705 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1983), 82-2200, Walker v. Pritzker
|Citation:||705 F.2d 942|
|Party Name:||David L. WALKER and Louis Fischer, Defendants-Crossdefendants-Appellants, v. Abram N. PRITZKER, Jay A. Pritzker, Nicholas J. Pritzker d/b/a Pritzker & Pritzker, an Illinois partnership, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and Richard C. Jones, as Trustee under Trust Agreement No. 105, Defendant-Coplaintiff-Appellee.|
|Case Date:||May 03, 1983|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit|
Argued Jan. 7, 1983.
John J. McInerney, Leahy & Eisenberg, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-crossdefendants-appellants.
Lawrence Gunnels, Reuben & Proctor, Ronald H. Galowich, Galowich & Galowich, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before PELL and ESCHBACH, Circuit Judges, and NEAHER, Senior District Judge. [*]
PELL, Circuit Judge.
In this statutory interpleader action plaintiff, the law firm of Pritzker & Pritzker, sought to determine who was entitled to a $400,000 deposit of earnest money it held under a real estate sales contract. For the purpose of this appeal, it is sufficient to know that Richard C. Jones, as seller, and David L. Walker, as buyer, negotiated a real estate contract that Walker later refused to perform. Under the contract plaintiff held $400,000 paid by Walker as earnest money. When it became clear that the contract would not be performed both Walker and Jones demanded the earnest money.
In response to these conflicting demands plaintiff filed this interpleader action in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1335, requesting that the court determine which of the defendants was entitled to the earnest money. Walker's agent, Louis Fischer, was also named as a defendant. Plaintiff, upon agreement of the parties, deposited the money into an interest bearing account subject to the court's order on disposition. The court entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting defendants from filing any other suits regarding the contract. Walker and Fischer then waived any claim they might have against plaintiff and moved to dissolve the restraining order and dismiss the complaint. The court denied this motion and entered a preliminary injunction preventing appellants from instituting further suits.
Appellants claim that by waiving their claim against plaintiff they have retroactively defeated the court's jurisdiction by eliminating one of the requisite adverse claimants under 28...
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