Mann v. Cnty. of San Diego

Decision Date20 November 2015
Docket NumberCase No. 3:11-cv-0708-GPC-BGS
Citation147 F.Supp.3d 1066
Parties Mark Mann et al., Plaintiffs, v. County of San Diego et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of California

Donnie R. Cox, Law Offices of Donnie R. Cox, Oceanside, CA, Robert Hamparyan, Law Office of Robert Hamparyan, San Diego, CA, Paul W. Leehey, Law Office of Paul W. Leehey, Fallbrook, CA, for Plaintiffs.

David G. Axtmann, David L. Brodie, San Diego, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF No. 194]

(2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF No. 197]

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL, United States District Judge

In this civil rights case, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated their family's civil rights during a child abuse investigation that led to the removal of the minor children from the family's home. Compl., ECF No. 1. Before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment. Defs. 2nd Mot. Summ. J. (“Defs. Mot.”), ECF No. 194; Pls. 2nd Mot. Summ. J. (“Pls. Mot.”), ECF No. 197. The motions have been fully briefed. Defs. Resp. to Pls. Mot. Summ. J. (“Defs. Resp.”), ECF No. 201; Pls. Resp. to Defs. Mot. Summ. J. (“Pls. Resp.”), ECF No. 202. A hearing on the motions was held on October 16, 2015 and the matter was taken under submission. ECF No. 210.

Having considered the parties' submissions, oral argument and the applicable law, and for the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' motion and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs' motion.

BACKGROUND

The relevant facts in this case having been described in the Court's previous Order, the Court will not reiterate them in depth here. See 1st Summ. J. Order 2–12 (“Summ. J. Order”), ECF No. 102. In short, this is an action brought by Plaintiffs Mark and Melissa Mann and their four minor children N.E.H.M., M.C.G.M., N.G.P.M., and M.N.A.M (Plaintiffs) challenging actions taken by the County of San Diego (County), the County's Health and Human Services Agency (“HHSA”), and the County's Polinsky Children's Center, a temporary emergency shelter for children who are separated from their families (“Polinsky”) (Defendants) during the course of a child abuse investigation that led to the removal of the minor children from the family's home. (Id. )

Plaintiffs initially filed a complaint against the County, HHSA, Andrea E. Hernandez (née Cisneros), Lisa J. Quadros, Gilbert Fierro, Kelly Monge, Susan Solis, and six other now dismissed defendants. Compl.; see also Orders Dismissing Defs., ECF Nos. 93, 142. Plaintiffs asserted eight causes of action for: (1) assault; (2) battery; (3) false imprisonment; (4) violation of federal civil rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; (5) Monell claims related to the County's policies; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); (7) violation of state civil rights under Cal. Civ. Code § 43 ; and (8) violation of state civil rights under Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. Compl. at 30–33.1 Every cause of action was pled against all the Defendants, with the exceptions of the fourth cause of action for the § 1983 claims, which was pled solely against the individual defendants, and the fifth cause of action for the Monell claims, which was pled solely against the County, HHSA, and Polinsky. Id .

Following parties' initial cross-motions for partial summary judgment, the Court found that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action for the § 1983 claims to the extent that such claims were based on Defendants': (1) interview with N.G.P.M. at school; (2) examination of the children at Polinsky; and (3) listing of Mr. Mann on California's Child Abuse Central Index (“CACI”), but not with respect to their actions in obtaining and executing the protective custody warrant. Summ. J. Order 16–29. Defendants were granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Monell cause of action with regards to the charge of inadequate training. Id. at 30–31; Scheduling Order 8, ECF No. 190.

Subsequently, the Court found good cause to direct additional briefing in order to determine whether the following issues can be decided on summary judgment: (1) Plaintiffs' Monell cause of action based on the Polinsky exams; (2) Defendants' qualified immunity defense to Plaintiffs' § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim; (3) all claims against Defendants Fierro, Monge, and Solis; and (4) Plaintiffs' state law causes of action of assault, battery, false imprisonment, IIED, and violations of Cal. Civ. Code § 43 and § 52.1. Scheduling Order 9–10. Parties' motions and responses followed.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 empowers the Court to enter summary judgment on factually unsupported claims or defenses, and thereby “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 325, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact is material when it affects the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The moving party can satisfy this burden by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element of his or her claim on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the moving party fails to bear the initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party's evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 159–60, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).

Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an element of its case, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In making this determination, the court must “view[ ] the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Fontana v. Haskin , 262 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir.2001). The Court does not engage in credibility determinations, weighing of evidence, or drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts; these functions are for the trier of fact. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Cross-motions for summary judgment do not necessarily permit the court to render judgment in favor of one side of the other. Starsky v. Williams , 512 F.2d 109, 112 (9th Cir.1975). The Court must consider each motion separately “on its own merits” to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists. Fair Housing Council of Riverside County, Inc. v. Riverside Two , 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir.2001) ; Starsky , 512 F.2d at 112. When evaluating cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must analyze whether the record demonstrates the existence of genuine issues of material fact, both in cases where both parties assert that no material factual issues exist, as well as where the parties dispute the facts. See Fair Housing Council of Riverside County , 249 F.3d at 1136 (citing Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano , 224 F.3d 1030, 1037 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2000) ).

DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiffs' Monell claims against the County, HHSA, and Polinsky

Plaintiffs bring Monell challenges to the County's policies of (1) preventing parents or guardians from being present during medical procedures, including examinations performed at Polinsky; and (2) allowing medical examinations to be performed at Polinsky in the absence of exigency, valid parental consent, or court order specific to the child being examined.2 Pls. Mot. 14, 30.

a. Factual Disputes

At the outset, it should be noted that the parties dispute whether issues of fact remain that preclude summary judgment on these claims. In its previous Summary Judgment Order, the Court found that disputed issues remained as to (1) whether the Polinsky examinations were overly intrusive in light of Defendants' justifications; (2) whether the County's policy of excluding all parents from examinations is warranted in light of Defendants' justifications; (3) whether the examinations were conducted primarily for investigatory purposes; and (4) whether the parents in this case consented to the examinations, but that since Plaintiffs failed to prove that the Polinsky examinations violated a clearly established right, Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity to the extent that Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims rested on the Polinsky examinations. Summ. J. Order 24–27. Subsequently, the parties indicated that there were no factual disputes underlying Plaintiffs' Monell claims. See Defs. Ex Parte Mot. Requesting Leave to File 2nd Summ. J. Mot. 2 (“Defs. Ex Parte Mot.”), ECF No....

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