Cock v. Cole
| Citation | 7 N.W. 419,55 Iowa 70 |
| Parties | COOK v. COLE |
| Decision Date | 09 December 1880 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Appeal from Polk Circuit Court.
ACTION upon accounts for gas and coke furnished to defendant by the Des Moines Gas Company, and by plaintiff as receiver of that company. The defendant pleads a counter-claim for services rendered by him as an attorney at law
A judgment was rendered for plaintiff; only a part of defendant's counter-claim was allowed. Both parties appeal.
AFFIRMED ON PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL. REVERSED ON DEFENDANT'S APPEAL.
Nourse Kauffman & Jackson, for plaintiff.
Cole & Cole, for defendant.
I.
The petition alleges that plaintiff was, on the 4th day of March 1876, appointed receiver of the property of the Des Moines Gas Company in an action brought by the Charter Oak Ins. Co. to foreclose a deed of trust executed by the gas company upon its property; that defendant is indebted to the gas company in the sum of $ 161.80 for gas and coke furnished between October 31st, 1875, and July 31st, 1876; that after the appointment of the receiver he took charge of and operated the gas works, and thereafter furnished defendant with gas and coke to the amount of $ 192.62.
The defendant in his answer sets up a counter-claim, alleging that he was employed as the attorney at law of the gas company, and rendered services under such employment to the value of $ 850 in an action brought by the gas company against the City of Des Moines.
The following facts are disclosed by the special verdict and findings of the court.
The action wherein the receiver was appointed was commenced August 31st, 1875; the cross-bill of the Charter Oak Ins Company, which prays the appointment of a receiver, was filed September 7th, 1875, and the receiver was appointed March 4th, 1876. From the order making this appointment an appeal was taken and supersedeas bond filed, and after the affirmance of the order, on the first of August, 1876, all the property of the company was turned over to the receiver.
The jury found that defendant was employed and rendered services for the gas company of the value of $ 700, and that he was paid $ 300 by the company. He was employed, and his first services were rendered, February 1st, 1876.
The gas company, before the receiver took possession of the property, furnished gas and coke to defendant of the value of $ 161.80. The receiver, after he went into possession of the property under his appointment, furnished defendant with gas and coke amounting in value to $ 192.62.
II. We will proceed to the statement of certain conclusions as to the rules of law applicable to the case. The right of defendant to recover for services performed by him before the property of the gas company became subject to the proceedings or order for the appointment of a receiver was not affected or changed thereby. After the property became subject to the authority of the receiver the rights of defendant then accruing are to be determined in view of the receivership. Before that time the receivership is not to be considered in determining the rights of the defendant. If defendant, before authority attached under the receivership to the property, had become indebted to the gas company, and that company owed defendant for services, the defendant could set off his claim against the demand of the gas company. In other words, when authority under the proceedings for the appointment of the receiver attached to the property of the gas company it divested no rights then existing. The receiver took the property subject to all rights of defendant and other persons then existing. These conclusions are supported by the most familiar principles, and do not demand for their support the citation of authorities.
III. An important inquiry, upon which the decision of the case turns, must now be made. It is this: When did the property become subject to the proceedings for the appointment of the receiver;...
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