Rodrigue v. Rodrigue

• Citation: 694 A.2d 924
• Court: Maine Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 08 May 1997
• Parties: Cecile RODRIGUE v. Francis RODRIGUE.

Page 924

694 A.2d 924

1997 ME 99

Cecile RODRIGUE v. Francis RODRIGUE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted on Briefs April 9, 1997.

Decided May 8, 1997.

Sidney H. Geller, Law Offices of Geller & Ferris, Waterville, for plaintiff.

Michael L. Rair, Bangor, for defendant.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA and LIPEZ, JJ.

WATHEN, Chief Justice.

¶1 Plaintiff Cecile Rodrigue appeals from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Somerset County, Alexander, J) in favor of defendant Francis Rodrigue. Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, her landlord, seeking damages for the personal injuries she suffered when she fell down the cellar stairs in defendant's apartment building. Plaintiff contends that a material issue of fact remains with respect to whether the stairs were within her exclusive possession and control and, therefore, the court erred in granting a summary judgment. We agree, and we vacate the judgment.

¶2 The facts as developed for purposes of the summary judgment motion are as follows: Defendant owns a three-family, three-story apartment building at 38 Elm Street in Fairfield. In addition, he owns other apartment buildings in Fairfield, and plaintiff has rented several different apartments from defendant over the past few years. In 1992, plaintiff moved from the second floor apartment to the first floor apartment at 38 Elm Street, where she lived with her twenty-five year old son, Michael Rodrigue. The rental agreement was oral and included heat. Both the first and second floor apartments were heated by a steam furnace housed in the dirt floor cellar. The water level in the furnace was not monitored automatically; when the water level was too low, the furnace would go off leaving the apartments without heat until someone added water to the boiler. There are two entrances to the cellar. A stairway leads to the basement from the first floor living room in plaintiff's apartment, and there is "a 3' by 30" scuttle hole like a bulkhead" on the exterior of the building. On the morning of October 19, 1992, plaintiff woke up to a cold apartment and started downstairs to check the boiler. She slipped on the second or third step of the stairs and tumbled down the remaining stairs resulting in injuries to her back, neck, head, and shoulder.

¶3 In 1996, plaintiff filed a complaint in the District Court alleging that her fall was caused by debris on the stairs and a loose handrail, that defendant breached his duty to maintain the stairs in a safe condition, and that his breach proximately caused her injuries. Defendant removed the case to the Superior Court and requested a jury trial. During discovery, plaintiff, Michael, and defendant were deposed. Plaintiff and Michael testified that the cellar and the stairs were not part of their apartment lease, they did not agree to assume responsibility for monitoring the furnace, and they did not use the cellar for other purposes. Defendant testified that he explained the need to monitor the furnace to plaintiff and Michael before they moved in. He also stated that there were a number of boxes in the cellar that he thought belonged to plaintiff and Michael, and that no other tenants used the cellar to his knowledge.

¶4 Michael admitted that he may have put a plastic Christmas tree down cellar with some ornaments. He also admitted that defendant showed him how to adjust the boiler water level when Michael was doing some work for defendant before they moved into the apartment. Similarly, before moving into the apartment, Michael had been down cellar to store paint cans and construction materials for defendant. Plaintiff stated that she had gone down the stairs only once before, two or three years before the incident, when defendant called her and requested that she check the oil level. Michael had gone down on a few occasions to adjust the water level, but stated that he did it under protest because he knew defendant would not do it. Michael was also upset that defendant would not install an automatic water fill switch.

¶5 Michael testified that the other entrance to the cellar, the bulkhead, had been nailed or screwed shut by defendant and was in that condition on October 19, 1992. Defendant agreed that he did seal the bulkhead with plywood and insulation but not until November of that year. Michael stated that defendant never used the bulkhead and that during the previous tenants' term, defendant would come and go through the apartment "because he had a key to their apartment."

¶6 Plaintiff stated that the stairs were covered with plaster, dust, and debris, such as boards, nails, paint cans, and brushes. She thought she slipped when she stepped on some plaster or other debris, but she does not know what she stepped on. She states that she was unable to hang onto the loose handrail.

¶7 Defendant moved for a summary judgment arguing that he owed no duty to plaintiff because the stairway was in plaintiff's exclusive possession and control. Defendant also argued that plaintiff had failed to present any evidence of causation. After a hearing, the court granted a summary judgment in favor of defendant. The court appeared to base its ruling primarily on plaintiff's exclusive possession and control of the stairway. The court stated that defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the stairs were "within the locked area of [plaintiff's] apartment." The court, however, also noted "a problem with causation."

¶8 We review the entry of a summary judgment for errors of law, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was entered. Panasonic Communications & Systems Co. v. State of Maine, 1997 ME 43, p 10, 691 A.2d 190. The judgment will be upheld if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. To survive a defendant's motion for a summary judgment, a plaintiff must produce evidence that, if produced at trial, would be sufficient to resist a motion for a judgment as a matter of law. Northeast Coating Technologies Inc. v. Vacuum Metallurgical, 684 A.2d 1322, 1325 (Me.1996). The plaintiff must establish a prima facie case for each element of the cause of action. Id.

¶9 It is well settled that a landlord is not liable for injuries caused by defective conditions in areas that are within the exclusive possession and control of a lessee. Cole v. Lord, 160 Me. 223, 202 A.2d 560 (1964). ¹ Plaintiff argues that there are genuine issues of material fact concerning control and possession of the cellar stairs. She contends there are unresolved factual disputes whether the basement was part of the leased premises, whether she or Michael assumed responsibility for monitoring the furnace and maintaining the stairs, and whether defendant had other means of access to the cellar.

¶10 A tenant gains control of an area by first obtaining possession pursuant to the terms of a lease. "A lease conveys a possessory interest in the land to another for a period of time." Town of Lisbon v. Thayer Corp., 675 A.2d 514, 516 (Me.1996). In Cole, we found that the basement where the injury occurred was "exclusively under the control of the plaintiff" because it was included in the lease along with the first floor apartment. Cole, 160 Me. at 229, 202 A.2d at 563. It follows that a tenant cannot be said to control an...