State v. Sallie, 97-19

• Decision Date: 13 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-19,97-19
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. SALLIE, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 673

81 Ohio St.3d 673

693 N.E.2d 267

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. SALLIE, Appellant.

No. 97-19.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Feb. 3, 1998.

Decided May 13, 1998.

Craig L. Brown died on December 26, 1994, the victim of a single gunshot wound to the head. From her initial contact with the police, appellant, Shaconda M. Sallie, consistently maintained she did not intend to shoot Brown. At trial, Sallie testified she and her boyfriend, Brown, quarreled throughout Christmas day. Upon returning home from a family Christmas dinner, Sallie and Brown argued again. According to Sallie, the verbal altercation turned physical.

Sallie testified Brown grabbed her by the neck, forced her onto the couch, and began to choke her. Sallie further testified Brown "was telling [her] he didn't care if [she] could breathe and he was going to kill [her][.]" Sallie claims the two struggled until she was able to break free and run down a hallway into a storage closet. Sallie retrieved a .38 caliber revolver from the closet and, cocking the hammer, pointed it at Brown. According to Sallie, she is uncertain what happened next: Brown may have lunged at her in an attempt to gain control of the gun, causing the weapon to discharge, or Sallie may have inadvertently placed too much pressure on the trigger. What is certain, however, is that Sallie shot and killed Brown.

Despite Sallie's testimony that Brown physically abused her on several occasions during their five-year relationship, Sallie consistently claimed she did not intend to shoot Brown. The testimony of several investigating police officers supported Sallie's claim of accidental shooting, as each heard Sallie repeatedly state she did not intend to shoot Brown. In fact, Sallie said she did not know if the gun was loaded. Sallie testified she turned the gun on Brown hoping "to get out of the house. I was trying to scare him."

A jury convicted Sallie of voluntary manslaughter with a firearm specification, and the trial court sentenced her to an eight to twenty-eight year period of incarceration. After Sallie's motion for a new trial was denied, she appealed her conviction to the Lucas County Court of Appeals. The court of appeals affirmed Sallie's conviction, holding she was neither denied the effective assistance of counsel, nor prejudiced by the other trial court rulings about which she complained.

Sallie then appealed to this court, claiming that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to present expert witness testimony concerning battered woman syndrome.

The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.

Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Craig T. Pearson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Jeffrey M. Gamso, Toledo, for appellant.

COOK, Justice.

This court has stated on numerous occasions that trial counsel's performance will be examined according to the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Applying the Strickland standard to the case at bar, we hold Sallie's counsel was not ineffective in failing to present expert witness testimony on battered woman syndrome.

"In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [Sallie] must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that prejudice arose from counsel's performance." State v. Reynolds (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 674, 687 N.E.2d 1358, 1365, citing Strickland. To demonstrate she has met the first prong of the Strickland test, Sallie must show counsel's conduct was objectively deficient by producing evidence that counsel acted unreasonably. State v. Keith (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 534, 684 N.E.2d 47, 65. In order to meet Strickland's second prong, Sallie must prove that but for counsel's errors, there exists a reasonable probability the result of the trial would be different. Id.

As we explained in State v. Carter (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 558, 651 N.E.2d 965, 977:

"Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is to be highly deferential, and reviewing courts must refrain from second-guessing the strategic decisions of trial counsel. To justify a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must overcome a strong presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." (Citation omitted.)

As a result, trial counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that all decisions fall within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Thompson (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 1, 10, 514 N.E.2d 407, 417. In the instant case, we believe counsel's failure to present expert testimony on battered woman syndrome was a reasonably sound trial strategy. Moreover, review of the record does not indicate a reasonable probability that presentation of such expert testimony would have changed the outcome of Sallie's trial.

In State v. Koss (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 213, 551 N.E.2d 970, this court recognized for the first time the admissibility of testimony on battered woman syndrome. Discussing the admissibility of evidence of the syndrome, we stated:

"[A]dmission of expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome does not establish a new defense or justification. Rather, it is to assist the trier of fact in determining whether the defendant acted out of an honest belief that she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that the use of such force was her only means of escape. * * * 'A history of physical abuse alone does not justify the killing of the abuser. Having been physically assaulted by the abuser in the past is pertinent to such cases only as it contributes to the defendant's state of mind at the time the killing occurred; e.g., in that it formed the basis for the woman's perception of being in imminent danger of severe bodily harm or death at the hands of her partner.' (Emphasis sic.)" (Citations omitted.) Id. at 217, 551 N.E.2d at 974.

Expert testimony explaining battered woman syndrome, and opining that the defendant suffered from the syndrome, may be admitted to...