Lafleur v. Dugas

• Decision Date: 06 May 1998
• Citation: 714 So.2d 792
• Parties: 97-958 La
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 792

714 So.2d 792

97-958 La. 5/6/98

Kimberly Kay LAFLEUR and Jacinta L. Gatte, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Melissa L. DUGAS, Safeway Insurance Company, Defendants and State Farm Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 97-958.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana Third Circuit.

May 6, 1998.

J. Wendel Fusilier, Ville Platte, for Kimberly Kay Lafleur et al.

John Edward Ortego, Lafayette, for State Mutual Automobile Insurance.

Before DOUCET, C.J., and WOODARD, PETERS, AMY and SULLIVAN, JJ.

[97-958 La. 1] DOUCET, Chief Judge.

Defendant and appellant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as State Farm), appeals a judgment of the trial court in favor of Kimberly Kay Lafleur and Jacinta L. Gatte, plaintiffs and appellees, which found that a policy of insurance issued by State Farm to Daniel Dugas provided coverage to Daniel's wife, Melissa Dugas. Melissa Dugas and her insurer, Safeway Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as Safeway) were also named as additional defendants herein.

[97-958 La. 2] We find that the State Farm policy at issue does not provide coverage for Melissa Dugas under the facts and circumstances of this case and thus reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss State Farm accordingly.

FACTS

The sole issue in this appeal is whether insurance coverage exists for an automobile accident involving Melissa Dugas occurring July 24, 1997. Daniel and Melissa Dugas were married on August 21, 1992. They established their matrimonial domicile in Lafayette, Louisiana. The family automobile, a Geo Metro, had been purchased by Daniel prior to their marriage. In February of 1993, Daniel purchased insurance on the Geo through State Farm. Melissa was not a named insured on the policy. The policy was again renewed in February of 1994 for six months. Shortly thereafter, in early March of 1994, Daniel and Melissa separated, and Melissa moved her minimal furniture and all of her personal belongings into her parents' apartment. Subsequently, on July 24, 1994, Melissa was involved in an automobile accident while driving her parents' automobile. She had recently been added as a named insured on her parents' insurance policy with Safeway Insurance Company.

Melissa admitted being at fault in the accident, and Safeway provided primary coverage. Insofar as the Safeway policy provided only minimal coverage, Lafleur and Gatte, plaintiffs herein, attempted to collect on the State Farm policy issued to Melissa's husband, Daniel Dugas. State Farm denied coverage based upon the following definition contained within the policy: "Spouse--means your husband or wife while living with you " (emphasis ours). State Farm contends that its policy did not provide coverage to Melissa because Melissa was not living with Daniel at the time of the accident.

Prior to trial, the parties reached a stipulation wherein Melissa Dugas admitted that she was at fault in causing the accident. The plaintiffs dismissed all claims against [97-958 La. 3] her, personally. The parties further agreed that the sole issue to be tried to the trial judge was the question of coverage under the State Farm policy. Finally, they also agreed that, if the trial judge found coverage, judgment would be rendered against State Farm only and then only for its policy limits.

At the close of the trial, the trial judge ruled in favor of plaintiffs, concluding that the policy provided coverage notwithstanding its language because it was "purchased and paid for during the existence of the marriage." The trial court reasons stated as follows:

This seems to have been a six months renewal policy and it was renewed, if that's correct, February 1994, and the accident, of course, occurred July of 1994. So this policy was obviously renewed during the period of the marriage and the Court ... while there is some conflict in the evidence that's contained into the record, there's an affidavit that seems to contradict what was said in the deposition by Ms. Melissa Dugas. The Court will find that Melissa Dugas was covered by this policy notwithstanding the language contained in the insurance policy.... This policy was purchased and paid for during the existence of the marriage. The policy ... was paid in February 1994. The accident occurred in July of 1994. It's a six month policy. So she's covered as far as this Court's concerned.

State Farm appeals that ruling.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The instant case hinges upon an interpretation of the phrase, "who lives with you" in the definition of "spouse" in the State Farm policy.

In Strickland v. State Farm Ins. Companies, 607 So.2d 769 (La.App. 1 Cir.1992), (third emphasis added) the court was faced with the same issue in a case where a minor child of separated parents was claiming coverage under a parent's policy with whom he was not residing. The First Circuit stated regarding the interpretation of policy language:

Strickland asserts "Louisiana laws on contractual interpretation support an interpretation of this insurance contract in favor of coverage." The rules for interpreting a contract are found in La.C.C. art.2045 et seq. The general rules for interpreting contracts of [97-958 La. 4] insurance are set forth in Pareti v. Sentry Indemnity Company, 536 So.2d 417, 420 (La.1988), as follows:

There are certain elementary legal principles which apply to the interpretation of insurance policies. An insurance policy is a contract and, as with all other contracts, it constitutes the law between the parties.... If the policy wording at issue is clear and expresses the intent of the parties, the agreement must be enforced as written....

An insurance contract is to be construed as a whole, and one portion thereof should not be construed separately at the expense of disregarding another.... If there is an ambiguity in a policy, then that ambiguity should be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.... However, courts have no authority to alter the terms of policies under the guise of contractual interpretation when the policy provisions are couched in unambiguous language. [Citations omitted.]

See also, Schroeder v. Board of Supervisors, 591 So.2d 342 (La.1991). Further, courts should not strain to find an ambiguity where none exists. Cell-O-Mar, Inc. v. Gros, 479 So.2d 386 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985), writs denied, 481 So.2d 1332, 1333 (La.1986). Whether a contract is ambiguous or not is a question of law. Borden, Inc. v. Gulf States Utilities Company, 543 So.2d 924 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 545 So.2d 1041 (La.1989); Aycock v. Allied Enterprises, Inc., 517 So.2d 303 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987), writs denied, 518 So.2d 512, 513 (La.1988).

We have found no published cases interpreting the phrase "who lives with you" found in this policy. Generally, a relative, for purposes of insurance coverage, is defined as a resident of the same household as the named insured. See W. McKenzie and H. Johnson, 15 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Insurance Law and Practice, §§ 43-49, 107, pp. 114-125, 228 (1986). We conclude, as a matter of law, that the phrase "who lives with you" is not ambiguous and should be given its generally prevailing meaning. La.C.C. art. 2047.

Strickland, 607 So.2d at 772.

Although we may easily determine from the jurisprudence that the phrase "who lives with you" is not ambiguous as a matter of law, we must still determine, under the facts of this case, whether Melissa lived with Daniel for purposes of coverage.

[97-958 La. 5] In Mobley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 28,357 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/8/96), 674 So.2d 1117, writ denied, 96-1402 (La.9/2/96), 679 So.2d 433, the Second Circuit had before it a situation where a husband and wife had been legally separated and their minor child, who resided with her mother, was involved in an accident. The mother brought suit on behalf of her daughter against the husband's UM carrier. The insurer was successful in rejecting coverage based on the policy definition of a "relative" as being one "who lives with [the insured]". Mobley at 1118. Both the trial and appellate courts concluded that the language was not ambiguous and should be given its generally prevailing meaning.

The Mobley Court stated on page 1121:

[W]e conclude that the phrase "who lives with you" is not, as a matter of law, ambiguous. The phrase unequivocally expresses the intent of the parties to limit coverage for relatives of the insured to those who "live with" the named insured. The plain, ordinary and popular sense of this expression is not ambiguous. It is equally clear that the question of whether a spouse or relative "lives with" the named insured is a question of fact (Strickland, supra ) to be determined on a case-by-case basis according to the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Cf. Taylor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. 248 La. 246, 178 So.2d 238 (La.1965).

The test for determining the meaning of "who lives with you," is stated in Bearden v. Rucker, 437 So.2d 1116, 1121 (La.1983), citing Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Kimball, 552 S.W.2d 207 (Tex.Civ.App.1977), as follows:

The controlling test of whether persons are residents of the same household at a particular time, within the meaning of the policy in question is not solely whether they are then residing together under one roof. The real test is whether the absence of the party of interest from the household of the alleged insured is intended to be permanent or only temporary--i.e., whether there is physical absence coupled with an intent not to return.

In Bearden, a married woman had been legally separated from her husband for nine months when she was injured in an automobile accident as a guest [97-958 La. 6] passenger of a non-owned auto. The issue presented to the court was whether a "Family Combination Automobile Policy" issued in the name of Mrs. Bearden's husband, on a community owned vehicle in Mrs. Bearden's exclusive custody for her use,...