Perry v. Tioga County

• Citation: 694 A.2d 1176
• Parties: Evan H. PERRY, Appellant, v. TIOGA COUNTY.
• Decision Date: 11 June 1997
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 1176

694 A.2d 1176

Evan H. PERRY, Appellant, v. TIOGA COUNTY.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Dec. 12, 1996.

Decided June 11, 1997.

Warren R. Baldys, Williamsport, for appellant.

Edith L. Dowling, Wellsboro, for appellee.

Before PELLEGRINI, and KELLEY, JJ., and MIRARCHI, Jr., Senior Judge.

MIRARCHI, Jr., Senior Judge.

Evan H. Perry (Perry) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County (trial court) granting Tioga County's (County) motion for summary judgment and dismissing Perry's complaint.

After Perry was terminated from his Maintenance Supervisor position with County, he filed an action alleging wrongful discharge and breach of his employment contract. County responded by filing preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. While the objections were pending, negotiations ensued between Perry's counsel and the County Solicitor (Solicitor).

Solicitor then prepared and sent a Release, which was unsigned by the County Commissioners, proposing to pay Perry $40,000 in exchange for his discontinuing the litigation. Perry executed the Proposed Release and returned it to the Solicitor. Thereafter, the County Commissioners refused to sign the document or otherwise ratify it at a public hearing, refused to tender the settlement monies, and alleged that Solicitor was without legal authority to make binding offers on County's behalf.

Perry amended his complaint to incorporate a third count, claiming breach of contract based upon the County's failure to execute the Proposed Release. County filed preliminary objections to the new count in Perry's complaint arguing that County could not have tendered a legitimate offer because the terms of the Proposed Release had not been approved in an open meeting, as required by the Sunshine Act, ¹ and because Solicitor was without express authority to offer settlement of the claim. The County finally argued, that even if the Proposed Release constituted a valid offer which Perry accepted, he did not discontinue the lawsuit and therefore, failed to uphold his end of the bargained-for exchange. The trial court sustained County's objections and dismissed Perry's complaint with prejudice on all counts. Perry appealed.

This Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the wrongful discharge and breach of employment contract claims, but vacated the dismissal of Perry's claim for breach of contract relating to the Proposed Release. See Perry v. Tioga County, 168 Pa.Cmwlth. 126, 649 A.2d 186 (1995), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 609, 655 A.2d 995 (1995). Reasoning that the trial court's dismissal of Perry's third claim was improperly based upon his failure to discontinue the litigation, this Court remanded "to the trial court to determine whether the Proposed Release was properly authorized and [whether] the County Solicitor had the authority to make an offer that was enforceable." Id., 649 A.2d at 189.

On remand, further discovery was conducted and the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Perry argued that the Release, the depositions of County Commissioners Hall and Barnes, and the affidavit of former Commissioner Bartlett, all showed that a valid offer was presented to him by the County Commissioners through their Solicitor. Once Perry signed and placed this offer into the mail, Perry again contended, that his actions constituted acceptance, and a valid enforceable contract was formed. Because County failed to execute this document, Perry argued that he was entitled to summary judgment on his breach of contract claim. Conversely, County argued that there was no meeting of the minds, that none of the statutory requirements for executing a binding document were followed by the Commissioners, and that the Solicitor, as a matter of law, does not have the requisite authority to negotiate binding contracts on the County's behalf.

In deciding the cross-motions, the trial court invoked its discretionary powers and refused to dismiss the action on the grounds that the proposed settlement offer was in violation of the Sunshine Act. ² Instead, the trial court assumed arguendo that a contract had been formed between the parties, but granted County's motion for summary judgment holding that the Release was "invalid because it was never properly executed by the County according to statute." (Trial Court Opinion, p. 4).

On appeal, Perry again avers that Solicitor was authorized by the Commissioners to prepare and send the Release containing the negotiated-for provisions, and that County's offer was accepted and a contract formed, when he placed the Release in the mailbox. Thus, Perry argues that Commissioners' subsequent failure to sign or publicly ratify the Release agreement cannot serve to invalidate the already completed contract. We disagree and affirm.

Our standard of review of the granting of a motion for summary judgment is well settled:

A motion for summary judgment may be properly granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no material issue of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... Summary judgment may be entered only in cases that are free and clear of doubt.... Additionally, the record must be examined in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts in its pleadings and giving the party the benefit of all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.... Moreover in summary judgment proceedings, the court's function is not to determine the facts, but only to determine if a material issue of fact exists.... Thus an order granting a motion for summary judgment will not be reversed unless the court below has committed an error of law or clearly abused...