THE AMARANTH
| Decision Date | 15 January 1934 |
| Docket Number | No. 131.,131. |
| Citation | 68 F.2d 893 |
| Parties | THE AMARANTH. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Louis Halle, of New York City (Milton R. Kroopf, of New York City, on the brief), for appellant.
Thomas E. Dewey, U. S. Atty., of New York City (George R. Pfann, Asst. U. S. Atty., of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.
Before L. HAND, SWAN, and AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judges.
On April 3, 1929, the United States filed a libel of information to forfeit 885 cases of gin, which were thereupon arrested upon mesne process and brought into the custody of the court. The libel, as later amended, alleged that on September 17, 1927, within four leagues of the United States, a Coast Guard officer seized on board the British auxiliary schooner Amaranth the gin in suit, of which the libelant had kept possession thereafter; that before the seizure the officer demanded of the Amaranth's master his manifest, which he failed to produce, although the vessel was bound to the United States; and that the cargo was consigned to her master, mate, super-cargo, or owner, and was not included in any manifest on board. The claimant appeared, made claim, and filed an answer on June 1, 1929, alleging among other things that the Amaranth was more than four leagues off the coast when seized. Thus the cause stood until December 10, 1932, when both parties stipulated that a decree of forfeiture might be entered, as though upon the verdict of a jury after a trial; upon which stipulation such a decree was entered on December 13, 1932. On January 24, 1933, the claimant procured an order to show cause why he should not be relieved of the stipulation and have the cause set down for a trial. This motion he supported by a petition alleging only that he had been mistaken in the law applicable; that he had thought the seizure lawful because the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 USCA § 1001 et seq.) superseded the Treaty of 1924 with Great Britain (43 Stat. 1761); but that the decision of the Supreme Court in Cook v. U. S., 288 U. S. 102, 53 S. Ct. 305, 77 L. Ed. 641, had just held the contrary. On the return day the judge denied the motion and the claimant appeals from that order.
Cook v. U. S., supra, did indeed hold that the Treaty with Great Britain of 1924 survived the Tariff Act of 1930, and that the United States had no power to overhaul and seize British ships more than an hour's sailing distance from shore. It held further that the treaty limited the power of the United States, no matter who of its officers seized the vessel; and that for this reason those decisions were inapposite in which the United States had been allowed to ratify a seizure made by an unauthorized person. In those cases the ratification was valid because the principal had the essential power; here the principal had divested itself of all power and the seizure was inevitably unlawful. Thus the libel at bar did not state a cause of forfeiture, for it did not appear what was the speed of the Amaranth, or where within four leagues she was overhauled. The claimant might have successfully excepted to it. But nevertheless the court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter and it had possession of the res, which was the equivalent of personal jurisdiction in a transitory cause of action. Though the decree ought not to have been entered, because under the allegations the property should not have been brought to its custody at all, nevertheless, when entered, it was not a nullity. Swift & Co. v. U. S. 276 U. S. 311, 326, 48 S. Ct. 311, 72 L. Ed. 587. Indeed, the defect did not go as deep into the jurisdiction of the court as in cases depending upon diversity of citizenship, where, though that fact be absent from the judgment roll, or even affirmatively disproved, the judgment itself is immune from collateral attack. McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192, 6 L. Ed. 300; Kennedy v. Georgia Bank, 8 How. 586, 611, 12 L. Ed. 1209; Evers v. Watson, 156 U. S. 527, 533, 15 S. Ct. 430, 39 L. Ed. 520; Cutler v. Huston, 158 U. S. 423, 15 S....
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