Brown v. Cranberry Iron & Coal Co.

• Decision Date: 04 February 1896
• Docket Number: 137.
• Citation: 72 F. 96
• Parties: BROWN et al. v. CRANBERRY IRON & COAL CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

72 F. 96

BROWN et al. v. CRANBERRY IRON & COAL CO.

No. 137.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

February 4, 1896

Chas A. Moore (of Moore & Moore), for plaintiffs in error.

R. H Battle (of Battle & Mordecai), for defendant in error.

Before GOFF and SIMONTON, Circuit Judges, and BRAWLEY, District Judge.

SIMONTON Circuit Judge.

This cause comes up by writ of error to the circuit court of the United States for the Western district of North Carolina.

On the 16th August, 1887, J. Evans Brown a citizen of New Zealand and William B. Carter, a citizen of Tennessee, filed their bill of complaint in the circuit court of the United States for the said district, against the Cranberry Iron & Coal Company, a body corporate under the laws of the state of North Carolina. The bill alleged that the complainants were tenants in common with the defendant in all the mines and minerals and mineral interests in certain lands in North Carolina, described in the bill, wherein they say the complainants are each entitled to an undivided fourth part and the defendant to an undivided half. The answer of the defendant denied any title in the complainants in the realty sought to be partitioned, and averred that defendant is sole owner in fee simple absolute thereof. It also set up certain matters in pais as constituting an estoppel against the plaintiffs from setting up any title to said mines and minerals and mineral interests. Replication having been filed, the cause came to a hearing, whereupon the court entered its order in these words:

'This cause coming on to be heard at the present term, before the Honorable R. P. Dick, judge, present and presiding, and it appearing to the court from the pleadings that the title of the plaintiffs to the property sued for in the bill, and every part thereof, is denied in the answer, the court doth thereupon order the plaintiffs' bill to be retained for twelve months, with liberty to the plaintiffs in meantime to proceed at law touching the matters in question in this cause; but, in case the plaintiffs shall not proceed at law and to proceed to trial within the time aforesaid, the plaintiffs' bill is from thenceforth to stand dismissed out of this court, with costs to be taxed by the clerk, unless further time is given, upon cause shown, by the court; but, in case the plaintiffs shall proceed at law and to trial as aforesaid, the court does reserve the further consideration of the costs of this suit and of all further directions until after such trial shall be had; and in either case any of the parties are to be at liberty to apply to the court as they shall be advised. And it is further ordered that this decree be without prejudice to the rights of the parties to take further evidence on the matters and equities involved in the cause upon notice duly given. And to the end the merits may come in question upon such trial, that there has been an ouster on the part of the defendant against the plaintiffs. It is further ordered by consent of parties that in any action at law the plaintiffs may institute to establish the title to the property sued for in this bill, that the evidence and depositions now on file, and which were taken in this cause before R. M. Douglass, examiner in the same, or which may hereafter be taken and filed herein, may be used by either party on the trial of such action, without prejudice to the right of the parties litigant to use such evidence, also on the further hearing of this suit.'

This course pursued by the learned judge who heard this case is in strict accord with the law and practice of courts of chancery. 'When, on a bill for partition, where partition is a subject of equity jurisdiction, the legal title is disputed and doubtful, the course is to send the plaintiff to a court of law to have his title first established. ' Cox v. Smith, 4 Johns.Ch. 271; Phelps v. Green, 3 Johns.Ch. 302. Equity has no jurisdiction to try the title to lands. Manners v. Manners, 2 N.J.Eq. 384. Obert v. Obert, 10 N.J.Eq. 98. An action at law was ordered, and not an issue out of chancery. This is in accord with the practice in North Carolina. 'An issue is sent from a court of equity to be tried before a court of law to aid the court of equity in the ascertainment of facts. An action is ordered to be tried in a court of law when the equity is based on a strictly legal right. ' Fisher v. Carroll, 1 Jones (N.C.) 27.

The complainants availed themselves of the leave granted to them by the court, and, within the period fixed, brought their action against the defendant, the Cranberry Iron & Coal Company, on the law side of the circuit court of the United States for that district. The action was begun by summons as prescribed in the Code of North Carolina, followed by complaint. It is in the form used to try the title to lands, sets up the claim of title in two undivided fourths of these minerals, mineral lands, and mineral interests, avers that defendants are unlawfully in exclusive possession, and prays to be let into possession, and for damages. The complaint and summons having been duly served on defendant, it answered, denying the claim of title set up by plaintiffs, setting up that defendant owns, and is in absolute and entire control of, said realty, and was so at the commencement of this action and for a long time prior thereto. Then it sets up certain matters of estoppel in pais against the claim of plaintiffs; also, its notorious, open, adverse, and exclusive possession, under deeds therefor, of this realty for more than 7 years next before the commencement of this action, and for more than 20 years prior to the same pleading such occupation and the statute of limitations in bar of the claim of plaintiffs. The cause came on for trial before the judge and a jury, and it seems that every other issue in the pleadings was abandoned but one, viz.' Is the plaintiff estopped from claiming any title by deed, conduct, acts, or otherwise? So much of the issue as presented matters of fact was submitted to the jury in the form of a question: 'Are the plaintiffs estopped by their acts, declarations, or otherwise from claiming any interest in the mines and minerals in the land described in the complaint? To this question the jury, under the charge of the judge, answered, 'Yes.' So much of the issue as involved the questions of law (the construction of deeds) his honor reserved for himself, and decided that they also estopped the plaintiffs from claiming title. 59 F. 434. Numerous exceptions were taken during the trial and to the charge by the court on the part of the plaintiffs, all of which were duly formulated in the bill of exceptions, and are in the assignments of error.

This is an action at law, brought by plaintiffs as a condition precedent to proceedings in equity. Although it was brought by them because of the order of the court of equity, that order was not mandatory. It only prescribed that, if the action was not brought within a time limited, the bill would be dismissed. In cases of this character the court of chancery assumes no jurisdiction over the action. If either party be dissatisfied with the result, a new trial must be moved for in a court of law. 'In directing the action at law,' says Daniell, Ch. Prac. (3d Am. Ed.) 1119, 'the court always orders it to be brought in such a form that the verdict should be such a form that the verdict should be regarded as conclusive.'

Mr. Adams, in his work on Equity (page 378), says:

'In this class of cases there is not a mere point of law or fact incidentally in dispute as to which the court for its own satisfaction seeks the aid of another tribunal, but there is a general question of right, determinable as such by the ordinary courts, and requiring a decision according to the course of these courts both of disputed facts and the law applicable thereto.'

In an action at law brought under the direction and by leave of the court, the court of equity does not assume to interfere with the course of pleadings in the court of law, and all error made at the trial must be corrected in that court or by writ of error to the appellate court having jurisdiction over it. Watt v. Starke, 101 U.S. 250; Smith, Ch. Prac. 90; Adams, Eq. (7th Ed.) 378; Bootle v. Blundell, 19 Ves. 500.

The exceptions and assignments of error have been properly brought to this court by the writ of error. Before discussing any of the assignments of error, a brief statement of facts is necessary.

Hoke Sumner, and Hutchinson were tenants in common of a tract of land in North Carolina. During negotiations for its sale in New York, they were informed that J. Evans Brown, one of these plaintiffs, and the estate of Avery, had a claim on the minerals in this land. They opened negotiations with Avery's executor, and contracted to purchase his interest, and then they dealt with W. J. Brown, the father of the plaintiff J. Evans Brown, who lived in New Zealand. The purpose of Hoke and his associates was to remove all cloud on the title of their land. This was communicated to Avery and to the attorneys in fact of the plaintiff Brown. After the negotiations with Brown and Vance were completed, and the sale agreed upon, and the price fixed, the papers were all placed in the hands of Col. Gaither, the attorney for Hoke, and his associates, who had represented them in the negotiations, and who had examined into the title of the property purchased, and he prepared the conveyance. The important parts of this conveyance are these: John E. Brown, for the consideration of $22,000, 'doth bargain, sell, release, and confirm unto Thomas J. Sumner and Robert F. Hoke the following tract of land, situate and being in the county of Mitchell, in the state of North Carolina, that is, one-half of...