West v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., A11A1349.

• Decision Date: 28 November 2011
• Docket Number: No. A11A1349.,A11A1349.
• Parties: EAGLE WEST, LLC v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

11 FCDR 3901

312 Ga.App. 882

720 S.E.2d 317

EAGLE WEST, LLC

v.GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.

No. A11A1349.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Nov. 28, 2011.

Schreeder, Wheeler & Flint, Mark W. Forsling, Atlanta, for appellant.

Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Mary Leddy Volkert, Joanna Maureen Campbell, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

PHIPPS, Presiding Judge.

Eagle West, LLC challenges a superior court order affirming the final agency decision of the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT), which denied permits for outdoor advertising signs.¹ For reasons that follow, we affirm.

On December 30, 2009, Eagle West submitted applications to the DOT seeking permits to erect and maintain outdoor advertising signs adjacent to State Route 405, a/k/a Interstate 95 (I–95), near Horse Stamp Church Road in an unincorporated area of Camden County. On February 24, 2010, the DOT denied the permit applications “because the proposed sign locations are within the 500 foot blocked out zone for the proposed ramp interchange” to connect I–95 and Horse Stamp Church Road. The DOT cited OCGA § 32–6–75(a)(18) of the Georgia Outdoor Advertising Control Act.²

In relevant part, that provision states, “No sign ... shall be erected or maintained which ... [i]s located outside of the corporate limits of a municipality and adjacent to an interstate highway within 500 feet of an interchange, intersection at grade, or safety rest area.” ³ As the parties acknowledge, the foregoing 500–foot zone is commonly referred to as the “blocked out zone.”

Eagle West thereupon obtained review by an administrative law judge (ALJ) with the Office of State Administrative Hearings, asserting that the plain language of OCGA § 32–6–75(a)(18) prohibited erecting and maintaining signs only near an “existing interchange” and that because there was no “existing interchange” at the intersection of I–95 and Horse Stamp Church Road, the DOT's denial of the permit applications should be reversed.

Acknowledging that “the interchange [was] not yet on the ground,” the DOT countered that it was authorized to deny the permit applications, given the circumstances as set forth in the affidavit of the project manager for the construction project “known as the I–95 Interchange with Horse Stamp Church Road, Camden County, Georgia.” Concerning the status of the project, he stated that “all preconstruction work on the project has been completed. The design, environmental and right of way phases are complete, the right of way has been certified, and funding is approved for the construction phase.” Further, he stated that a construction contract would be awarded on or about July 16, 2010, ground was expected to be broken by September 2010, and construction was scheduled to be completed with the interchange fully operational within 24 months “from notice to proceed of the construction contract.” Citing Fulton County v. Davidson,⁴ the DOT sought a broad holding that because construction of the interchange would begin within two years, denial of the permit applications was proper.

The ALJ rejected the DOT's argument and ruled in favor of Eagle West, determining that OCGA § 32–6–75(a)(18) “specifically prohibits the placement of signs within 500 feet of an interchange (not a ‘present road,’ ‘present interchange,’ ‘future interchange,’ etc). This Court will not assume that the General Assembly meant to include proposed interchanges as part of this prohibition.”

The DOT obtained agency review of the ALJ's decision. And in the final agency decision, the deputy commissioner of the DOT determined that, contrary to the ALJ's characterization, the interchange was not “merely ‘proposed’ ”; instead, “the interchange is nearly completed in the sense that construction is the very last phase of a very long series of events”; and Eagle West's signs “would have to be removed ... once the interchange is completed and operational since maintenance of a sign in the block[ed]-out zone would violate ... OCGA § 32–6–75(a)(18).” Further, the deputy commissioner reasoned that “construing ‘interchange’ to include only infrastructure that is already in operation, as the ALJ appears to do, would lead to absurd and highly impractical results.” As examples, the deputy commissioner cited the granting of permits for “signs that would have to be torn down in short order,” and that “since removal of the sign would be considered a ‘taking,’ the [DOT] would be required to provide just compensation to the billboard owner.” The deputy commissioner stated further in the final agency decision that the ALJ had “incorrectly dismissed the applicability of Fulton County v. Davidson ” ⁵ and that for purposes of outdoor advertising permits, an interchange “does exist at I–[95] and Horse [Stamp Church] Road. No signs can be erected within the block[ed]-out zone surrounding this interchange.” Consequently, the DOT's final agency decision reversed the ALJ's decision, ruling that Eagle West's permit applications were denied.

The superior court affirmed the DOT's final agency decision, albeit upon a more expansive holding: “[O]nce the location of an interchange is publicly announced, [the DOT] is authorized to deny requests for permits to build signs at or adjacent to the site of the interchange which would violate the limitations imposed by OCGA § 32–6–75(a)(18).”

We granted Eagle West's application for discretionary review. Eagle West contends that the superior court erred by affirming the denial of its permit applications; ⁶ it also contests the superior court's holding that OCGA § 32–6–75(a)(18) allows the DOT to deny applications upon public announcement of the location of an interchange.

The General Assembly has delegated, “in no uncertain terms, ... the regulation of outdoor advertising to the DOT.” ⁷ Notwithstanding, “DOT decisions regarding outdoor advertising permits are subject to judicial review pursuant to the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act.” ⁸ Thereunder, judicial review of an administrative decision requires the court to determine whether the findings of fact are supported by “any evidence” and to examine the soundness of the conclusions of law that are based upon the findings of fact.⁹ While the judiciary accepts the findings of fact if there is any evidence to support the findings, ¹⁰

the court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; ... (6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.¹¹

And both this Court and the superior court review conclusions of law de novo. Finally, when this Court reviews a superior court's order in an administrative proceeding, our duty is not to review whether the record supports the superior court's decision but whether the record supports the final decision of the administrative agency.¹²

Guided by these principles, we turn to the issues before us. Eagle West maintains that the DOT was not authorized to deny its permit applications under OCGA § 32–6–75(a)(18). It argues that the provision's language, “within 500 feet of an interchange,” is plain and unambiguous, and therefore the Code provision “does not prohibit signs in areas where there could be a future interchange, where an interchange is planned but does not yet exist, or, as the trial court ruled, in an area where ‘the location of a new interchange is publicly announced.’ ”

While judicial deference is afforded an agency's interpretation of statutes it is charged with enforcing or administering, the agency's interpretation is not binding on the courts, which have the ultimate authority to construe statutes. It is the role of the judicial branch to interpret the statutes enacted by the legislative branch and enforced by the executive branch, and administrative rulings will be adopted only when they conform to the meaning which the court deems should properly be given. The judicial branch makes an independent determination as to whether the interpretation of the administrative agency correctly reflects the plain language of the statute and comports with the legislative intent.¹³

Our legislature has expressly stated its intent in enacting the Outdoor Advertising Control Act: “It is the intention of the General Assembly to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of outdoor advertising, such basis to be consistent with the public policy relating to areas adjacent to roads of the state highway system which also form a part of the interstate and primary systems of highways declared by the Congress in Title 23, Section 103, United States Code.” ¹⁴ Furthermore,

[t]he General Assembly declares it to be the policy of this state that the erection or maintenance of outdoor advertising in areas adjacent to the rights of way of roads of the state highway system, which roads are also a part of the interstate and primary systems of highways within the state, shall be regulated in accordance with the terms of this part and the regulations promulgated by the commissioner pursuant thereto and that all outdoor advertising which does not conform to the requirements of this part is a public nuisance.¹⁵

As this court has ascertained, “The intent of the General Assembly, when the entire [Outdoor Advertising Control] Act is read together, is to protect the public traveling along the highway from distractions.” ¹⁶ And with respect to the specific statutory provision at issue here, we have determined: “The minimization of distractions by signs in the area of an interchange is precisely the intent and purpose behind the blocked-out zone contemplated in [ OCGA § 32–6–75(a)(18) ].” ¹⁷

Focusing solely on the statutory clause “within 500 feet of an interchange” falls short of adequately addressing the underlying...