Williams v. City of Chi.

• Citation: 733 F.3d 749
• Decision Date: 24 October 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–3249.,12–3249.
• Parties: Herbert WILLIAMS, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

733 F.3d 749

Herbert WILLIAMS, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 12–3249.

United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit.

Argued June 5, 2013.

Decided Oct. 24, 2013.

Kenneth N. Flaxman, Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Stephen G. Collins, Attorney, City of Chicago Law Department, Chicago, IL, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge.

In the wee hours of November 18, 2009, Herbert Williams was returning home from work. He smelled smoke, saw that his neighbor's house was on fire, and went to the porch of the burning home to bang on the door to rouse anyone who might be inside. Chicago police officers Matthew O'Brien and Joseph Byrne also spotted the smoke and found Williams on the porch. They soon arrested him on suspicion of arson. A prosecutor declined to file arson charges later that night. Officers O'Brien and Byrne then charged Williams with criminal trespass, but that charge was quickly dismissed.

Williams brought this suit against Officers O'Brien and Byrne under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging false arrest in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and against both officers and the City of Chicago under state law for malicious prosecution on the trespass charge. The district court granted the' motion for summary judgment. Williams v. City of Chicago, 2012 WL 4434678 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 19, 2012). Williams appeals. We reverse and remand for trial. Whether there was even arguable probable cause to arrest and charge Williams depends on disputed issues of fact. Based on Williams's version of the evidence, the officers had no reasonable grounds for concluding that Williams had committed arson or trespass, or that he was anything other than a good neighbor trying to ensure his neighbors' safety.

I. Facts for Summary Judgment

Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we present the facts in the light reasonably most favorable to Williams, as the non-moving party. Good v. Univ. of Chicago Med. Ctr., 673 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir.2012). Neither we nor the district court can resolve issues of credibility when deciding a motion for summary judgment or an appeal from its grant. Mullin v. Temco Machinery, Inc., 732 F.3d 772, 778–79, 2013 WL 5569461, at *5–6 (7th Cir. Oct. 10, 2013). Those are issues for a jury at trial, not a court on summary judgment.

Williams came home from his job as a janitor with the United States Postal Service at approximately 2:30 a.m. on November 18, 2009. When he exited the bus near his Chicago home, he smelled smoke. He rounded the corner and saw that the house at 11144 South Edbrooke was on fire. Concerned that there could be people inside the burning house, he began banging on the front door in an attempt to rouse them. He did not enter the burning house.

Defendant—Officers Byrne and O'Brien were in a patrol car en route to their police station when they spotted a cloud of smoke. O'Brien testified that he was one or two houses away from 11144 South Edbrooke when he first noticed the flames, which came from the rear of the house. The officers approached the house in their patrol car and saw Williams on the front porch, at the door. ¹

The officers stopped, went to the porch, and spoke with Williams. Williams explained that it was his neighbor's house, he thought people might be inside, and he was banging on the door to wake them. The officers then tried to enter the house, but the front door was locked. Officer O'Brien kicked the door open and the officers entered.

They found no one inside who needed to leave, but they observed a neatly stacked pile of firewood ablaze. They also saw burning sheets of newspaper stuffed into exposed insulation in the walls. Officer O'Brien recalled seeing a burning mattress, and he testified that the burning items were spread out over each of the house's three floors. Officer Byrne testified that all the burning materials were on the second floor. The officers argue on appeal that they believed the fire was likely the result of arson—Officer O'Brien explained that his arson determination was based on his training as a police officer and on “common sense.” This testimony was not part of defendants' Local Rule 56.1 statement, but even if it had been, it would not affect the outcome of this appeal. So for purposes of argument, we will assume they believed the fire was arson.

When the officers left the burning house, they saw Williams in front of the house across the street, which was his own house. They approached and asked Williams for identification. Williams provided a state identification card and other cards issued by the United States Postal Service and the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Officer O'Brien then put Williams in handcuffs and the officers put him in their patrol car. Williams's mother and a neighbor both tried to intercede on his behalf. The neighbor told the officers that Williams “had nothing to do with” the fire. After the officers placed Williams in their patrol car, Officer O'Brien ran a criminal background check on Williams and found no prior arrests for arson.

The officers then drove Williams to the police station and placed him in an interrogation room. Detective Janice Govern of the Bomb and Arson section of the Chicago Police Department investigated the fire and questioned Williams. Detective Govern did not notice an unusual smell when she was questioning him. Williams repeated what he had told Officers Byrne and O'Brien: he was a janitor for the Postal Service. He never went inside 11144 South Edbrooke, but he was banging on the front door to warn anyone who might have been asleep in the house. In other words, he was a Good Samaritan doing exactly what any concerned neighbor would do.

Detective Govern inspected the inside of the house at 11144 South Edbrooke and concluded that the home was unoccupied. She confirmed this with the owner of the house, Carl Branigan, who told Detective Govern that he and his family had recently moved out. Branigan did not say that he wanted to sign a criminal complaint against Williams.

Detective Govern finished her investigation and concluded that a chemical accelerant was not used to start the fire. Govern Dep. at 38. Detective Govern's report said nothing about whether Williams smelled of gasoline, and she testified that if Officers Byrne or O'Brien had told her that Williams had smelled of gasoline, she would have included that fact in her report. Id. at 29–32. The arrest report prepared by Officers O'Brien and Byrne also said nothing about Williams smelling of gasoline when they arrested him. See O'Brien Dep. at 93–96; Byrne Dep. at 62–63.²

Detective Govern provided the information gleaned from her investigation to Assistant State's Attorney Jennifer Sexton, but she did not recommend that Williams be charged with arson. ASA Sexton's notes from that conversation contain the following narrative:

the officers observed [Williams] coming from the front door. [Williams] stopped officers to notify them of fire. Officers entered the residence to check for victims and found small piles of wood in the back room of the second floor on fire. Officers observed newspaper shoved into the walls of the residence. [Williams] was then placed into custody. Fire investigators related the fire was arson and that there were three points of origin. Building is a residence but had not been occupied for over two weeks. No injuries and no one in residence at the time of the fire. Owners of building notified.

Sexton Dep. at 10–11. ASA Sexton declined to approve an arson charge against Williams. In her deposition, she explained that her decision was likely based on a lack of information about the victim and the absence of eyewitnesses who saw Williams start the fire. Detective Govern and ASA Sexton did not discuss whether to charge Williams with criminal trespass to a residence.

Detective Govern told Officers O'Brien and Byrne that the prosecutor had rejected an arson charge against Williams. Officers O'Brien and Byrne then signed a charge of criminal trespass against Williams, which occurs when a person “without authority ... knowingly enters or remains within any residence....” 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/19–4(a)(1), (b)(1) (Class A misdemeanor). The evidence from the three officers conflicts in important ways as to how the charging decision was made. Officer O'Brien recalled that Detective Govern instructed him to charge Williams with criminal trespass. O'Brien Dep. at 129. His testimony, however, was contradicted by Detective Govern, who denied instructing the officers to charge Williams, and by Officer Byrne who recalled that he and Officer O'Brien jointly decided to go ahead and charge Williams. Govern Dep. at 63; Byrne Dep. at 67.

The district court's treatment of this factual issue was erroneous, and it highlights some procedural complications in this appeal. The district court wrote: “After Detective Govern told the Officers that Williams could not be charged with arson, the Officers had a conversation and decided, with Detective Govern's approval, to charge Williams with criminal trespass to residence, a Class A misdemeanor.” Williams, 2012 WL 4434678, at *2. The defendants' motion for summary judgment and Local Rule 56.1 Statement did not present this evidence or claim the facts were undisputed. Williams's Local Rule 56.1 Statement also did not cite this evidence. The district court was not prohibited from examining all of the evidence filed on the motion for summary judgment, of course, but when its exploration of that evidence went beyond what the parties had cited, the risk of error increased.

We have often explained that district courts may not grant summary judgment on grounds not argued by the moving party, at least not without giving notice so that the non-moving party has a full opportunity to present relevant evidence and argument. E.g., Pactiv Corp. v. Rupert, 724 F.3d 999,...