Taylor v. Gilmartin, 81-1215
| Decision Date | 30 July 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-1215,81-1215 |
| Citation | 686 F.2d 1346 |
| Parties | Walter Robert TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kevin M. GILMARTIN, Michael E. Trauscht, Wayne N. Howard, Freedom of Thought Foundation, Inc., Joseph Alexander, Esther Alexander, and Gary Scharff, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
John C. McMurry, Oklahoma City, Okl. (Martha McMurry, Oklahoma City, Okl., with him on the brief), for plaintiff-appellant.
William A. Johnson, Sanders, Boone & Johnson, Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendants-appellees Gilmartin, Freedom of Thought Foundation, Inc., Joseph Alexander, Esther Alexander, and Gary Scharff.
John B. Hayes, Looney, Nichols, Johnson & Hayes, Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendant-appellee Trauscht.
Albert R. Vermeire, Monbleau, Vermeire & Turley, Phoenix, Ariz., for defendant-appellee Howard.
Before DOYLE and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges, and ANDERSON, District Judge *.
Appellant seeks reversal of several judgments which grow out of the entry of summary judgments.
The actions arise out of alleged civil rights and common law claims. The former arise under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983, 1985(2) and (3). The complaint describes conspiracy to commit legal malpractice, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment and conspiracy to commit assault and battery. The appeal is pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The essence of the case is an attempted religious deprogramming effort together with the means which were employed to accomplish the objective. The charges revolve around the particular circumstances which led up to the deprogramming, the actual techniques which were employed in an effort to persuade the subject to abandon the religion which he had adopted.
All of this commenced when Taylor took up residence in the monastery of the Holy Protection of the Blessed Virgin Mary, a local religious organization, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Appellant had reached the age of 21 when the deprogramming effort occurred. Taylor's parents were opposed to his joining the religion and in July of 1976 they took the action which led to this cause. They employed an organization called the Freedom of Thought Foundation, a corporation which carries on the business of deprogramming religious zealots. Deprogramming is a process of attempting a psychological shock treatment on members of non-mainstream religious sects in an effort to sever their involvement with a religious cult lifestyle.
As part of the program, appellant's father, through Freedom of Thought, applied to the Oklahoma County District Court to be appointed as "temporary" guardian of the appellant. Appellees Howard and Trauscht, lawyers for Dr. Taylor, the father of appellant, visited Judge John A. Benson, an Oklahoma state district judge who was "... the right of (Plaintiff's) father and ... family to know (Plaintiff) decided ... to spend the rest of (his) life away from them secluded in a monastery ... probably overrides any individual right (Plaintiff) might possibly have on a temporary basis ... to be free from ... custody." PX 1 at p. 52.
temporarily assigned in Oklahoma City, and conferred with him ex parte. They asked him to hear the case. Benson contacted the Probate Judge who would ordinarily hear such a matter and obtained permission to hear it. Only after that was the petition for a guardianship filed. Judge Benson ordered the temporary guardian of plaintiff's person be appointed in order to determine whether plaintiff was under the influence of a religious cult. Judge Benson said that he wanted the plaintiff taken into custody "so that (plaintiff) could be given notice of a (permanent) guardianship hearing." Plaintiff was at the monastery when the deputies came for him. He offered no resistance. The hearing occurred before Judge Benson as soon as Taylor was brought in to court. Although Judge Benson found him to be normal, he formally entered an "order appointing Taylor's father as Temporary Guardian of the Person." The reason for the Judge's action was
The July 15, 1976 order also provided:
1. Notice of the time and place of hearing is not required.
2. Dr. Walter Taylor is appointed the Temporary Guardian of the Person of Petitioner's child, to-wit: Walter Robert Taylor and that temporary Letters of Guardianship issue.
3. The Temporary Guardian of the person shall have power to: (a) take said proposed ward into Petitioner's personal custody to have proposed ward counselled, examined, and treated by persons including, but not limited to physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers and lay persons; (b) to keep said ward in Petitioner's custody, even in the event said ward wishes to leave said custody; and (c) such further powers as are necessary to exercise those above granted.
4. Further hearing in this matter will be held at August 13, 1976 at 3:00 P.M. at which time the ward is directed to show cause if any the ward has, why the Petitioner, Dr. Walter Taylor should not be appointed permanent Guardian of the ward's person,
On the basis of the order heretofore cited plaintiff was taken that same day, that is July 15, 1976, from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma to Akron, Ohio. He was not examined by physicians or psychiatrists. The only examination occurred on July 24 which was performed by Dr. Gilmartin, a psychologist, with apparently some experience in treating cult members. Taylor was held for approximately one week in Akron where he was kept at a motel and under constant guard. There followed the deprogramming. Taylor testified that he was abused in the following manner:
1. The defendants yelled at him constantly.
2. The deprogrammers worked in shifts or crews.
3. They said that they would have him tracked down by the state patrol if he escaped; that they would have him thrown in jail and deprogrammed in jail.
4. The deprogrammers threatened to have the police close down plaintiff's monastery; to have the temporary guardianship made permanent and to have the deprogramming continue indefinitely, to have plaintiff committed to a mental institution and to beat him.
5. He was deprived of sleep and was told that he would be subject to shock treatment. He suffered severe gastritis, diarrhea and abdominal cramping and when he complained, the deprogramming seemed to intensify.
6. They threw cold water on him, shined a light in his eyes, tore his clothing off, cut his hair and beard and they told him they called friends and religious leaders from a list plaintiff had given them of people who would vouch for him, and they stated that the friends reported his religion was not legitimate. The deprogrammers indicated the pressure would cease if plaintiff would renounce his religion.
On July 23rd or 24th, 1976, plaintiff was taken from Akron to Phoenix, Arizona, where apparently his mother was staying. He was held, still under guard, for the rehabilitation phase of the deprogramming. However, he escaped July 31, 1976 and returned to Oklahoma City and to the seminary. He has been there ever since. The record does not indicate that any effort was made to remove him from the seminary after this. Subsequently, Taylor instituted this present suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma against not only the deprogrammers, but also his parents and his brother. However, the Taylor family members were dismissed by an agreement prior to trial. The deprogrammers remain.
In his complaint Taylor sought damages compensatory and punitive. On December 30, 1978 the trial judge entered an order dismissing the § 1983 claim on the ground that the complaint failed to allege that the defendants acted under color of state law. The court rejected the defendants' contention that use of the Oklahoma state court for Dr. Taylor's appointment as temporary guardian and plaintiff's seizure by local police was tantamount to state action. The reason was that the Oklahoma judge and the police were ruled not to be members of any conspiracy with defendants, in that they did not share common goals; neither were they charged as defendants. However, on the same day the court granted partial summary judgment dismissing the claim for conspiracy to violate Taylor's civil rights pursuant to § 1985(3). The lower court noted that in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) the Supreme Court held that § 1985(3) encompassed a private conspiracy to violate thirteenth amendment rights and the right to interstate travel. However, the claim below failed because, as the court saw it, Congress did not have the power to reach a private conspiracy to violate rights protected under the fourteenth amendment. The judge rejected plaintiff's argument that § 5 of the fourteenth amendment provided the Congressional power.
A third cause of action was dismissed on December 30 of the same year. This was the legal malpractice claim against Wayne Howard and Michael Trauscht. Taylor's claim was that Howard and Trauscht, as attorneys, participated in experimental psychological treatment on plaintiff, filed an illegal guardianship proceeding in Arizona and lied to the Oklahoma court. The lower court found no attorney-client relationship between these defendants and Taylor and continued that this, as a matter of law, could not result in liability.
On December 28, 1979 the trial court granted a partial summary judgment for defendants on the conspiracy cause of action with respect to obstructing justice pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). The court's reasoning was the same as in the order on the § 1985(3) conspiracy claim. The orders entered on December 30, 1978 and December 28, 1979 were made applicable to all defendants by the order of July 8, 1980.
The matter of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which was also charged in the complaint, was disposed of on directed verdict. The court said that reasonable minds could not differ that defendants' conduct was not so extreme...
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