Engebretson v. Mahoney

• Decision Date: 28 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 10–35626.,10–35626.
• Citation: 724 F.3d 1034
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
• Parties: Jesse K. ENGEBRETSON; Catherine T. Engebretson, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Mike MAHONEY, Warden, Montana State Prison; State of Montana; William Slaughter, Director of the Department of Corrections for the State of Montana, Defendants–Appellees.

724 F.3d 1034

Jesse K. ENGEBRETSON; Catherine T. Engebretson, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.Mike MAHONEY, Warden, Montana State Prison; State of Montana; William Slaughter, Director of the Department of Corrections for the State of Montana, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 10–35626.

United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 8, 2013.

Filed May 30, 2013.

Amended June 28, 2013.

Kayla Liatti (argued) and Claudia Menjivar (argued), Ninth Circuit Clinical Externship, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, CA; Erica L. Reilley, Jones Day, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs–Appellants.

Brenda K. Elias (argued) and Ira Eakin, Special Assistant Attorneys General, Montana Department of Corrections, Helena, MT, for Defendants–Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana, Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 9:09–cv–00098–DWM.

Before DOROTHY W. NELSON, A. WALLACE TASHIMA, and CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

The opinion filed on May 30, 2013, is amended as follows:

Slip opinion page 11, note 3, lines 5–7: Replace Mays v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107, 112–13 (5th Cir.1996) (absolute immunity for sheriff's attachment of prisoner pursuant to a court order, even though sheriff allegedly knew the order was invalid)> with Mays v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107, 112–13 (5th Cir.1996) (absolute immunity for sheriff who attached a prisoner pursuant to a facially valid court order issued within the scope of the court's jurisdiction)>.

Slip opinion page 13, note 6, line 2: Replace with .

No future petitions for panel rehearing or petitions for rehearing en banc will be entertained.

OPINION

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal we are asked to decide whether prison officials enjoy absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for conduct prescribed by facially valid court orders. We conclude that they do.

BACKGROUND

In 1993, Plaintiff–Appellant Jesse Engebretson pleaded guilty to four counts of sexual assault. The state trial court sentenced him to four concurrent 20–year prison terms. The court also found that because Engebretson had been convicted of burglary (a felony) within five years of committing the sexual assaults, he was a persistent felony offender under Montana law. SeeMont.Code Ann. § 46–18–501. The court accordingly sentenced Engebretson to serve an additional 30 years in prison, to run consecutively to the assault sentences. However, the trial court suspended Engebretson's entire 30–year sentence and imposed probation instead, even though Montana's persistent felony offender law provides that “the imposition or execution of the first 5 years of a sentence imposed under” the law “may not be deferred or suspended.” Id. § 46–18–502(3).

Engebretson did not appeal, and he began serving his 20–year prison sentence in November 1993. He was discharged for good behavior about ten years later, in September 2003. Engebretson then began serving his probationary term under the supervision of a probation officer.

Three years later, while he was on probation, Engebretson filed a habeas petition with the Montana Supreme Court. He argued that the state trial court's sentencing order was illegal because his entire 30–year persistent felony offender sentence was suspended, in violation of § 46–18–502(3). In other words, the law required Engebretson to serve at least five years of his 30–year sentence in prison. The Montana Supreme Court granted Engebretson's petition, concluding that the “sentencing court lacked authority to suspend Engebretson's entire sentence as a persistent felony offender.”

On remand, the state trial court (through a different judge) adjudged Engebretson guilty of the four counts of sexual assault for which he previously had been charged, sentenced him to four concurrent 20–year terms (with credit for time served), and prescribed “terms and condition[s] of probation of any remaining time.” However, the court proceeded to amend the judgment to state that Engebretson's “sentence has been discharged,” and to delete all the terms and conditions of his probation. The court's orders did not mention Engebretson's status as a persistent felony offender, and they did not impose a five-year prison term under § 46–18–502(3). The State did not appeal.

Nearly two years later, Engebretson and his wife, Catherine Engebretson, filed a pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district court against Defendants–Appellees Mike Mahoney, the warden of the prison where Engebretson had served his sentence, and William Slaughter, the director of the Montana Department of Corrections. In an amended complaint, which added the State of Montana as a defendant, the Engebretsons alleged that Mahoney and Slaughter “would only release me [Jesse Engebretson] to a probationary sentence, even though I had informed them that such was an illegal sentence.” In other words, the Engebretsons sought damages because Jesse Engebretson was released from prison earlier than he should have been.¹ The Engebretsons more specifically alleged that: (1) Mahoney and Slaughter “had a duty to ascertain that I [Jesse Engebretson] had a legal sentence prior to accepting me into their custody;” (2) Engebretson “was stopped from filing in the court by the lack of legal reference materials” during his imprisonment; and (3) Engebretson was “stopped from gaining the assistance” of another inmate in his legal filings during his imprisonment, after that inmate “was moved to another facility after the Department of Corrections found out that he was assisting inmates in their legal research.” The complaint also alleged that Mahoney, Slaughter, and Jesse Engebretson's probation officer (who was not named as a defendant) unconstitutionally restrained Engebretson's liberty during his “illegal” term of probation. The Engebretsons sought $10 million in damages.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Upon a magistrate's recommendation, the district court dismissed the claims against Mahoney and Slaughter because they

subjected Jesse Engebretson to restrictions on his liberty based on a facially valid court order. Even though the order was later invalidated by the Montana Supreme Court, they cannot be held liable for complying with the order while it was in place.

The district court also dismissed the Engebretsons' claims against the State of Montana on Eleventh Amendment grounds, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law loss-of-consortium claim that Catherine Engebretson appeared to assert in the amended complaint. The Engebretsons appeal only the district court's conclusion that Mahoney and Slaughter are entitled to absolute immunity.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Botello v. Gammick, 413 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir.2005). We must “take as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir.2011). “[W]e construe pro se complaints liberally and may only dismiss a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, we review de novo whether a public official is entitled to absolute or qualified immunity. Slater v. Clarke, 700 F.3d 1200, 1203 (9th Cir.2012); Botello, 413 F.3d at 975.

DISCUSSION

Although the parties and the district court do not discuss it, the first question we must address is whether the Engebretsons have standing to bring this action. Jesse Engebretson did not suffer any actual injury from the defendants' enforcement of the state court's unlawful sentencing order; indeed, that order saved him five years' mandatory prison time. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (explaining that the “basic purpose of § 1983 damages is to compensate persons for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights” (quotation marks omitted)).

However, Jesse Engebretson alleges that the term of probation prescribed by the state court's sentencing order, and enforced by the defendants, was unlawful because, after the Montana Supreme Court vacated and remanded the state trial court's initial sentencing order, a different trial judge did not identify him as a persistent felony offender and accordingly relieved him of any further prison or probation time. In other words, in Engebretson's view, he never should have served any probation time. Engebretson also alleges that the defendants had a duty to investigate whether the initial sentencing order was lawful before enforcing it. While we think these allegations lack merit, because we are reviewing this case at the dismissal stage, and because the Engebretsons proceeded pro se below, the allegations are sufficient for purposes of standing to assert a § 1983 claim. See Bernhardt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (“We are doubtful that Bernhardt's damages claims are plausible.... But we accept her allegations because we examine only the face of her complaint and therefore conclude that she has standing to pursue her claim for damages.”). Finally, even without any actual injury for which they may seek compensatory damages, the Engebretsons would be entitled to nominal damages under § 1983 if they can establish a violation of a constitutional right. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist., 477 U.S. at 308 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 2537;Bernhardt, 279 F.3d at 872.

The next question is whether prison officials who, like Mahoney and Slaughter, simply enforce facially valid court orders are absolutely immune from any liability under § 1983. We have not yet had occasion to address this question. See ...