Lobato v. Taylor
| Decision Date | 28 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 00SC527.,00SC527. |
| Parties | Eugene LOBATO; Zack Bernal; Gabrielita Adeline Espinosa; Edward Espinosa; Pete E. Espinosa, Jr.; Corpus Gallegos, by and through his conservator Yvette Gallegos; Gloria Gallegos; Rupert Gallegos; Raymond Garcia; Charlie Jacquez, Jr.; Adolph J. Lobato; Bonifacio "Bonnie" Lobato, by and through his conservator Teresa Lobato; Carlos Lobato; Emilio Lobato, Jr.; Jose F. Lobato; Presesentacion J. Lobato; Gloria Maestas; Norman Maestas; Robert "Bobby" Maestas; Raymond J. Maestas; Eugene Martinez; Mark Martinez; Agatha Medina; Gilbert "Andres" Montoya; Shirley Romero Otero; Eppie Quintana; Lucille Samelko; Arnold Valdez; Ervin L. Vigil; Larry J. Vigil; Michael J. Vigil; Billy Alire; Robert Atencio; Frances D. Berggran-Buhrles; Jose Fred Carson; Elmer Manuel Espinosa; Margurito Espinosa; Moises Gallegos; Ruben Gallegos; Richard J. Garcia; Manuel Gardunio; Ruben Herrara; Jeffrey Jacquez; Adelmo Kaber; Crucito Maes; Daniel Martinez; David Martinez; Jesse Martinez; Leonardo Martinez; Rosendo Martinez; Solestiano Martinez; Alfonso Medina; Gilbert Medina; Leandardo Medina; Loyola Medina; Marvin Medina; Orry Medina; Raymond N. Medina; Rudy Montoya; Gurtrude C. Olivas; Eppy Wayne Quintana; Robert Romero; Shirley Romero; Anthony Sanchez; Bonnie Sanchez; Eugene Sanchez; Evan Sanchez; James Sanchez; Jose G. Sanchez; Rufino Sanchez; S.R. Sanchez; Vernon Sanchez; Ronald A. Sandoval; Elesam Santistevan; Daniel Segura; Floyd R. Solan; Carolyn Taylor; Sam Valdez; Martha Vialpondo; Joe P. Vigil; and Walter Vigil, Petitioners, v. Zachary TAYLOR, as executor of the Estate of Jack T. Taylor, Jr., deceased; The Taylor Family Partnership; J. Hoy Anderson; Marvin Lavern Stohs; Edythe Kelly Stohs; Charles W. Gelderman; William F. Phinney; Harlan A. Brown; Dena F. Fuhrmann; Jimmy C. Crook; Freeland D. Crumley; Joseph P. Campisi; Hugh R. Denton; Robert Paul Resteli; Eugene J. Kafka; Avis M. Anderson; Clifford R. Jenson; Don W. Jacobs; Raymond E. Gauthier; Francis P. Heston; and Howard G. Frailey, Respondents. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing June 16, 2003.1
Brauer, Buescher, Goldhammer & Kelman, P.C., Jeffrey A. Goldstein, Littler Mendelson, P.C., William F. Schoeberlein, Robert Maes, David Martinez, Walters & Joyce, PC, Julia T. Waggener, Kelly, Haglund, Garnsey & Kahn, LLC, Norman D. Haglund, Don Hiller & Galleher, PC, Watson Galleher, Elisabeth Arenales, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioners.
Wolf & Slatkin, PC, Albert B. Wolf, Raymond P. Micklewright, Jonathan L. Madison, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondent.
Richard Garcia, Denver, Colorado, Peter L. Reich, Costa Mesa, California, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Bi-National Human Rights Commission, International Indian Treaty Council, National Chicano Human Rights Council, Comision De Derechos Humanos De Seminario Permanente De Estudios Chicanos Y De Fronteras.
Federico Cheever, Gorsuch Kirgis, LLP, Loretta P. Martinez, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Hispanic Bar Association.
David J. Stephenson, Jr., Denver, Colorado, Attorney for Amicus Curiae Rocky Mountain Human Rights Law Group.
David H. Miller, Denver, Colorado, Attorney for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Colorado.
Henry J. Feldman, Denver, Colorado, Attorney for Amicus Curiae National Lawyers Guild, Colorado Chapter.
Today's opinion is the third in a trilogy of decisions that we have issued construing some of the oldest property rights in the state. Involved are access rights to a large, mountainous tract of land in southern Costilla County, Colorado known as the Taylor Ranch.2 These property rights trace their origins to the time before Colorado's statehood when southern Colorado was still a part of Mexico.
The Costilla County landowners, whose property rights are at issue, are the present-day descendants of 1850s frontier farming families who were recruited by Carlos Beaubien to move north from the Taos area in New Mexico and settle in what is now southern Colorado.
Beaubien acted from self interest: without settlers, he could not perfect his rights to the one million-acre Sangre de Cristo land grant because the Mexican government made settlement an express condition of the grant to Beaubien. To convince these families to move north, Beaubien granted the settlers access to the wooded, mountainous area to graze their animals, gather firewood, and harvest timber to build their homes and outbuildings. Without these property rights, subsistence farming on the valley floor would have been impossible.
At trial, many current residents of Costilla County testified that, for over one hundred years, the use of these rights was widespread by the families residing in the region. These residents testified that it was general knowledge in their communities that the Taylor Ranch could be used to graze their animals, gather firewood, and collect timber. According to trial testimony, the mountainous tract purchased by Taylor had been known simply as "la merced," roughly translated from Spanish to mean the gift or grant.
Our prior decisions have recited the history of the landowners' property rights up to the present day in detail. To summarize the roots of today's conflict, Jack Taylor purchased the Taylor Ranch in 1960. After purchase, he fenced off the property, patrolled the area with armed guards, and instituted a Torrens Title action in federal court in order to extinguish the landowners' property rights. His lawsuit gave personal notice to a small fraction of the predominantly Spanish-speaking, Costilla County landowners. The great majority of the landowners received notice only by publication. Taylor subsequently was successful in extinguishing the landowners' property rights.
In our first decision, Rael v. Taylor, 876 P.2d 1210 (Colo.1994), we determined that due process required that Taylor exercise reasonable diligence in the Torrens action to identify and personally serve all reasonably ascertainable persons with an interest in his property. We remanded the case for development of the facts, concluding that the appellate record was inadequate to permit us to determine whether Taylor had met the due process standard. Id. at 1228.
After the trial court developed the record on remand, the case was appealed for the second time. In our second decision, we held that the landowners have the same property rights as the original settlers to reasonably access the Taylor property for grazing animals, gathering firewood, and harvesting timber. Lobato v. Taylor, 2002 WL 1360432 *1, 71 P.3d 938, 942-943 (Colo. June 24, 2002) ("Lobato I"). As we explained in Lobato I, the rights Beaubien granted to the settlers were profits à prendre or, in more modern parlance, easements appurtenant to the land owned or occupied by the original settlers. See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 5.2 (2000).
In this third opinion we resolve several remaining issues: (1) which present-day landowners may claim access rights to the Taylor Ranch; (2) whether Taylor met the due process requirements outlined in our first opinion when he gave notice to the landowners of his Torrens action; and (3) whether res judicata3 bars the claims of the landowners who were personally named and served in the Torrens action.
Our decision can be summarized as follows. First, we conclude that reasonable access rights to the Taylor Ranch are available to Costilla County landowners who are successors in title to the original settlers of Beaubien's grant. For practical purposes, landowners who are able to trace the settlement of their property to at least the time of William Gilpin's ownership of the Taylor Ranch shall be deemed successors in title to the original settlers of Beaubien's grant.
Second, we hold that the publication notice given by Taylor when he initiated his Torrens action violated due process. The facts developed at trial show that Taylor knew Costilla County landowners claimed rights to use the ranch and that reasonable diligence would have identified the names and addresses of the landowners.
Third, we hold that res judicata applies and precludes the claims of those Costilla County landowners and their successors who were personally named and served in the 1960s Torrens action.
Thus, we reverse the trial court's due process/res judicata decision and return the case to the court of appeals for remand to the trial court. We direct the trial court to identify all landowners who have access rights to the Taylor Ranch and to enter all necessary and appropriate orders to safeguard those rights.
In order to fully understand the due process and res judicata issues before this court today, it is important to review the circuitous procedural history that has led to today's decision. Because the facts of this case have been fully detailed in our prior decision, Lobato I, 2002 WL 1360432 at *1-4, 71 P.3d at 942-946, we now discuss only those facts that are relevant to the due process/res judicata inquiry presented in this case.
The petitioners, landowners in the Culebra River Drainage4 region of Costilla County, claim access rights to the Taylor Ranch. These access rights had been granted to the original settlers in Costilla County and had been utilized for over one hundred years. In 1960, Jack Taylor purchased the Taylor Ranch and forcibly excluded landowners by fencing the land. Soon after, Taylor sought to quiet title in the land via a Torrens Action 5 that he filed as a diversity action in the federal district court in Denver. Taylor's exclusive ownership of the Taylor Ranch was subsequently confirmed in 1967. Sanchez v. Taylor, 377 F.2d 733 (10th Cir.1967).
In 1981, the landowners filed suit in the Costilla County District Court to regain access to the land. The trial court dismissed the landowners' claims, holding...
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Allen v. Martin, 06CA1768.
...consequences of allowing a defendant who has pled guilty to adopt a contrary position in subsequent civil litigation. In Lobato v. Taylor, 70 P.3d 1152, 1166 (Colo.2003), the supreme court noted that for purposes of res judicata, "if one matter could be easily relitigated with inconsistent ......
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Loveland Essential Grp., LLC v. Grommon Farms, Inc., 11CA0722.
...regard the statement about “matters that could have been raised in a prior proceeding but were not,” the court cited Lobato v. Taylor, 70 P.3d 1152, 1165 (Colo.2003), as the source. ¶ 70 Although Lobato does, indeed, make that statement, the court there did not rely on that language to reac......
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People ex rel. J.C.S.
...Due diligence to ascertain the identity of interested parties before service by publication satisfies due process. Lobato v. Taylor, 70 P.3d 1152, 1161 (Colo.2003)(property ownership case). The same standard applies to termination of parental See, e.g., In re Claudia S., 131 Cal.App.4th 236......
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Mclane Western, Inc. v. Department of Rev.
...bars not only the claims actually litigated in the first proceeding, but also those that could have been litigated. Lobato v. Taylor, 70 P.3d 1152, 1165 (Colo.2003). Issue preclusion prohibits the relitigation of issues actually litigated in the first proceeding. Issue preclusion applies wh......
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Romer party plus one: managing public law in Colorado, 2000-2004.
...73 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1059 (2004); Hawes v. Colo. Div. of Ins., 65 P.3d 1008 (Colo. 2003); Lobato v. Taylor, 70 P.3d 1152 (Colo. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 922 (2003); Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938 (Colo. 2002); Mullens v. Hansel-Henderson, 65 P.3d 992 (Colo.......
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CHAPTER 12 - § 12.4 • PARTIES
...for the level of care plaintiffs must exercise in determining the vitality of a named defendant and researching heirs, Lobato v. Taylor, 70 P.3d 1152 (Colo. 2003), and other jurisdictions' decisions are instructive. Under Lobato, plaintiffs must make a diligent inquiry into who may have a p......
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Chapter 12 - § 12.4 • PARTIES
...for the level of care plaintiffs must exercise in determining the vitality of a named defendant and researching heirs, Lobato v. Taylor, 70 P.3d 1152 (Colo. 2003), and other jurisdictions' decisions are instructive. Under Lobato, plaintiffs must make a diligent inquiry into who may have a p......
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Chapter 3 - § 3.1 • PARTIES
...or the plaintiff did not care about the interest," citing G. P. Anderson, Colorado Quiet Title Actions § 3.1.7).[140] Lobato v. Taylor, 70 P.3d 1152 (Colo. 2003) (Lobato II).[141] Id. at 1160.[142] The other two are Rael v. Taylor, 876 P.2d 1210 (Colo. 1994), and Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 9......