680 P.2d 762 (Wash. 1984), 48781-2, State v. Pam

Docket Nº:48781-2.
Citation:680 P.2d 762, 101 Wn.2d 507
Opinion Judge:ROSELLINI
Party Name:The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Isaac Lee PAM, Petitioner.
Attorney:Seattle-King County Public Defender, Michael Filipovic, Rosemary P. Bordlemay, Seattle, for petitioner., Norman K. Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Joanne Maida, Jennifer Eychaner, Deputy Pros. Attys., Seattle, for respondent.
Judge Panel:WILLIAM H. WILLIAMS, C.J., and STAFFORD, UTTER, BRACHTENBACH, DOLLIVER, DORE, DIMMICK and PEARSON, JJ., concur.
Case Date:May 10, 1984
Court:Supreme Court of Washington
 
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Page 762

680 P.2d 762 (Wash. 1984)

101 Wn.2d 507

The STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.

Isaac Lee PAM, Petitioner.

No. 48781-2.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

May 10, 1984

[101 Wn.2d 508] Seattle-King County Public Defender, Michael Filipovic, Rosemary P. Bordlemay, Seattle, for petitioner.

Norman K. Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Joanne Maida, Jennifer Eychaner, Deputy Pros. Attys., Seattle, for respondent.

ROSELLINI, Justice.

Petitioner Isaac Lee Pam challenges a Court of Appeals decision which allows the State to retry him on habitual criminal charges. We reverse. State v. Pam, 31 Wash.App. 692, 644 P.2d 722 (1982).

On May 16, 1980, petitioner was convicted of first degree robbery and second degree assault. These convictions were affirmed in State v. Pam, 98 Wash.2d 748, 659 P.2d 454 (1983). The special weapon findings were vacated, however, and Pam's case was remanded for resentencing.

Following his conviction, the State filed a supplemental information charging Pam as a habitual criminal. The information contained three counts alleging prior convictions. Count 1 involved defendant's 1969 guilty plea to forgery in the first degree. Count 2 alleges that defendant pleaded guilty, in 1974, to violating the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. In count 3, the State presented evidence that defendant had been convicted of robbery in 1968.

Pam challenged the present use of the guilty pleas and, prior to trial, he moved to dismiss counts 1 and 2. Pam asserted that these guilty pleas were constitutionally infirm. He cited two defects in the pleas. As to count 1, Pam contended that he had not been advised of the maximum term for the offense. As to count 2, Pam contended that he had neither been advised nor did he understand his constitutional right to remain silent. [101 Wn.2d 509]

To prove the constitutionality of the pleas, the State subpoenaed Pam's prior defense attorneys. Pam moved to quash the subpoena, asserting that communications with former attorneys are protected by the attorney-client privilege. The trial court denied the motion to quash, ruling that the privilege did not apply.

At this point, the proceedings were continued to the next day, when the prosecutor announced that the attorneys were present and that the public defender's office had refused to honor the subpoena for the pertinent files. Pam's attorney in the first...

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