Thomas v. Lee, S10A0584.

• Decision Date: 01 March 2010
• Docket Number: No. S10A0584.,S10A0584.
• Citation: 691 S.E.2d 845
• Parties: THOMAS v. LEE et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

691 S.E.2d 845

THOMAS v. LEE et al.

No. S10A0584.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 1, 2010.

Duffy & Feemster, Stanley E. Harris, Jr., Savannah, for appellant.

Brown, Readdick, Bumgartner & Carter, Richard K. Strickland, Paul M. Scott, Brunswick, for appellees.

MELTON, Justice.

Following termination of her employment as an administrative assistant in the office of A. Mark Lee, the Solicitor-General of Effingham County (County), Angela Denise Thomas brought suit against Lee and the Effingham County Board of Commissioners (Board). In this action, Thomas contended that, because she had a property interest in her employment triggering due process rights, she was entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling Lee and the Board to hold a hearing pursuant to County policies prior to her termination. Lee and the Board filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted based on a determination that Thomas had no property interest in her continued employment by Lee.¹ Thomas now appeals this ruling, and we affirm.

The record shows that, on June 21, 2005, Thomas was fired for sending an email to a public forum in which she disparaged the Effingham County Sheriff's Department. This act apparently violated Effingham County policies, and Lee wrote Thomas a letter basing her termination on this fact. Thomas later requested a termination hearing pursuant to County policies, but Lee and the Board denied her request. In response, Thomas filed this lawsuit against Lee and the Board, contending that: (1) her due process rights to her employment under the civil service system had been violated, (2) Lee had tortiously interfered with her employment contract, and (3) she was entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling Lee and the Board to hold a termination hearing.² In the court below, Lee and the Board filed a motion to dismiss Thomas' claims, contending that, because Lee never requested that Thomas be placed in the civil service system by written application, Thomas was an at-will employee of Lee. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that Thomas was neither an employee of the County, nor the civil service system. As a result, she had no property interest in her employment, and her claims had no merit.

The trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss on this basis.

In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, an appellate court must construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the appellant with all doubts resolved in the appellant's favor. A motion to dismiss should only be granted if the allegations of the complaint, construed most favorably to the plaintiff, disclose with certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts. Stated somewhat differently, a motion to dismiss should not be granted unless the movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought.

(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Ewing v. City of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 652, 653(2), 642 S.E.2d 100 (2007).

All of Thomas' claims must fail in this case if there is no manner in which she may have a property interest in her employment as an employee of the County covered by its civil service system.

To establish such a claim, Thomas must show that she had a protected property interest in her employment. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2706, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). "State law determines whether a public employee has a property interest in his or her job." Warren v. Crawford, 927 F.2d 559, 562 (11th Cir.1991). Under Georgia law, a public employee generally has no protected property interest unless he or she is employed under a civil service system, which allows termination only for cause. Id.

Brett v. Jefferson County, 123 F.3d 1429, 1433-1434(II)(B) (11th Cir.1997).

We have previously considered the manner in which employees of elected county officials may be brought under a county civil service system in Gwinnett County v. Yates, 265 Ga. 504, 458 S.E.2d 791 (1995). There, we explained:

The power of the General Assembly to authorize by general law the creation of county civil service systems was made part of the 1983 Georgia Constitution. Art. IX, § 1, Para. IV, which preserves the distinction between county employees and the employees of elected officials, provides that the General Assembly may authorize the establishment of civil service systems by county governments "covering county employees or county employees and employees of elected county officials." The legislature again preserved this distinction between county employees and employees of elected county officials with the passage in 1986 of OCGA § 36-1-21.

Id. at 506(1)(b), 458 S.E.2d 791. In relevant part, OCGA § 36-1-21 states:

(a) The governing authority of any county is authorized to provide by ordinance or resolution for the creation of a civil service system for employees of the county, other than elected officials or persons appointed to positions for specified terms.

(b) Subsequent to the creation of a civil service system, the county governing authority which created the system may provide by ordinance or resolution that positions of employment within departments subject to the jurisdiction of elected county officers or subject to the jurisdiction of other commissions, boards, or bodies of the county shall be subject to and

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