186 (R.I.1989).
We now focus upon the primary issue propounded on appeal.
At the AAC hearing, prior to the presentation of any evidence by either the state or Link, counsel for Link moved to dismiss the refusal charge. As grounds, he argued that because the law-enforcement report submitted to the Administrative Adjudication Division by the South Kingstown police incorrectly listed the $147 fee for refusing the breathalyzer test as $115, the report did not comport with § 31-27-2.1 and therefore required dismissal.
After listening to arguments from both parties, the hearing judge dismissed the charge. In doing so, she reasoned that past decisions of the District Court establish that the report required by § 31-27-2.1(a) must precisely disclose all the penalties that accompany refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test. Because the report at issue did not list the correct fee amount, she concluded that the charge had to be dismissed. In response, the state, pursuant to § 31-43-4(2), sought review of the decision by the appeals panel. The scope of the panel's review is delineated in § 31-43-4(6). Although we have not to date interpreted this provision, it appears substantively identical to G.L.1956 (1993 Reenactment) § 42-35-15(g), which delineates the standard for reviewing administrative agency decisions, and G.L.1956 (1991 Reenactment) § 45-24-20(d), P.L.1993, ch. 144, § 2, which presents the standard for reviewing zoning-board decisions. In determining the appeals panel's scope of review, therefore, we are guided by this court's pronouncements concerning § 42-35-15(g) and § 45-24-20(d).
In reviewing a hearing judge's decision pursuant to § 31-43-4(6), the appeals panel lacks the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. See Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Janes, 586 A.2d 536, 537 (R.I.1991). The review of the appeals panel is confined to a reading of the record to determine whether the judge's decision is supported by legally competent evidence or is affected by an error of law. Section 31-43-4(6). See Environmental Scientific Corp. v. Durfee, 621 A.2d 200, 208 (R.I.1993). In circumstances in which the appeals panel determines that the decision is "[c]learly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record" or is affected by "error of law," it may remand, reverse, or modify the decision. Section 31-43-4(6)(d) and (e). See Durfee, 621 A.2d at 208. Otherwise, it must affirm the hearing judge's conclusions. Section 31-43-4(6). See Janes, 586 A.2d at 537.
Our review of appeals panel judgments is authorized by § 31-43-4(10), and it must conform to the standards embodied in § 31-43-4(6). See Durfee, 621 A.2d at 208. This court, accordingly, must determine whether the appeals panel exceeded its authority under § 31-43-4(6). See Sawyer v. Cozzolino, 595 A.2d 242, 245 (R.I.1991). The appeals panel's decision will not be reversed unless we decide the panel "misapplied the law, misconceived or overlooked material evidence, or made findings that were clearly wrong." Brum v. Conley, 572 A.2d 1332, 1335 (R.I.1990). Pursuant to this standard of review, we next examine the opinion of the appeals panel.
The appeal panel's decision provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "Based on the testimony presented, a review of the arguments on behalf of the motorist, and a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State ex rel. Town of Middletown v. Anthony
...observed in the past, the language of 31-27-2.1 "is clear and unambiguous and should therefore be applied literally." Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I.1993). This Court has held that "the administration of [a breathalyzer] examination constitute[s] a search within the meaning of the ......
-
State v. Jenkins
...the panel "misapplied the law, misconceived or overlooked material evidence, or made findings that were clearly wrong." Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I.1993) (quoting Brum v. Conley, 572 A.2d 1332, 1335 As we have previously stated, "The doctrine of collateral estoppel makes conclus......
-
State v. Falandes
...judge finds that the law-enforcement report required by § 31-27-2.1(a) precisely enumerates all penalties imposed for refusal." 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993). In Link, a rights form stated that an imposed fee was $115, although it was actually $147. Id. at 1346-47. Despite this error, the......
-
State v. Warzeka
...to determine whether the judge's [or magistrate's] decision is supported by legally competent evidence or is affected by an error of law." Id. (citing Envtl. Sci. Corp. v. Durfee, 621 A.2d 200, 208 (R.I. 1993)). "In circumstances in which the Appeals Panel determines that the decision is cl......