State v. Holeman
| Decision Date | 10 January 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 50606-0,50606-0 |
| Citation | 693 P.2d 89,103 Wn.2d 426 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. David Ross HOLEMAN, Petitioner. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Reaugh & Prescott, Carol L. Heburn, Seattle, for petitioner.
Norman K. Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Greg R. Hubbard, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.
We hold that the police cannot arrest a suspect without a warrant, absent exigent circumstances, while the suspect is standing in the doorway of his house. We further hold that a person has no right to come to the aid of another who is arrested by uniformed police officers where there is no threat of serious bodily injury to the arrestee.
Two uniformed police officers went to David Holeman's home to question him about the theft of a bicycle. David's father, Clarence Holeman, met the officers at the door and called David to the doorway. The officers, while remaining outside, questioned David as he was standing in the doorway. David denied any involvement in the theft. During the discussion, Clarence Holeman became angry and told the police they had no right to arrest David without a warrant. At this point, the officers read David his Miranda 1 rights and decided to question him at the police station despite the fact that they did not have a warrant. Both parties agree that at this point David was under arrest.
After reading David his Miranda rights, one of the officers reached through the doorway to take David by the arm, whereupon David's father grabbed a crowbar and raised it above his head in a threatening position. In response, the officers drew their guns and entered the house to disarm Clarence Holeman and place him under arrest for obstructing a public servant. 2 David and his older brother subsequently attempted to prevent their father's arrest and were also formally arrested for obstructing. At the police station, David was again advised of his Miranda rights, which he waived in writing. He then gave an oral confession and directed the police to the location where the missing bicycle was hidden.
At trial, David asserted that his arrest was illegal and, hence, his confession was inadmissible. The trial court held that the arrest was legal. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, 37 Wash.App. 283, 679 P.2d 422, held that the first attempt to take David to the police station was an illegal arrest. However, the court ruled that the subsequent arrest of David for obstructing an officer was valid and, hence, David's confession was admissible. We agree.
David was arrested twice. The first arrest took place while David was standing in the doorway of his house. The State does not contest that David was under arrest at this point in time despite the fact that the officers never told David that he was under arrest. A person is under arrest for constitutional purposes when, by a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 908, 100 S.Ct. 3051, 65 L.Ed.2d 1138 (1980). Here, when the police began reading David his Miranda rights, he was not free to leave and, as such, was under arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes.
This arrest of David was unlawful because, without a warrant and absent exigent circumstances, 3 the police are prohibited from arresting a suspect while the suspect is standing in the doorway of his house.
[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). It is no argument to say that the police never crossed the threshold of David's house. It is not the location of the arresting officer that is important in determining whether an arrest occurred in the home for Fourth Amendment purposes. Instead, the important consideration is the location of the arrestee. United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir.1984); United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753 (9th Cir.1980), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 814, 102 S.Ct. 89, 70 L.Ed.2d 82 (1981), aff'd, 457 U.S. 537, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982). A person does not forfeit his Fourth Amendment privacy interests by opening his door to police officers. State v. Counts, 99 Wash.2d 54, 659 P.2d 1087 (1983). A person's home can be invaded to the same extent when the police remain outside the house and call a person to the door as when the police physically enter the household itself. Our State Constitution guarantees that
No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.
Const. art. 1, § 7. Here the police did not have the proper authority of law; i.e., a warrant. Consequently, this first arrest of David was unlawful.
In contrast to the first arrest, the second arrest of David for obstructing a public servant was lawful. David argues that he has the right to aid his father in resisting what he believed to be an illegal arrest of his father. We do not agree. It is true that at one time in this nation's history some states allowed a person to aid a family member in what he believed was an unlawful arrest. See, e.g., People v. Gallo, 206 Misc. 935, 135 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1954); King v. State, 131 Tex.Crim. 442, 99 S.W.2d 932 (1936). However, the recent trend has been to prohibit people from interfering with an arrest that is being made by police officers. See, e.g., People v. Bailey, 108 Ill.App.3d 392, 64 Ill.Dec. 75, 439 N.E.2d 4 (1982); People v. Santiago, 69 Misc.2d 1098, 332 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1972); Gonzalez v. State, 574 S.W.2d 135 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). Our own Court of Appeals in State v. Westlund, 13 Wn.App. 460, 467, 536 P.2d 20 (1975) elaborated on why, absent a threat of serious bodily injury to the arrestee, a person is prohibited from interfering with an arrest made by a uniformed police officer:
[T]he arrestee's right to freedom from arrest without excessive force that falls short of causing serious injury or death can be protected and vindicated through legal processes, whereas loss of life or serious physical injury cannot be repaired in the courtroom....
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