Solomon v. Petray
| Decision Date | 09 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 11–3486.,11–3486. |
| Citation | 699 F.3d 1034 |
| Parties | James Clayton SOLOMON, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Hunter PETRAY, Captain, Benton County Detention Center; Sheriff Keith Ferguson; Sgt. Tomlin; Sgt. Robbins; Sgt. Torrez; Deputy Johnson; Deputy Johnston; Deputy Morrison; Deputy Roland; Deputy Rankin; Deputy Wales; Deputy Elkington; Deputy Lockhhart; Deputy Engleman; Deputy Wright; Deputy Fry; Deputy Reyes; Deputy Holly; Deputy Carlton; Deputy Lowther; Deputy Duncan; Deputy Hernandez; Deputy Bryson; Major Gene Drake; Lt. Carter; Sgt. Vaughn, Defendants Deputy U.S. Marshal Cory Thomas; Deputy U.S. Marshal Susan Jones, Defendants–Appellants John Does, Unknown U.S. Marshals; Benton County Deputy Stickland, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Claude Shackelford Hawkins, USA, Fort Smith, AR, for appellant.
Morgan E. Welch, North Little Rock, AR, for appellee.
Before BYE, GRUENDER, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
James Clayton Solomon brought suit against Deputy United States Marshals Susan Jones and Cory Thomas, amongst others, alleging retaliation for exercising his free speech rights under the First Amendment, and violations of his rights to due process and to be free from excessive force. Jones and Thomas each moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court denied the motions and denied Jones's and Thomas's subsequent motions to amend or alter the order denying their motions for summary judgment. They now appeal. We remand the case to allow the district court to set forth a sufficient explanation of its analysis of the claims of qualified immunity to provide an adequate basis for review.
After taking James Clayton Solomon into custody on an unrelated matter, U.S. marshals transferred him from the Oklahoma City Federal Transfer Center to the United States Marshal Service (USMS) office in Fort Smith, Arkansas, on April 24, 2008. Officers of the Benton County Sheriff's Department then transferred Solomon that same day to the Benton County Criminal Detention Center (BCCDC), where he was housed until September of 2008 while awaiting disposition of the matter for which he had been taken into custody. In 2010, while incarcerated in a different facility, Solomon filed his pro se complaint alleging numerous violations of his constitutional rights and expressly naming as defendants the USMS, the BCCDC, the Benton County Sheriff's Department, and twenty-four individual staff members of either the BCCDC or the Benton County Sheriff's Department. To assist it in screening Solomon's pro se complaint, the district court provided Solomon with an addendum to fill out, which he completed and filed.
In the addendum to the complaint, Solomon named for the first time Deputy U.S. Marshal Susan Jones and Deputy U.S. Marshal Cory Thomas as defendants. He also supplemented his allegations in the complaint by alleging U.S. marshals had (1) housed him in the BCCDC, rather than another facility, in retaliation for a letter he had written about a local judge; (2) taunted him while transporting him from the Oklahoma Federal Transfer Center to the USMS office in Fort Smith and then to the BCCDC; and (3) arranged for adverse treatment he had received at the BCCDC, including a beating he alleged he had been subjected to shortly after he had initially arrived there. In the paragraph in which he indicated he intended to add Jones and Thomas as named defendants, Solomon claimed Jones and Thomas had each violated his rights to due process and to be free from excessive force.
After screening the complaint and the addendum to the complaint, the district court concluded Solomon had stated cognizable claims of (1) retaliation against Jones, Thomas, and other unknown U.S. marshals, (2) inhumane conditions of confinement against unknown U.S. marshals and BCCDC defendants, and (3) two claims of excessive force against “the various named Defendants.” It then issued an order adding Jones and Thomas as named defendants.
Prior to the commencement of discovery, Jones and Thomas each filed individual motions to dismiss all of Solomon's claims against them with prejudice, arguing Solomon had failed to state a claim against either of them and that they were entitled to qualified immunity. Each also moved in the alternative for summary judgment, arguing qualified immunity entitled them to judgment as a matter of law. In support of their motions, Jones and Thomas each submitted a declaration by Supervisory Deputy United States Marshal Mark Spellman. The declaration indicated neither Jones nor Thomas had been involved in assigning Solomon to be housed in the BCCDC and, of the two, only Jones had been assigned to transport Solomon and then only from Oklahoma City to the USMS office in Fort Smith on April 24, 2008.1
Solomon opposed the motions. In his briefs in response, he asserted a new allegation that, while he was being transported from Oklahoma City to the BCCDC, Thomas had struck him without provocation.
The district court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), treated Jones's and Thomas's motions as motions for summary judgment, which it denied. To the extent the district court set forth its analysis, it indicated only that Jones and Thomas had failed to prove they were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because they had not submitted evidence to prove they had not used excessive force against Solomon.
Jones and Thomas then filed motions to amend or alter the order denying their motions for summary judgment, which the district court denied as well. They then filed this appeal, challenging the denial of their motions for summary judgment.2
Before addressing the parties' arguments, we must first determine whether this court has jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (). This court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal of an order denying summary judgment based on qualified immunity only “to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.” Jones v. McNeese, 675 F.3d 1158, 1160–61 (8th Cir.2012) (citing Fields v. Abbott, 652 F.3d 886, 889–90 (8th Cir.2011)). To the extent an order denying summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity turns on a determination whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact for trial, this court does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal of such an order. Id. (citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 320, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995)). Accordingly, we must first determine whether the issues Jones and Thomas raise on appeal challenge the sufficiency of the evidence submitted by Solomon or turn solely on issues of law. Id.
After careful review, we conclude the issues raised on appeal comprise an amalgamation of challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence submitted by Solomon and assertions the district court erred as a matter of law by not granting their motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. We lack jurisdiction to consider the deputies' challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence submitted by Solomon. Id. However, to the extent the challenge to the district court's denial of summary judgment turns solely on the application of the legal principles of qualified immunity, this court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Id. (citing Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 595 F.3d 798, 806 (8th Cir.2010)). This court reviews a district court's denial of summary judgment as a matter of law de novo. Id. (citing Johnson v. Phillips, 664 F.3d 232, 236 (8th Cir.2011)).
Qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than merely a defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). It entitles an individual to not be subject to trial or the other burdens of litigation and “is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Id. Accordingly, it is important that the question of qualified immunity be resolved as early as possible in the proceedings. O'Neil v. City of Iowa City, 496 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir.2007) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001); Schatz Family ex rel. Schatz v. Gierer, 346 F.3d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir.2003)).
Analyzing a claim of qualified immunity requires a two-step inquiry. Jones, 675 F.3d at 1161. In one step, the deciding court determines whether the facts demonstrate a deprivation of a constitutional right. Id. (citing Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir.2010)). In the other, the court determines whether the implicated right was...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Celia v. Kane
...as a motion for summary judgment and adequately alerted the plaintiff that such would probably be the case. Cf. Solomon v. Petray, 699 F.3d 1034, 1036-37 (8th Cir. 2012); Ashanti, 666 F.3d at 1151; Barron v. S.D. Bd. of Regents, 655 F.3d 787, 792 (8th Cir. 2011); Frazier v. Vilsack, 419 F. ......
-
United States v. Mask Ka-Nefer-Nefer
...motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The Statement in the brief is controlling. SeeF.R.A.P. 28(a)(5); Solomon v. Petray, 699 F.3d 1034, 1037 n. 2 (8th Cir.2012). Therefore, the appeal of the Order of Dismissal has been waived, and we need not be concerned about the truth of the pl......
-
Jones v. McNeese
...or the other burdens of litigation and ‘is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.’ ” Solomon v. Petray, 699 F.3d 1034, 1038 (8th Cir.2012) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). An individual is only denied quali......
-
Solomon v. Petray
...that Solomon's excessive force claim against him "is not subject to dismissal at this time." Reply Brief of Appellants at 9, Solomon v. Petray, 699 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-3486); see Anthony v. Runyon, 76 F.3d 210, 214 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e believe that the district court should ......