Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc.
| Decision Date | 05 June 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. C-3332,C-3332 |
| Citation | 696 S.W.2d 549,28 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 466 |
| Parties | Linda CAVNAR, et al., Petitioners, v. QUALITY CONTROL PARKING, INC., et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
O'Quinn & Hagans, John O'Quinn, Houston, for petitioners.
Brown, Sims & Ayre, James D. Wise, Jr., Houston, for respondents.
This is a wrongful death and survival action. The primary issues are: (1) whether children can recover loss of companionship damages resulting from the death of their parent; and (2) whether prejudgment interest is recoverable in personal injury cases. The court of appeals allowed loss of companionship damages and denied prejudgment interest. 678 S.W.2d 548 (Tex.App.1984). We reverse that part of the judgment denying recovery of prejudgment interest and remand it to the trial court with instructions.
On the night of November 17, 1978, Geraldine Cavnar left a nightclub called The Ritz with her adult daughter, Kathy, and a friend. As they walked across a parking lot toward their car, a van driven by a valet parking attendant hit Mrs. Cavnar, backed over her, and then ran over her a second time before the driver fled. Moshen Kakavand, the driver of the van, was employed by Quality Control Parking, Inc., a company that provided valet parking at The Ritz. Mrs. Cavnar sustained serious injuries which resulted in her death eight days later.
Linda, Kathy and Steve Cavnar (the children of Geraldine Cavnar) and River Oaks Bank & Trust Co. (the administrator of Mrs. Cavnar's estate) joined in bringing this action against Xenon, Inc. (the company that owned The Ritz), Quality Control Parking, Inc., Eugene White (who was affiliated with the valet parking service), and the valet driver who ran over Mrs. Cavnar. Plaintiffs' claims were based on common law negligence, the Texas Wrongful Death Statute (Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4671 [Vernon Supp.1985] ), and the Texas Survival Statute (Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5525 [Vernon 1958] ). Trial was to a jury, which found that all three defendants and Geraldine Cavnar had committed acts of negligence that proximately caused the accident. The jury attributed negligence to each of the parties as follows:
The Ritz 18%
Quality Control and Eugene White 40%
The valet driver 37%
Geraldine Cavnar 5%
The jury found that Kathy Cavnar sustained $175,000 in damages for "loss of affection, comfort, companionship, society, emotional support and love in the past and which in reasonable probability she would have received in the future," and $100,000 in damages for "mental suffering, in the past and which in reasonable probability she will suffer in the future" (emphasis In addition, the jury found that:
added). The jury further found that Linda and Steve Cavnar had each sustained $75,000 in past and future damages for loss of affection, etc., and $50,000 in past and future damages for mental anguish, and that each of Mrs. Cavnar's children sustained $25,000 damages for past and future loss of services, advice, counsel and pecuniary contributions.
(1) Mrs. Cavnar suffered pain and anguish before her death entitling her estate to $20,000;
(2) Mrs. Cavnar incurred reasonable and necessary hospital and medical expenses totalling $20,000;
(3) Mrs. Cavnar's estate incurred reasonable funeral and burial expenses totalling $3,000; and
(4) the conduct of Quality Control and White constituted a heedless and reckless disregard of the rights of others, for which the jury assessed $1,000,000 in exemplary damages.
The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict for plaintiffs but refused to award loss of companionship damages and prejudgment interest. However, the trial court stated in its judgment that it would have allowed recovery for loss of companionship and prejudgment interest if such damages had been recoverable under Texas law.
The court of appeals:
(1) reversed and rendered the portion of the judgment that denied recovery for loss of companionship damages; and
(2) found that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury finding of Mrs. Cavnar's negligence, and therefore reversed and rendered the portion of the judgment that reduced the damages awarded by the 5% comparative negligence of Geraldine Cavnar.
In all other respects, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
Plaintiffs appeal the denial of prejudgment interest. The only defendants who appeal are Quality Control and White. Even though the court of appeals reached the proper result on the loss of companionship issue, we address it because of the significance of this issue.
Plaintiffs requested and the trial court submitted proper issues concerning the loss of companionship and mental anguish suffered by each child. The trial court nevertheless refused to award loss of companionship damages because at that time they were not recoverable. Quality Control contends that the Cavnar children are not entitled to recover damages for the mental anguish and the loss of companionship they suffered as a result of their mother's death. We disagree.
Before 1983, Texas applied the pecuniary loss rule as the measure of damages for the death of a child. This rule was abolished in Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.1983). See also Madisonville Independent School District v. Kyle, 658 S.W.2d 149, 150 (Tex.1983). This court said in Sanchez that "injuries to the familial relationship are significant injuries and are worthy of compensation." 651 S.W.2d at 252. There is no logical reason to treat an injury to the familial relationship resulting from the wrongful death of any family member enumerated in Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4675 (Vernon 1952) differently than an injury to such relationship resulting from the wrongful death of a child. We therefore hold that the Cavnar children were entitled to recover damages for the mental anguish and loss of companionship resulting from the death of their parent.
The Cavnars challenge the refusal of the lower courts to permit recovery of prejudgment interest on the amount of damages awarded by the jury. We find merit in part of the Cavnar's argument.
The term "interest" encompasses two distinct forms of compensation: interest In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co., 569 S.W.2d 480, 485 (Tex.1978), this court recognized two separate bases for the award of prejudgment interest: (1) an enabling statute and (2) general principles of equity. 1 Since no statute controls the award of prejudgment interest in personal injury cases, the Cavnars must rely upon equitable considerations in order to prevail on their prejudgment interest claim.
as interest (eo nomine ) and interest as damages. Interest as interest is compensation allowed by law or fixed by the parties for the use or detention of money. 1 R. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice in District and County Courts § 1.11 (rev.1981). Interest as damages is compensation allowed by law as additional damages for lost use of the money due as damages during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment. See McCormick, Damages, § 50 (1935).
The primary objective of awarding damages in civil actions has always been to compensate the injured plaintiff, rather than to punish the defendant. W. Keeton, et al, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 2 (5th ed. 1984). A law that denies recovery of prejudgment interest frustrates this goal. If a judgment provides plaintiffs only the amount of damages sustained at the time of the incident, plaintiffs are not fully compensated. They have been denied the opportunity to invest and earn interest on the amount of damages between the time of the occurrence and the time of judgment.
Perhaps the lower courts would have relied upon the equitable ground of recovery set forth in Stahl had they not believed that the award of prejudgment interest was foreclosed based on dicta in Watkins v. Junker, 90 Tex. 584, 40 S.W. 11 (Tex.1897), and its progeny. Watkins involved a suit on a contract to recover money allegedly due for services and rental of boats. The court permitted the recovery of prejudgment interest but stated that "[i]nterest ... cannot be allowed upon damages arising from assault and battery, libel and slander, seduction, false imprisonment nor for personal injuries and the like." Watkins, 40 S.W. at 12.
The Watkins court justified its refusal to allow prejudgment interest in this class of cases because the measure of damages was not fixed at any particular time and because the jury was given considerable latitude in determining the amount of recovery in such cases. This limitation is echoed in Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon Supp.1985), which, by its terms, applies only to ascertainable sums. Later cases also rely on the Watkins dicta in denying recovery of prejudgment interest. See Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Carr, 91 Tex. 332, 43 S.W. 18 (1897); Hutton v. Burkett, 18 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex.Civ.App.--Eastland 1929, writ ref'd); State v. Weller, 666 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] ), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 682 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.1984) (citing Hutton v. Burkett ). However, the court in Watkins recognized that an award of prejudgment interest is necessary in order to fully compensate an injured plaintiff.
It is objected in this case that interest is a creature of the statute, and cannot be allowed upon unliquidated damages. It is true that interest, strictly speaking, exists only by statutory law, but it is likewise true that courts have recognized the fact that compensation for detention of that which is due on account of injury inflicted is an element of damages necessary to the complete indemnity of the injured party.... In the case of Heidenheimer v. Ellis, 67 Tex., on page 428, 3 S.W. 667, the court said: "It 40 S.W. at 11-12.
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