McCoy v. State

• Decision Date: 06 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 27214.,27214.
• Citation: 737 S.E.2d 623,401 S.C. 363
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: John Curtis McCOY, Petitioner, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent. Appellate Case No. 2010–178927.

401 S.C. 363

737 S.E.2d 623

John Curtis McCOY, Petitioner,

v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent.Appellate Case No. 2010–178927.

No. 27214.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Submitted Nov. 1, 2012.

Decided Feb. 6, 2013.

Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Suzanne H. White, all of Columbia, for the State.

Justice KITTREDGE.

Petitioner John Curtis McCoy appeals the summary dismissal of his second post-conviction relief (PCR) application, which alleged recently discovered juror misconduct, on the grounds it was successive, untimely, and failed to prove a newly discovered evidence claim. We reverse and remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing. Further, for the benefit of the bench and the bar, we clarify the proper legal standard for claims involving juror misconduct.

I.

Petitioner was indicted for first-degree burglary and assault and battery with intent to kill. Petitioner's case was called to trial on June 14, 2005. During voir dire, at defense counsel's request, the trial judge asked the potential jurors if they were related by blood or marriage to any person employed in the Seventh Circuit Solicitor's office. Seven potential jurors responded affirmatively; however, Juror 84, who ultimately served on the final jury panel, did not respond or disclose that her cousin was married to the Seventh Circuit Solicitor. The defense exercised only four of its ten peremptory strikes during the jury selection process. At the conclusion of his trial, Petitioner was convicted of both offenses.

Following the dismissal of his direct appeal and first PCR application, Petitioner reviewed a fellow inmate's case in November 2009 and discovered the inmate's trial took place the day after Petitioner's. The inmate's trial was before a different trial judge but in the same courthouse. During voir dire for the inmate's trial, Juror 84—the same juror who served on the final panel in Petitioner's trial—advised the court that her cousin was married to the Seventh Circuit Solicitor.

A few days after making this discovery, Petitioner filed his second PCR application, arguing he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an impartial and objective jury. In support of his claim, Petitioner submitted an excerpt of the voir dire transcript wherein Juror 84 revealed her relationship to the Solicitor and a copy of defense counsel's requested voir dire from his own trial, which included the specific question to which Juror 84 failed to respond. Petitioner argued that Juror 84's concealment deprived him of information material to his intelligent use of peremptory challenges, which, in turn, deprived him of his constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury. Petitioner averred that, if he had been aware of the juror's relationship to the Solicitor at trial, his use of peremptory challenges would have been different. Petitioner further argued he could not have previously raised this issue because the juror's concealment of her relationship to the Solicitor, in and of itself, rendered the information unavailable to him until four years after trial when he discovered the information in a fellow inmate's case file. As noted, this occurred after both his direct appeal and first PCR application were dismissed. Petitioner further contended his claim fell within the “discovery rule” exception to the one-year limitation period and was therefore timely.

The State filed a motion to dismiss Petitioner's PCR application, arguing it was successive and barred by the statute of limitations. Regarding successiveness, the State claimed Petitioner failed to present sufficient reason why he could not have raised the current allegations in his previous PCR application. Further, the State contended the application was untimely because it was not filed within the one-year limitation period applicable to PCR actions. The State also contended Petitioner's claim “that he has discovered evidence that he was not tried by a fair and impartial jury lack[ed] merit” because Petitioner failed to provide any corroborating information or demonstrate how his allegations satisfied the five-pronged test for newly discovered evidence.¹

The PCR judge granted the State's motion for summary dismissal, finding Petitioner's claim was untimely because it was not filed within one year of trial. The PCR judge also found Petitioner's claim was successive because it could have been raised in his first PCR application and failed to prove a claim based on newly discovered evidence. Specifically, the PCR judge found that, because Petitioner failed to “offer any detail as to how this information would have affected his trial had it been known at that time, or how and when it was discovered,” Petitioner failed to establish “sufficient reason” why the current allegations could not have been raised in his previous PCR application. We granted certiorari to review the PCR judge's summary dismissal of Petitioner's claim.

II.

A.

Petitioner argues his second PCR application should not have been summarily dismissed and asks this Court to reverse and remand this matter for a hearing. We find summary dismissal was error because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Petitioner's claim is successive or barred by the statute of limitations.

A PCR application ordinarily must be filed within one year after a conviction or, if a direct appeal is taken, one year after the remittitur is sent to the trial court. S.C.Code Ann. § 17–27–45(A) (2003). However, section 17–27–45(C) provides that if a PCR applicant discovers “material facts not previously presented and heard that require[ ] vacation of [his] conviction or sentence,” he may file a PCR application “within one year after the date of actual discovery ... or after the date when the facts could have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”

A PCR applicant must allege all available grounds for relief in his original application; any ground not raised in the original application may not be the basis for subsequent applications unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which, for sufficient reason, was not raised in the original application. S.C.Code Ann. § 17–27–90.

“The [PCR] court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the [PCR] application when ... there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” S.C.Code Ann. § 17–27–70(c). When considering the State's motion for summary dismissal, where no evidentiary hearing has been held, the PCR judge must assume facts presented by the applicant are true and view those facts in the light most favorable to the applicant. Leamon v. State, 363 S.C. 432, 434, 611 S.E.2d 494, 495 (2005) (citing S.C.Code Ann. § 17–27–80). Where an applicant alleges facts that would establish an exception to either the statute of limitations or the prohibition against successive PCR applications and those facts are not conclusively refuted by the record before the PCR court, a question of fact is raised which can only be resolved by a hearing. Cf. Delaney v. State, 269 S.C. 555, 556, 238 S.E.2d 679, 679 (1977).

As to the timeliness issue, we conclude the PCR judge misconstrued section 17–27–45(A) in finding Petitioner was required to file his claim within one year after his trial, rather than one year after the remittitur was sent from his direct appeal. The time limitation in § 17–27–45(A) provides that, where a defendant appeals his conviction (as Petitioner did), the one-year period begins the date the remittitur is sent by the appellate court—not the date of conviction. Further, the PCR judge apparently overlooked the discovery rule in section 17–27–45(C), which allows one year after the discovery of “material facts not previously presented and heard that require[ ] vacation of the conviction or sentence” to file a PCR application. Petitioner argued he did not discover the juror's misconduct until November 2009, and he promptly filed his second PCR application after making that discovery. Because Petitioner's claim that he is entitled to the benefit of the discovery rule is not conclusively refuted by the record, the PCR judge erred by summarily dismissing Petitioner's claim.

We also find a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Petitioner's claim is successive under section 17–27–90, which permits an applicant to file a subsequent PCR application only if the applicant demonstrates a sufficient reason why the claims asserted therein were not asserted previously. Petiti...