State v. Libberton, 5701
| Decision Date | 23 April 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 5701,5701 |
| Citation | 141 Ariz. 132,685 P.2d 1284 |
| Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Lawrence K. LIBBERTON, Appellant/Cross-Appellee. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer III, Jack Roberts and David R. Cole, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee/cross-appellant.
James Hamilton Kemper, Phoenix, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Appellant, Lawrence Libberton, was convicted of first degree murder, A.R.S. § 13-1105, aggravated robbery, A.R.S. § 13-1903, kidnapping, A.R.S. § 13-1304, and theft, A.R.S. § 13-1802, all in connection with the same incident. Appellant was sentenced to death for the murder conviction. He was also sentenced to terms of imprisonment of 15 years for the aggravated robbery, 21 years for the kidnapping, to be served consecutively to the aggravated robbery sentence, and 5 years for the theft, to be served consecutively to the kidnapping sentence. The case was automatically appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3), A.R.S. § 13-4031, and A.R.S. § 13-4035. We affirm.
In addition to our independent review of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the sentencing judge, our proportionality review, and our review of the record for fundamental error, six issues confront us:
1. whether appellant was denied his right to a unanimous jury verdict because the jury was given only guilty and not guilty verdict forms for the murder charge even though appellant was charged alternatively with premeditated murder and felony murder 2. whether appellant's death sentence is invalid because the sentencing judge did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant killed, intended to kill or attempted to kill;
3. whether appellant was denied his right to trial by jury because Arizona's death penalty statute empowers the trial judge to find aggravating and mitigating circumstances;
4. whether Arizona's death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it fails to provide sentencing judges with guidelines on how to balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances;
5. whether the trial court committed fundamental error by admitting evidence of appellant's absence from a Department of Corrections work furlough program; and
6. whether the aggravating factor set forth in A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(7)--the defendant committed the offense while in the custody of the Department of Corrections--applies to appellant. (This issue was urged by the state on cross-appeal.)
In the early morning hours of November 17, 1981, the victim, Juan Maya, picked up a hitchhiker, Martin Norton. Norton, a 14-year-old, lived with a friend, Steven James, in a mobile home trailer located in Phoenix. Maya drove to the trailer and, according to Norton, made homosexual advances. Norton resisted and told Maya he should go in the trailer because there was a homosexual there who could satisfy Maya's desires. Maya entered the trailer, which was occupied at the time by James and the appellant, Libberton. Norton told James that Maya was gay and to get rid of him. James then kicked Maya in the crotch, and Maya left the trailer and ran. James and appellant pursued Maya and brought him back to the trailer. Norton testified that Maya's nose and mouth were bleeding when he was brought back to the trailer.
Once again in the trailer, Norton, James, and appellant took turns hitting Maya in the face. Maya pleaded with them to take his car and credit cards and quit hitting him. James had a gun in his hand and took Maya's wallet. From the wallet, appellant obtained the title to Maya's car, and forced Maya to sign the title over to appellant. James took Maya's bracelet and ring. Appellant put on Maya's belt, which had Maya's name engraved on the back, and said, "[n]ow that I own Juan Maya's car I might as well be Juan Maya."
The three assailants then discussed, in Maya's presence, what to do with Maya. James said "[t]he only thing we can do is kill him." Appellant agreed. Next, James suggested the three could hide the body in a mine shaft on his parents' property in Salome. Appellant agreed, and at gunpoint forced Maya into Maya's car. Appellant kept the gun pointed at Maya all the way to Salome, approximately a two-hour drive from the trailer. On the way, James bought gas and cigarettes with one of Maya's credit cards. Later, along the highway to Salome, a police officer stopped the car for speeding. James, the driver, got out of the car and talked with the officer. Appellant threatened to shoot Maya if he said anything. James got back in the car and the group proceeded to Salome.
The group arrived at James' parents' property shortly before daybreak. Appellant handed the gun to James who ordered Maya to walk up the side of a small mountain to the mine shaft. Maya requested and was allowed to smoke a cigarette. The assailants stood by Maya, allowing him to finish his cigarette, before beginning the final assault. When Maya finished his cigarette, James ordered Maya to step to the shaft, a hole about five feet in diameter with a beam across the top. Maya screamed "[d]on't kill me." James fired at Maya twice from less than five feet. (Only sparks and no bullets came out of the gun because, as established at trial, the gun was filled with debris.) Maya ran at James, grabbed the gun, struggled with James, and fell to the ground. Appellant grabbed a five-pound rock and began beating Maya on the back of the head and shoulders with it. Maya was still struggling with James for the gun. Norton handed appellant a board, with which appellant struck Maya on the back, forcing Maya to let go of the gun. James then shot in the direction of Maya's head. As before, only sparks came out of the gun. Maya was still conscious, making "gurgling sounds," and moaning. Appellant grabbed the gun from James and fired it at Maya's head. Again, the gun malfunctioned. Maya was still not dead, so all three assailants picked up large rocks and slammed them on the back of Maya's head as Maya lay face down. After about five blows Maya lay unconscious. Appellant and James dragged Maya to the mine shaft and threw him in.
Back in the car appellant and James told Norton that if he told anyone they would kill him. The three then returned to Phoenix. James told Norton to clean the trailer and remove Maya's blood from the couch. That morning appellant and James picked up a David McIntosh in Maya's car. The three assailants and McIntosh drove around. Appellant bought some shoes with one of Maya's credit cards. At noon the three assailants were captured when appellant attempted to get a cash advance of $20 on Maya's MasterCard.
Appellant argues that he was denied his right to a unanimous jury verdict as guaranteed by Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 23 because he was charged alternatively with premeditated murder and felony murder but the jury was given verdict forms only of "guilty of first degree murder" and "not guilty of first degree murder." In State v. Encinas, 132 Ariz. 493, 496-97, 647 P.2d 624, 627-28 (1982), we decided this issue contrary to appellant's position. We have affirmed our position since then, see State v. Berndt, 138 Ariz. 41, ---, 672 P.2d 1311, 1315 (1983); State v. Smith, 136 Ariz. 273, 277, 665 P.2d 995, 999 (1983), and continue to do so today.
Appellant claims that his death sentence is invalid because the sentencing judge did not, in compliance with Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), and as adopted by this court in State v. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, 199, 665 P.2d 70, 81 (1983), determine beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill. Because appellant was sentenced before we decided McDaniel, the trial court did not have the benefit of that case when pronouncing sentence. Similarly, the trial court in McDaniel sentenced the defendant before we adopted Enmund. Nevertheless, in McDaniel we reviewed the record and independently concluded that the defendant had in fact killed the victim. As in McDaniel, in the present case the record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Enmund is satisfied.
In finding that the mitigating circumstance listed in A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(3) 1 did not exist, the sentencing judge stated that "[t]he defendant was one of the individuals who actually committed the offense and was not found guilty by reason of being legally accountable for the conduct of another person ...." Appellant correctly points out that this finding was not made beyond a reasonable doubt.
After reviewing the record we agree with the trial court that appellant's participation in the murder was not minor. Rather, appellant actively participated in the murder. At the trailer appellant agreed with James that the only thing to do was to kill Maya. Appellant also agreed to hide Maya's body in the mine shaft. Appellant pointed a gun at Maya during the trip to Salome, and when the police officer stopped the car, appellant threatened to shoot Maya if he said anything. At the mine shaft, while Maya was struggling with James, appellant struck Maya first with a rock and then with a board. As Maya lay still on the ground, appellant pointed and fired a gun at Maya's head from close range. Appellant then slammed large rocks onto Maya's head. Finally, appellant helped throw Maya into the mine shaft. These facts establish beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intended to kill Juan Maya.
Appellant urges that he was denied his right to trial by jury because Arizona's death penalty statute unconstitutionally empowers the trial judge to find aggravating and mitigating factors. See A.R.S. § 13-703. We have rejected this contention and continue to do so. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 137 Ariz. 504, 506, 672 P.2d 169, 171 (1983).
Appellant asserts that Arizona's death penalty statute is...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Fierro
...also State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 694 P.2d 222, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1143, 105 S.Ct. 2689, 86 L.Ed.2d 706 (1985); State v. Libberton, 141 Ariz. 132, 685 P.2d 1284 (1984). The defendant does not have to intend to kill beforehand to satisfy the statute. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. at 36, 734 P.2d a......
-
State v. Lavers
...State v. James, 141 Ariz. 141, 685 P.2d 1293, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990, 105 S.Ct. 398, 83 L.Ed.2d 332 (1984); State v. Libberton, 141 Ariz. 132, 685 P.2d 1284 (1984). Additionally, we have reviewed one recent case that involved the same three aggravating factors found to exist in this cas......
-
Henderson v. State
... ... State, supra. Other states have found automobiles to constitute "something of pecuniary value," State v ... Page 859 ... Libberton, 141 Ariz. 132, 685 P.2d 1284, 1291 (1984), as well as the desire to establish "a remunerative drug-dealing network and [the] need to establish a ... ...
-
State v. Cook
...Ariz. 142, 161, 692 P.2d 991, 1010 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111, 105 S.Ct. 2347, 85 L.Ed.2d 864 (1985); State v. Libberton, 141 Ariz. 132, 139, 685 P.2d 1284, 1291 (1984)). We held that the fact the defendant was in the bank to commit a robbery "infect[ed] all other conduct." LaGrand......