Ex Parte Bessemer Bd. of Educ. Et Al.(in Re Bessemer Bd. of Educ. Et Al. v. Jean Minor).Ex Parte Ed Richardson
Citation | 271 Ed. Law Rep. 1202,68 So.3d 782 |
Decision Date | 04 February 2011 |
Docket Number | 1041932 and 1050037. |
Parties | Ex parte BESSEMER BOARD OF EDUCATION et al.(In re Bessemer Board of Education et al.v.Jean Minor).Ex parte Ed Richardson, as superintendent of the Alabama Department of Education, et al.(In re Ed Richardson, individually and as superintendent of the Alabama Department of Education, et al.v.Jean Minor). |
Court | Supreme Court of Alabama |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
David A. Sullivan, Birmingham, for petitioner Bessemer Board of Education.Troy King, atty. gen.; Reginald L. Sorrells, gen. counsel and deputy atty. gen., Alabama Department of Education; and Carl Johnson, deputy atty. gen., of Bishop, Colvin, Johnson & Kent, Birmingham, for petitioners Ed Richardson, Alabama Department of Education, Wayland Blake, Marvin Taylor, Sr., Marvin Taylor, Jr., Michael Taylor, and Alan Stevens.Charles Norton, Alabama Education Association, Montgomery; J. Cecil Gardner of Gardner, Middlebrooks, Gibbons, Kittrell, Olsen, Walker & Hill, P.C., Mobile; Candis A. McGowan of John Saxon, P.C., Birmingham; and Sam Heldman of Gardner, Middlebrooks, Gibbons, Kittrell, Olsen, Walker & Hill, P.C., Washington, D.C., for respondents.PARKER, Justice.
The Alabama Department of Education (“the Department”); Ed Richardson, as superintendent of the Department; Wayland Blake, as the appointed chief financial officer of the Bessemer School System; Marvin Taylor, Sr., Marvin Taylor, Jr., and Michael Taylor, as appointed financial officers of the Bessemer School System; and Alan Stevens, as the appointed chief administrative officer of the Bessemer School System (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the State defendants”) (case no. 1050037),1 and the Bessemer Board of Education (“the Bessemer Board”) and its members in their official capacities (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the Bessemer Board defendants”) (case no. 1041932) separately appealed the trial court's order in favor of Jean Minor, a teacher in the Bessemer School System. Because the trial court's order is not final and the Bessemer Board defendants and the State defendants are seeking review of an order denying their claims of immunity, we treat the appeals as petitions for a writ of mandamus. In case no. 1041932, we deny the Bessemer Board defendants' petition in part and grant it in part, and, in case no. 1050037, we deny the State defendants' petition in part and grant it in part.
Facts and Procedural History
In March 2000, the Alabama State Board of Education assumed control over the finances of the Bessemer School System. The State Board of Education authorized Richardson, as superintendent of the Department, to appoint a chief financial officer for the Bessemer School System under § 16–6B–4, Ala.Code 1975. Richardson appointed Blake to that position. In May 2000, the Alabama Legislature enacted § 16–22–13.1, Ala.Code 1975, which provided percentage pay increases for public-education employees based on the employee's number of years of experience. The pay increases were effective for the fiscal year beginning October 1, 2000. At that time, Minor was employed as a teacher by the Bessemer Board. Under the statute, Minor's years of experience entitled her to a 5.5% pay increase. Marvin Taylor, Sr., an appointed financial officer of the Bessemer School System, determined the method to be used in calculating the salary increases for the teachers employed by the Bessemer Board, and the teachers were paid accordingly. On March 11, 2004, the State Board of Education returned all financial control of the Bessemer School System to the Bessemer Board.
In 2001, Minor, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated employees, sued the State defendants and the Bessemer Board defendants, claiming that her statutory pay raise had been miscalculated.2 Minor sought backpay for the 2000–2001 fiscal year and sought to have the amount of her pay recalculated for ensuing years. Minor also made a general allegation that she had been denied “due process of law” and requested “relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including attorneys' fees per 42 U.S.C. § 1988.”
The Bessemer Board defendants and the State defendants moved to dismiss the complaint or for a summary judgment. They contended that they are entitled to immunity from Minor's action and that the teachers' pay increase was computed correctly. Minor also moved for a summary judgment.
On March 8, 2005, the trial court entered an order dismissing all claims against the Bessemer Board defendants on the basis of sovereign immunity. On March 11, 2005, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Marvin Taylor, Sr., Marvin Taylor, Jr., Michael Taylor, and Wayland Blake on the bases of sovereign immunity and qualified immunity. On March 29, 2005, the trial court entered an order in the case-action summary declaring that the March 8, 2005, order should be considered a “final order” as to all claims and all parties.
On April 6, 2005, Minor moved “to alter or amend the judgment.” On April 23, 2005, the trial court granted Minor's motion, entered a judgment in favor of Minor, and vacated “the judgment(s) previously entered in this case during March 2005.”
In the April 23, 2005, order, the trial court recognized that “the [Bessemer Board] as a legal entity is and always has been the employer and the entity with the legal obligation to pay [Minor] the correct salary.” The trial court explained that based on Alabama Agricultural & Mechanical University v. Jones, 895 So.2d 867 (Ala.2004), the Bessemer Board defendants were not entitled to immunity because, it reasoned, the Bessemer Board had no discretion to refuse to pay Minor the appropriate salary increase under § 16–22–13.1, Ala.Code 1975, and because Minor was seeking “a liquidated measure of money.” The trial court held that “the claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities do not need to be addressed; those claims are moot, in that no additional relief would be awarded against the individual-capacity defendants that is not being awarded against the [Bessemer Board] and the defendants in their official capacities.” The trial court ordered
The trial court also noted that
3
The order did not specifically mention the State defendants.
On May 9, 2005, the Bessemer Board defendants filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the April 23, 2005, order. On May 23, 2005, the State defendants filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the April 23, 2005, order. The trial court did not rule on either motion.
On September 23, 2005, the State defendants moved to amend the trial court's April 23, 2005, order nunc pro tunc to reflect whether the trial court's March 11, 2005, order remained a final order as to the State defendants. That motion stated that the April 23, 2005, order appeared to enter a judgment against only the Bessemer Board defendants. The trial court did not rule on that motion.
On September 21, 2005, the Bessemer Board defendants filed a notice of appeal to this Court from the trial court's April 23, 2005, order (case no. 1041932). The State defendants filed a notice of appeal to this Court from that same order on September 30, 2005 (case no. 1050037).4 We have consolidated those appeals for the purpose of writing one opinion, and as stated earlier we are treating the appeals, which challenge an order denying claims of immunity, as petitions for a writ of mandamus.
Standard of Review
The standard of review applicable to a petition for a writ of mandamus is well settled:
“
Ex parte Inverness Constr. Co., 775 So.2d 153, 156 (Ala.2000). In reviewing a trial court's application of the law to undisputed facts, we apply a de novo standard of review. Ex parte J.E., 1 So.3d 1002, 1008 (Ala.2008).
Discussion
The Bessemer Board defendants and the State defendants argue that the trial court erred in refusing to grant them immunity from liability in Minor's action against them. Minor responds that the appeals should be dismissed because, she says, the trial court's April 23, 2005, order did not constitute a final judgment and, thus, was not appealable.
We agree that the trial court's April 23, 2005, order did not constitute a final judgment, but, because they challenge an order denying a claim of immunity, we are treating the appeals as petitions for a writ of mandamus.5
This Court has held that the manner in which a party styles its request for relief is not...
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