Garner v. Kennedy

• Decision Date: 02 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11–40653.,11–40653.
• Citation: 713 F.3d 237
• Parties: Willie Lee GARNER, also known as Willi Free I Gar'ner, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Eileen KENNEDY, in her official capacity as Director, Region IV, Texas Department of Criminal Justice; Senior Warden Ernest Gutierrez, Jr.; Brad Livingston, Executive Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice; Executive Director Rick Thaler, Defendants–Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

713 F.3d 237

Willie Lee GARNER, also known as Willi Free I Gar'ner, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Eileen KENNEDY, in her official capacity as Director, Region IV, Texas Department of Criminal Justice; Senior Warden Ernest Gutierrez, Jr.; Brad Livingston, Executive Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice; Executive Director Rick Thaler, Defendants–Appellants.

No. 11–40653.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 2, 2013.

Russell Joe Manning, Gene R. Ward, Hornblower Firm, Corpus Christi, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

James Patrick Sullivan, Assistant Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General, Office of the Solicitor General, Marjolyn Carol Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Law Enforcement Defense Division, Austin, TX, for Defendants–Appellants.

Christopher Chen–Hsin Wang, Mark Lenard Gross, Deputy Chief Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae United States of America.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before REAVLEY, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

OWEN, Circuit Judge:

This case requires us to determine whether the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's policy of prohibiting prisoners from wearing beards for religious reasons violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).¹ After a bench trial, the district court granted declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of the plaintiff, a Muslim, to the extent that the policy prohibits him from wearing a quarter-inch beard. The defendants have appealed that ruling. We affirm.

I

Willie Lee Garner is a Texas state prisoner in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ). He is currently incarcerated in the McConnell Unit in Beeville, Texas. Garner claims that as a Muslim he is required to wear a beard. However, TDCJ rules prohibit most inmates, including Garner, from having a beard, and Garner has been disciplined for his failure to comply with this policy. Some inmates are allowed to grow beards up to a quarter of an inch if they have specified skin conditions. These exemptions from the general no-beard policy are known as “clipper-shave passes.” TDCJ does not issue clipper-shave passes to accommodate religious beliefs or tenets.

Garner filed a pro se complaint against a number of defendants, who we will refer to collectively as TDCJ, in the Southern District of Texas pursuant to RLUIPA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Garner claimed that TDCJ violated RLUIPA and his constitutional rights by prohibiting him from wearing a beard and from wearing a white head covering, known as a Kufi, to and from worship services. The district court initially denied Garner's request to appoint counsel and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Garner appealed, and we reversed the district court's judgment on Garner's request for declaratory relief and injunctive relief with respect to his RLUIPA claim but affirmed in all other respects.²

On remand, the district court appointed counsel and held a bench trial on Garner's RLUIPA claims. After noting that it is not seriously contested that TDCJ's policies impose a substantial burden on Garner's religious exercises, the court concluded that TDCJ failed to discharge its burden to show that TDCJ's beard policy is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest. It therefore enjoined the defendants from enforcing the grooming policy prohibiting Garner from wearing a quarter-inch beard. However, the district court concluded that requiring an inmate to remove his Kufi and make it available for inspection when traveling to and from religious services is the least restrictive way of furthering TDCJ's compelling government interest in the safety and security of prisoners and prison staff. Therefore, the district court held that Garner was not entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief on his claim with respect to wearing his Kufi. TDCJ has appealed the district court's ruling that its grooming policy violates RLUIPA insofar as it prohibits Garner from wearing a quarter-inch beard.

II

RLUIPA provides that “no government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person confined in an institution, even if that burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless the burden “is in furtherance of a compelling government interest” and “is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.” ³ The plaintiff initially bears the burden of showing that “the challenged government action substantially burdens the plaintiff's religious exercise.” ⁴ In order to show a substantial burden, the plaintiff must show that the challenged action “truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior and significantly violate his religious beliefs.” ⁵

If the plaintiff shows that the government action imposes a substantial burden on his religious exercise, the burden then shifts to the government to show that the action was supported by a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest. ⁶ However, the Supreme Court has held that although RLUIPA requires a compelling interest, “context matters,” ⁷ and therefore the court must give “due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.” ⁸

We have not specifically addressed whether determining if a prison policy meets the requirements of RLUIPA presents a question of law or fact. At least one court has addressed this question in the RLUIPA context. ⁹ Several courts of appeals have addressed this question with respect to the predecessor to RLUIPA,¹⁰ the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),¹¹ which is identical to RLUIPA for present purposes.¹² These courts have generally held that whether the imposition of a burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest is a question of law. Because it is highly dependent on a number of underlying factual issues, we conclude that whether the imposition of a burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest is best characterized as a mixed question of fact and law, which is subject to de novo review.¹³ As always, we review questions of fact for clear error. ¹⁴

III

TDCJ first argues that the district court's written opinion fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1), which requires that the district court “find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately.” ¹⁵Rule 52(a)(1) serves three main purposes: “1) aiding the trial court's adjudication process by engendering care by the court in determining the facts; 2) promoting the operation of the doctrines of res judicata and estoppel by judgment; and 3) providing findings explicit enough to enable appellate courts to carry out a meaningful review.” ¹⁶Rule 52(a)(1), however, is not overly burdensome—it “ ‘exacts neither punctilious detail nor slavish tracing of the claims issue by issue and witness by witness.’ ” ¹⁷ It requires only that the district court “issue findings with sufficient detail to enable the appellate court to consider the findings under the applicable reviewing standard.” ¹⁸ We will not remand for clarification as long as “the district court's findings give the reviewing court a clear understanding of the factual basis for the decision.” ¹⁹

TDCJ cites the following paragraph from the district court's opinion as most evident of the district court's error:

The Defendants also contend that allowing an exception to the no beard rule would have an economic impact. They are probably correct in assuming that if Plaintiff Garner were allowed to have a beard, other Muslim prisoners in the McConnell Unit would desire the same benefit. This could, and probably would, result in some additional expense to the TDCJ, but the evidence fails to demonstrate that it would be significant. The McConnell Unit already features barbering services for the benefit of those inmates who are allowed to maintain beards by virtue of a medical condition. These services might have to be expanded to accommodate Muslim prisoners, but the additional expense is unlikely to be exorbitant. Some additional expense would also be incurred in taking new photographs for prisoner identification cards, but some of that expense is covered by fees paid by the prisoners themselves. In short, the evidence as a whole fails to establish that the economic impact on the TDCJ would be significant.

TDCJ argues that this paragraph “leaves the reader to wonder what findings of fact are to be reviewed on appeal for clear error, if any, and what conclusions of law are to be reviewed de novo.” It argues that instead of issuing a finding of fact as to the approximate amount of expenses, the district court couched its language in the form a legal conclusion, stating that the expenses are not significant enough to frustrate Garner's RLUIPA claim.

We find no error in the form of district court's opinion. With respect to the paragraph quoted above, TDCJ's evidence concerning increased costs was vague and consisted primarily of speculation and conjecture. There was no evidence concerning concrete numbers besides testimony that a single disposable razor costs four cents while an electric clipper costs thirty-four dollars. The district court cannot be faulted for not making an exact finding with regard to costs.

More generally, the district court clearly discusses its view of the evidence presented. It found, for various reasons, that TDCJ's arguments that allowing beards poses great safety risks were unfounded, that there is at least one viable alternative to achieve easy identification of inmates, and that the costs,...