Rawson v. United Steelworkers of America, 15338
| Decision Date | 04 September 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 15338,15338 |
| Citation | 111 Idaho 630,726 P.2d 742 |
| Parties | , 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2305, 55 USLW 2167, 105 Lab.Cas. P 12,115 Tharon RAWSON, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for her minor children, Seth Rawson and Cindy Rawson, heirs of John P. Rawson, deceased, Plaintiff- Appellant, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, Defendant- Respondent. Berniece JOHNSON, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for Michael Wayne Johnson, Ruth Ellen Johnson and John Russel Johnson, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, Defendant- Respondent. Laura DUNBAR, as Guardian ad Litem for Rickina Rossiter and Glen Rossiter, Jr., minor children and heirs of Glen Raymond Rossiter, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, Defendant- Respondent. Mary WOOD, as Guardian ad Litem for Leslie D. Wood, her minor child, heir of Don B. Wood, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, Defendant- Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Kenneth B. Howard, Jr., Coeur d'Alene, Lloyd J. Webb, Twin Falls, and Bruce O. Robinson, Bonners Ferry, for plaintiff-appellant.
Margaret L. McMahon, Caldwell, George H. Cohen, Washington D.C., Robert M. Weinberg, James D. Nelson and Frederick V. Betts, Seattle, Wash., for defendant-respondent.
1986 Opinion No. 30, Issued February 24, 1986, is Hereby Withdrawn and this Opinion is Substituted Therefor.
ON REHEARING
By this appeal, we are called upon to review a trial court's order granting summary judgment to the United Steelworkers of America (hereinafter referred to as U.S.W.A. or the Union) in an action brought by representatives of estates of four miners (hereinafter referred to as "the Miners") who lost their lives in the 1972 Sunshine Mine fire at Kellogg, Idaho, against the Steelworkers' Union on theories of negligence and fraud.
Judge Prather's memorandum opinion in support of his order granting the Steelworkers' Union's motion for summary judgment of dismissal of the complaint stated his conclusions:
(1) That the U.S.W.A. was entitled to summary judgment on the Miners' fraud claims;
(2) That the U.S.W.A. was entitled to summary judgment on the Miners' negligence claims; and
(3) That the record established that the Miners' claims related exclusively to the manner in which the U.S.W.A. exercised its authority as collective bargaining representative of the employees at the Sunshine Mine and, hence, that this Court should again consider the issue of whether the Miners' claims are preempted under federal labor law.
We affirm the order of summary judgment as to the fraud claim. However, for reasons discussed infra, we reverse the order of summary judgment as to the negligence claim and remand for further proceedings.
The amended complaints allege that the U.S.W.A. made the following representations to its members at the Sunshine Mine:
A. That it was a competent organization for protecting the welfare, safety and interest of its members, and had a concern for said welfare, safety and interest of its members.
B. That it had a reliable degree of expertise in underground mining.
C. That it would develop adequate programs of safety through its Union representatives for the benefit of its members, the rank-and-file of said Union.
D. That it would provide competent Union representatives to participate in the inspections of the mine for safety and accident prevention.
E. That it would enforce the provisions of the Union contract with the Sunshine Mine with regard to safety and accident prevention.
The complaints allege that the above representations were false, that they were relied upon by the employees, and that they were a proximate cause of appellants' decedents' death.
The Miners' brief does not specify whether their claim is one of actual fraud or constructive fraud. However, a party asserting a cause of action based on fraudulent misrepresentation must prove each of the following elements: a representation; its falsity; its materiality; the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; the speaker's intent that it should be acted on by the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated; the hearer's ignorance of its falsity, reliance on its truth, right to rely thereon, and consequent and proximate injury. Smith v. King, 100 Idaho 331, 597 P.2d 217 (1979).
In an action to prove actual fraud, the claimant must prove that the other party acted with an intent to deceive. Sorenson v. Adams, 98 Idaho 708, 571 P.2d 769 (1977). In a case of constructive fraud, that element is not required. State v Summary judgment should be granted only when the pleadings, depositions and admissions, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the motion, who is also to be given the benefit of all favorable inferences which might be reasonably drawn from the evidence. Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982).
[111 Idaho 633] Hightower, 101 Idaho 749, 620 P.2d 783 (1980); Bethlamy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); McGhee v. McGhee, 82 Idaho 367, 353 P.2d 760 (1960).
The record reflects that the U.S.W.A. submitted evidence establishing that it did not represent to the Miners that it had expertise in mine safety or that it could ensure a safe work place. Respondents failed to present evidence contradicting the U.S.W.A.'s showing. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported by affidavit, an opposing party may not rest upon his pleadings, but must respond by affidavit, deposition or interrogatory setting forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. As the trial court observed in its decision granting the Union's motion for summary judgment on the fraud claim:
The record is ... bereft of evidence the defendant Union made misrepresentations of fact or that the defendant intended to defraud plaintiffs. On the other hand, the defendant has submitted testimony that the Union did not misrepresent its expertise; the Union members were aware the Union only acted in an advisory capacity and that the primary responsibility for ensuring job safety lay with each individual Union member and the company.
Since the record reflects that appellants relied only on their pleadings and did not produce the necessary documentation to show that there was a genuine issue for trial, the trial court did not err in granting the motion for summary judgment on the fraud claim.
The trial court also granted the Union's motion for summary judgment of dismissal on the Miners' negligence claim. The court concluded that the Miners' had not established that the Union owed a duty to the deceased miners. The trial court's memorandum opinion in support of its order granting the motion for summary judgment on the negligence claims reads:
Plaintiffs seek to hold the Union responsible on negligence theories. A fundamental component of a negligence claim is the existence of a duty toward another. Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975). A duty is a standard of conduct to which the defendant is required to conform. Algeria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980). Plaintiffs rely on the collective bargaining agreement and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 323 and 324A (1965), as the sources for the legal duty owed by defendant Steelworkers.
A breach of contract is not in and of itself a tort. A contract may, however, create a situation which furnishes the occasion for a tort. When a person renders services to another pursuant to a contract or otherwise, the law imposes a duty of care in the performance of those services. "The duty of care arises ... irrespective of contract," and "[t]here must be a breach of duty apart from the non-performance of a contract." Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 484, P.2d 664 (1971). Mere failure to carry out contractual obligations cannot support a tort action while misfeasance in the performance of contract obligations may support a tort action.
Plaintiffs complain the Union "failed to develop an adequate program for inspection and for safety, ... failed to inspect," and "failed to require other safety devices to be used." Clearly the plaintiffs are upset with what the Union did not do, not with what it did do. Non-performance The "Good Samaritan Doctrine" is enunciated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 323 and 324A. Section 324A reads:
[111 Idaho 634] of alleged contractual duties will not sustain a tort claim.
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for the physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if:
(A) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or
(B) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or
(C) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.
Section 323 is substantially the same as 324A except it deals with the situation where an individual undertakes to render services directly to another person.
We start with the premise there is no duty to be a good Samaritan. The law will only hold a defendant liable if the plaintiff can meet the criteria laid down by the RESTATEMENT. This Court has already held there is no proof the plaintiffs' decedents relied on the Union's safety activities. Therefore, the third possible criteria, that the harm is suffered because of reliance of the third person upon the undertaking, is not satisfied. Neither has the first criteria, i.e., the failure to exercise reasonable...
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