Celia v. Kane

• Decision Date: 20 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. C13-3018-MWB,C13-3018-MWB
• Parties: ROBERT ANTHONY CELIA, Plaintiff, v. MIKE KANE, RYAN MOORE, STEVE ZDRAZIL, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

ROBERT ANTHONY CELIA, Plaintiff, v. MIKE KANE, RYAN MOORE, STEVE ZDRAZIL, Defendants.

No. C13-3018-MWB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA CENTRAL DIVISION

Dated: March 20, 2014

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION ON

DEFENDANTS' MOTION

TO DISMISS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION....................................... 2

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.................. 2

III. APPLICABLE STANDARDS................................ 5

A. Failure to State a Claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)....................5

B. Consideration of Materials Beyond the Pleadings............... 6

C. Summary Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56......7

IV. ANALYSIS............................................9

A. Overview of Civil Rights Claims under 42 U. S.C. § 1983..........9

B. The Plaintiff's Failure to Respond....................... 10

C. The Defendants' Contentions Regarding Lack of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.................... 11

D. The Defendants' Contentions Regarding Failure to Protect from Harm Claim.................................. 14

E. The Defendants' Remaining Argument.................... 16

V. CONCLUSION........................................ 16

I. INTRODUCTION

The defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 11) has been referred to me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for the filing of a report and recommended disposition. The plaintiff has not filed a resistance. The defendants did not request oral argument, and, in any event, I find that oral argument is not necessary. See Local Rule 7(c). The motion is fully submitted.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 4, 2013, the plaintiff submitted a complaint, which the clerk's office filed on July 24, 2013. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated his constitutional rights while he was confined at the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility because they failed to protect him from another inmate who assaulted him. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that on September 26, 2012, he arrived at the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility, and, almost immediately, started receiving threats while he was in general population—Emmet Unit.

On October 15, 2012, he was placed in protective custody because staff at the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility received a kite from another inmate that indicated a threat had been made against Celia. On October 16, 2012, Celia met with the defendants and Sergeant Gonzalaz and conveyed to them that inmates had told him there was a "hit" placed on him and he should check into protective custody. "When asked by Gonzalaz who was threatening him and why was he being threatened, Celia told Gonzalaz that he did not know but the individuals were part of the "frys", which is a prison gang. When again asked who exactly was causing him problems, he denied knowing who the individual was because he did not want to knowingly involve anyone else and thought the officials knew more information than he was telling them.

Given whatever information he thought the defendants knew, Celia expected to be transferred. After a few weeks, he did not get transferred and did not receive additionalinformation from either Mike Kane (Kane) or Ryan Moore (Moore) about his situation. Eventually, Kane told him that more information was needed and, in response, Celia told Kane that he was a confidential informant, provided the name of the individual that was causing him problems and expressed that he could not go to general population and needed to be transferred. After providing Kane with the name of the person, nothing happened and Celia remained in protective custody.

On November 24, 2012, Celia got into a fight with another inmate who was also in protective custody. Celia asked to move cells a total of six times. Three times he asked Kane to move cells and three other times he asked other corrections officers to move cells.

On January 22, 2013, Celia was told that he could not be transferred because he was involved in a fight and he would have to wait until May to be transferred. Aside from being told he had to wait until May, he was told that he could go to general population if he wanted. On February 5, 2013, Celia asked to move to general population. Moore, Kane and Steve Zdrazil (Zdrazil) asked why he thought it was safe to move to general population. Celia responded that he did not think it was safe and would probably be attacked or get into a fight, that he wanted to go to treatment classes so he could get paroled and that the person who he informed on was no longer at the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility. On that same date, he moved to general population—Emmet Unit.

On February 9, 2013, Celia states he was blind-sided and attacked by someone who was a member of the frys. He received nine stitches and was placed back in protective custody. He told Moore, Kane, Zdrazil and Gonzalaz that it was not safe for him in general population and he was assaulted because they refused to transfer him. On February 12, 2013, a review occurred and a transfer was granted. He was subsequently told that there were two people involved in assaulting him.

As relief, Celia requests cosmetic surgery for scar removal and compensation. On December 10, 2013, I conducted an initial review of the plaintiff's complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Before concluding that it was a close question as to whether or notthe plaintiff's complaint was frivolous or failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and ordering the defendants to respond, I stated the following:

Read liberally, the plaintiff's complaint appears to assert a failure to protect claim. In light of the facts alleged by the plaintiff and the law, the court is doubtful that the plaintiff states a claim upon which relief can be granted. This is so because it appears that the plaintiff did not fully exhaust administrative remedies prior to commencing this action, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), and the facts suggest that the plaintiff told the defendants that he was generally having issues with others and had not told them that he had been threatened by a particular individual, that he elected to return to general population and that a significant amount of time passed between when he complained to the defendants and when he was assaulted, see Prater v. Dahm, 89 F.3d 538, 541-42 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that a prisoner failed to show that a prison official "actually knew of the risk" to the prisoner when the prisoner told the official that he received threats from his roommate because, in part, after reporting the threats, the prisoner and his roommate told the official that there would be no trouble and the two "were incarcerated together for a substantial period of time without incident").

In their motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the defendants maintain that dismissal is proper for the following reasons: (1) the plaintiff never exhausted his administrative remedies; (2) the plaintiff fails to state a failure to protect from harm claim upon which relief can be granted; and (3) in light of the alleged facts, the protection of qualified immunity applies. Alternatively, the defendants maintain that summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is appropriate. Pointing to evidence outside the pleadings, the defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff failed to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), the undisputed facts do not establish a valid failure to protect from harm claim and qualified immunity protects them from suit.

III. APPLICABLE STANDARDS

A. Failure to State a Claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal on the basis of "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept all of the plaintiff's factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 696 (2009). With respect to the facts, "'[t]he court may consider the pleadings themselves, materials embraced by the pleadings, exhibits attached to the pleadings, and matters of public record.'" Illig v. Union Electric Co., 652 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 2010)); accord Mulvenon v. Greenwood, 643 F.3d 653, 656-57 (8th Cir. 2011); Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999); see also Ashanti v. City of Golden Valley, 666 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2012) ("Documents necessarily embraced by the pleadings include 'documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading.'" (quoting Kushner v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 317 F.3d 820, 831 (8th Cir. 2003))).

"To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); accord B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 569 F.3d 383, 387 (8th Cir. 2009). A claim satisfies the plausibility standard "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Bell Atl. , 550 U.S. at 556); see also Parkhurst v. Tabor, 569 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 2009) ("[A] complaint mustcontain factual allegations sufficient 'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .'" (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555)); Killingsworth v. HSBC...