Carver v. Nixon

• Decision Date: 19 December 1995
• Docket Number: No. 95-2608,95-2608
• Citation: 72 F.3d 633
• Parties: Thomas D. CARVER, Appellant, v. Jeremiah W. NIXON, Attorney General, State of Missouri; John Maupin, Chair, Missouri Ethics Commission, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 633

72 F.3d 633

64 USLW 2407

Thomas D. CARVER, Appellant, v. Jeremiah W. NIXON, Attorney General, State of Missouri John Maupin, Chair, Missouri Ethics Commission, Appellees.

No. 95-2608.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Sept. 13, 1995.

Decided Dec. 19, 1995.

T. Patrick Deaton, Springfield, Missouri, argued, for appellant.

James Robert Layton, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, Missouri, argued (Cynthia A. Barrett, Stephen R. Martin, II, and Amy E. Randles, on the brief), for appellees.

Before BOWMAN, ROSS and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

The campaign contribution limits in Proposition A, Mo.Ann.Stat. Sec. 130.100 (Vernon Supp.1995), adopted by initiative, were declared constitutional by the district court, which refused to enjoin their implementation. Carver v. Nixon, 882 F.Supp. 901 (W.D.Mo.1995). Thomas D. Carver appeals, arguing that the district court erred in ruling that the Proposition A contribution limits for state and local candidates did not violate a contributor's freedoms of speech and association under the First Amendment. We conclude that section 130.100 is unconstitutional and reverse the judgment of the district court.

In the spring of 1994, the Missouri General Assembly passed Senate Bill 650, adopting campaign contribution limits to become effective January 1, 1995. See Mo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 130.032 (1994). Voters approved Proposition A at the November 8, 1994 election. Proposition A adopted lower contribution limits and became effective immediately. ¹

The Missouri Attorney General issued an opinion stating that, although both Proposition A and Senate Bill 650 "concern campaign finance, they are not irreconcilably inconsistent." Missouri Ethics Commission, Op.Atty.Gen. No. 218-94 (Dec. 6, 1994), at 4. The Attorney General stated that the two provisions stand together in regulating campaign finance, and to the extent there is a conflict between specific provisions of the statutes, the more restrictive provision prevails. Id. Thus, the lower campaign contribution limits of Proposition A control. ²

The contribution limits in Proposition A are limits "per election cycle per candidate." ³ Mo.Ann.Stat. Sec. 130.100. The statute provides that no person or committee shall make a contribution to any one candidate or candidate committee with an aggregate value in excess of: (a) $100 for candidates in districts with fewer than 100,000 residents; (b) $200 for other than statewide candidates in districts of 100,000 or more residents; and (c) $300 for statewide candidates. Mo.Ann.Stat. Sec. 130.100. Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Auditor, Treasurer, and Secretary of State are enumerated as statewide candidates for purposes of the section. Mo.Ann.Stat. Sec. 130.100(2) [sic].

Senate Bill 650 imposed limits for each election. Thus, on an election cycle basis, the Senate Bill 650 limits are twice the amount enumerated in the text of Senate Bill 650. See Mo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 130.032.1. Contributions are limited to $1,000 per election for Governor and other statewide offices, as well as for candidates in districts with a population of at least 250,000. Mo.Rev.Stat. Secs. 130.032.1(1), (6). There is a $500 per election contribution limit for candidates for State Senate, and for any office in electoral districts with a population between 100,000 and 250,000. Mo.Rev.Stat. Secs. 130.032.1(2), (5). Contributions are limited to $250 per election for candidates for State Representative and for offices in districts of a population less than 100,000. Mo.Rev.Stat. Secs. 130.032.1(3), (4).

Carver brought this action to enjoin enforcement of Proposition A. He asserted that Proposition A restricted his ability to make contributions in violation of his rights of free speech and association. He also argued that the limits are so low as to unconstitutionally interfere with his ability to support candidates and to communicate with potential supporters for fundraising purposes. He argued that Proposition A is not narrowly tailored to meet the State's interests of avoiding corruption or the appearance of corruption, and will not prevent wealthy special interests from opposing candidates.

After hearing evidence and receiving briefs, the district court denied the injunction. Carver, 882 F.Supp. at 902. The court recognized that Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), governed the issues. Carver, 882 F.Supp. at 903. The court read from Buckley that "a major purpose of the First Amendment is to protect political speech," and that "[l]imitations on these rights are permissible where a compelling state interest is served, if the limitations imposed are narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Carver, 882 F.Supp. at 903-04. The court observed that the Supreme Court has recognized that governments have a compelling interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption that may result from individuals making large contributions to candidates. Id. at 904 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-27, 96 S.Ct. at 637-38).

The district court ruled that the Proposition A limits were not so low as to be an unconstitutional restriction of First Amendment rights. Id. at 904-05. The court held that "the law is tailored narrowly enough to help the state meet its goals of eliminating some of the means of corruption and of avoiding the appearance of corruption." Id. at 906. The court observed that Proposition A does not prevent candidates from spending their own money on their campaigns. ⁴ Id. The court stated that, although Proposition A does not address all of the problems related to campaign finance, it is a positive step toward eliminating political corruption, even if it is not comprehensive. Id. It may not close all of the loopholes, but that does not make it unconstitutional. Id. Carver appeals.

I.

Carver argues before us, as he did in the district court, that the Proposition A contribution limits restrict his First Amendment rights to political communication and association. He contends that, because the Proposition A limits burden fundamental First Amendment rights, they are subject to strict scrutiny and do not serve a compelling state interest. The State argues that we should apply an intermediate standard of review, but even if we apply strict scrutiny, the Proposition A limits are narrowly tailored to address a compelling state interest.

The Supreme Court identified the interests implicated by contribution limits in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14, 96 S.Ct. at 632 (citations omitted):

[C]ontribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities.... The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order "to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." ... "[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs, ... of course includ[ing] discussions of candidates...."

"[C]ontribution and expenditure limitations impose direct quantity restrictions on political communication and association by persons, groups, candidates, and political parties...." Id. at 18, 96 S.Ct. at 634.

In view of these fundamental interests, the Court has instructed that campaign contribution limits are "subject to the closest scrutiny." Id. at 25, 96 S.Ct. at 637 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170-71, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958)). Under this standard, "a significant interference with protected rights of political association may be sustained" only when the State can demonstrate "a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms." Id. (quotations omitted) (citing Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488, 95 S.Ct. 541, 547-48, 42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328, 340-41, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960)).

After identifying the interests and the applicable level of review, the Court in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59, 96 S.Ct. at 653-54, upheld the constitutionality of the $1,000 contribution limit for federal elected offices. The Court reasoned that the $1,000 contribution limit focused precisely on the problem of large campaign contributions and, therefore, was narrowly tailored to the goal of limiting corruption and the appearance of corruption. Id. at 26-28, 96 S.Ct. at 638-39. The Court pointed out that a contribution limit "entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication" and does not materially undermine "the potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates and campaign issues...." Id. at 20-21, 29, 96 S.Ct. at 635, 640. The Court characterized a contribution as only "a general expression of support for the candidate and his views," explaining that "the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor." Id. at 21, 96 S.Ct. at 636.

The Court recognized that "contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy." Id. at 21, 96 S.Ct. at 636. The Court found no evidence that the $1,000 limit prevented candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy. Id. at 21, 96 S.Ct. at 636. The Court refused to analyze the propriety of the specific dollar amount of the contribution limits. Id. at 30, 96 S.Ct. at 640. The Court cautioned, however, that if the contribution limits were too low, the limits could be unconstitutional. Id.

The Court struck down the independent...