State v. Pam

Decision Date10 May 1984
Docket NumberNo. 48781-2,48781-2
PartiesThe STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Isaac Lee PAM, Petitioner.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Seattle-King County Public Defender, Michael Filipovic, Rosemary P. Bordlemay, Seattle, for petitioner.

Norman K. Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Joanne Maida, Jennifer Eychaner, Deputy Pros. Attys., Seattle, for respondent.

ROSELLINI, Justice.

Petitioner Isaac Lee Pam challenges a Court of Appeals decision which allows the State to retry him on habitual criminal charges. We reverse. State v. Pam, 31 Wash.App. 692, 644 P.2d 722 (1982).

On May 16, 1980, petitioner was convicted of first degree robbery and second degree assault. These convictions were affirmed in State v. Pam, 98 Wash.2d 748, 659 P.2d 454 (1983). The special weapon findings were vacated, however, and Pam's case was remanded for resentencing.

Following his conviction, the State filed a supplemental information charging Pam as a habitual criminal. The information contained three counts alleging prior convictions. Count 1 involved defendant's 1969 guilty plea to forgery in the first degree. Count 2 alleges that defendant pleaded guilty, in 1974, to violating the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. In count 3, the State presented evidence that defendant had been convicted of robbery in 1968.

Pam challenged the present use of the guilty pleas and, prior to trial, he moved to dismiss counts 1 and 2. Pam asserted that these guilty pleas were constitutionally infirm. He cited two defects in the pleas. As to count 1, Pam contended that he had not been advised of the maximum term for the offense. As to count 2, Pam contended that he had neither been advised nor did he understand his constitutional right to remain silent.

To prove the constitutionality of the pleas, the State subpoenaed Pam's prior defense attorneys. Pam moved to quash the subpoena, asserting that communications with former attorneys are protected by the attorney-client privilege. The trial court denied the motion to quash, ruling that the privilege did not apply.

At this point, the proceedings were continued to the next day, when the prosecutor announced that the attorneys were present and that the public defender's office had refused to honor the subpoena for the pertinent files. Pam's attorney in the first case, took the stand; Pam objected, asserted the attorney-client privilege, and the prosecuting attorney responded:

MRS. MAIDA: I don't wish to put Mr. Sayre in any difficult position. I realize we are just trying to make a record to preserve the record for the appellate court, but I think the Court understands my position the fact that a person being previously convicted of a crime is not a privileged matter because it took place in court. It is a matter of public record and it was just an informational question which would have led up to my asking the ultimate question in this case but with that objection being stated I'll move on to another question.

THE COURT: Very well.

MRS. MAIDA: I would assume the Court would sustain it in order to preserve this record.

THE COURT: All right, I'll sustain it.

Q (By Mrs. Maida) Mr. Sayre, as I indicated, I don't wish to put you in any difficult position, and we are just making a record at this point. In regards to Cause No. 51386 and your representation of the defendant, Mr. Pam, did you advise him the maximum term which he would serve for which a person charged with first degree forgery might legally receive?

MR. SEDNEY: Objection on all the same grounds, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. We will rule in the same manner for the reasons previously noted in order to merely protect and make the record. Sustain the objection.

(Italics ours.) Report of Proceedings, at 31-32.

The attorney then volunteered that he intended to assert the privilege. The next defense counsel did likewise with similar statements being made by counsel and the trial judge.

The court then inquired about the status of the case and the prosecutor responded:

MRS. MAIDA: Your Honor, I indicated prior to the recess that we took this morning that I would be willing to proceed with the matter independent of any privilege that is raised by the defense. I still feel that I have enough information here beyond a reasonable doubt that would convince this Court of the validity of these convictions and therefore I am proceeding now with the habitual criminal proof aspect of this trial. I would like to have the Court entertain receipt into evidence of certain documents.

THE COURT: Okay.

MRS. MAIDA: I do have a detective available to testify to the admission of certain documents, and so for the purpose of calling him now, I would like to--he would be called out of the normal order of evidence the way I would normally present it. I would like to get him on the stand so that we could excuse him.

Report of Proceedings, at 40.

Following the State's presentation, the trial court found that the State was unable to prove that Pam had been advised of the consequences of his guilty pleas. Consequently, the judge granted defense motions to...

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  • State v. Studd
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • April 1, 1999
    ...invited error doctrine "prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on appeal." State v. Pam, 101 Wash.2d 507, 511, 680 P.2d 762 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Olson, 126 Wash.2d 315, 893 P.2d 629 (1995). For example, in Pam the State had i......
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    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • January 8, 2015
  • State v. Henderson
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • June 14, 1990
    ...an error at trial and then complaining of it on appeal. State v. Boyer, supra. The present case does exactly that. State v. Pam, 101 Wash.2d 507, 511, 680 P.2d 762 (1984). Under these circumstances, we hold that: ... (2) any error in connection therewith was invited error and cannot be comp......
  • State v. Mak
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • April 24, 1986
    ...386 U.S. 1042, 87 S.Ct. 1501, 18 L.Ed.2d 610 (1967); State v. Byrd, 25 Wash.App. 282, 287, 607 P.2d 321 (1980).117 State v. Pam, 101 Wash.2d 507, 511, 680 P.2d 762 (1984); State v. Kincaid, 103 Wash.2d 304, 314-15, 692 P.2d 823 (1985).118 State v. Burri, 87 Wash.2d 175, 182, 550 P.2d 507 (1......
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2 books & journal articles
  • § 4.3 Superior Court Decisions that May Be Appealed
    • United States
    • Washington State Bar Association Washington Appellate Practice Deskbook (WSBA) Chapter 4 Appeal and Discretionary Review
    • Invalid date
    ...suppression order followed by an order dismissing the charges, the state must appeal and assign error to both orders. State v. Pam, 101 Wn.2d 507, 680 P.2d 762 (1984); State v. Fortun, 94 Wn.2d 754, 626 P.2d 504 (1980). However, the court held that it will overlook the state's technical vio......
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • Washington State Bar Association Washington Appellate Practice Deskbook (WSBA) Table of Cases
    • Invalid date
    ...564 (1993): 11.7(1)(a)(ii) State v. Paine, 69 Wn. App. 873, 850 P.2d 1369, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1024 (1993): 11.3(1) State v. Pam, 101 Wn.2d 507, 680 P.2d 762 (1984): 4.3(14)(b) State v. Pappas, 176 Wn.2d 188, 289 P.3d 634 (2012): 12.8(14) State v. Parkes, 174 Wn. App. 1070 (2013): 23.3......

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