Woodley v. Department of Corrections

• Decision Date: 17 November 1999
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 3:99CV156.,Civ.A. 3:99CV156.
• Citation: 74 F.Supp.2d 623
• Parties: Duke WOODLEY, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

74 F.Supp.2d 623

Duke WOODLEY, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

No. Civ.A. 3:99CV156.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division.

November 17, 1999.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Duke Woodley, Capron, Va, pro se.

William Wayne Muse, Office Of Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, VA, for Department of Corrections, respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LOWE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Duke Woodley, a Virginia state prisoner proceeding pro se, submitted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his parole revocation and the Virginia Parole Board's policy that requires him to serve the total remaining time of his sentences without consideration of the Good Conduct Allowances he had earned. Jurisdiction is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 636(c)(3).

In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Woodley raises the following claims as grounds for relief¹:

A) Petitioner was denied equal protection and due process of law when his parole was revoked based upon his refusal to agree to pay $1800 to reside in a halfway house for six months.

B) Petitioner's Good Conduct Allowance earned prior to release on parole was revoked in violation of the equal protection, due process and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.

Statement of the Facts

On August 9, 1988, in the Richmond City Circuit Court, Petitioner was sentenced to a two-year term of imprisonment for conspiracy and a three-year term for grand larceny. On August 28, 1988 Petitioner received a four-year sentence for perjury. In September 1988, he received three additional one-year sentences, one year of which was suspended. All sentences were imposed consecutively so that Petitioner had a total term of eleven years to serve. Petitioner was released on discretionary parole effective June 4, 1992. At that time, his term of confinement had been reduced by approximately three years because of Good Conduct Allowances (GCA).² He was arrested and returned to jail for violations of parole conditions on May 18, 1994. On September 9, 1994, Petitioner was sentenced in Fairfax County Circuit Court to a three-year consecutive term of imprisonment for fraudulent use of a credit card. Petitioner's parole was revoked on December 7, 1994. On April 21, 1998, after serving eight of the total of 14 years which had been imposed, Petitioner was released on mandatory parole with a minimum expiration date of October 21, 1998.³ From the date his discretionary parole was revoked until the date of his mandatory parole, Petitioner earned approximately 1,185 days of GCA. Thus, a total of approximately 1,985 days in GCA had been applied to reduce Petitioner's maximum term of confinement when he was released on mandatory parole.⁴

Prior to his release, Petitioner agreed to a parole plan which required him to reside at the Onesimus House while on parole and he agreed to follow his parole officer's instructions. On April 22, 1998, one day after his release, Petitioner refused to reside at the Onesimus House because he felt the $1800 charge for six months rent was too high, and because he had been promised his parole officer would consider permitting him to reside in Virginia Beach or Washington, D.C.

The Virginia Parole Board, after finding Petitioner had violated his parole by refusing to comply with instructions to reside at Onesimus House revoked Petitioner's parole and re-committed him to the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) to serve the remainder of his unserved sentence. On August 8, 1998, the VDOC notified Petitioner that "Effective 5-11-95 per policy of the Virginia Parole Board under VCS 53.1-159, all time not physically served on applicable sentences prior to mandatory parole, is revoked and has been added to the record." See Enclosure B of Respondent's Response to Court's Order of September 7, 1999. Petitioner's case was set for parole review in six months after his parole revocation. On January 26, 1999, the Parole Board denied parole due to the Petitioner's prior record with convictions and parole violations. After revocation of parole, Petitioner had six years, one month and 25 days remaining to serve in confinement.⁵ Petitioner's anticipated release date with GCA earned since his violation date is now July 20, 2002.

Petitioner executed a petition for writ of habeas corpus which was summarily denied by the Supreme Court of Virginia on November 12, 1998. Petitioner's claims have been presented to the highest State court and are therefore properly exhausted.

Analysis

Woodley bears a substantial burden in proving his claims and receiving a writ of habeas corpus. The passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, effectively raised the standard of review a federal court must apply to habeas petitions. Rather than employing a de novo review, relief in a federal court must be denied unless the state court decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1-2). In applying this standard, the court "must decide (1) what was the decision of the state courts [sic] with regard to the questions before us and (2) whether there is any established federal law as explicated by the Supreme Court, with which the state court decision conflicts." Hoover v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 366, 368 (5th Cir.1999); see also Bocian v. Godinez, 101 F.3d 465, 471 (7th Cir.1996) ("Federal courts no longer permitted to apply their own jurisprudence, but must look exclusively to the Supreme Court case law"). Here, the Virginia Supreme Court has ruled on the merits in a single paragraph order, finding that the Petitioner's habeas petition was frivolous. The Fourth Circuit has found such a ruling to be on the merits for habeas review purposes. See Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 159-60 (4th Cir. 1998); Parker v. Angelone, 959 F.Supp. 319, 320-322 (E.D.Va.1997). Federal courts will defer to a state court's decision unless "reasonable jurists considering the question would be of one view that the state courts ruling was incorrect" or that the decision was "not debatable among reasonable jurists." McLee v. Angelone, 967 F.Supp. 152, 156 (E.D.Va.1997) (internal citations omitted); see also Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865 (4th Cir.1998). The Court therefore examines the substance of Petitioner's claims to consider if the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court is an unreasonable application of settled federal law as explicated by the Supreme Court of the United States.

Due Process and Equal Protection for Parole Conditions

It is clear that Petitioner was required by law to comply with all conditions of parole imposed upon him, notwithstanding his release was on "mandatory parole." "Such persons shall also be subject, for the entire period of parole fixed by the Board, to such terms and conditions prescribed by the Board in accordance with § 53.1-157." Va Code § 53.1-159 (Michie 1998). Nor is it disputed that Petitioner agreed as a condition of parole that he would reside at Onesimus House for the duration of his parole period. He asserts, however, the Parole Board could not require that he obligate himself to pay for his room, board and other costs incurred while living at the Onesimus House.

What little law there is on the subject supports the proposition that a state may require a prisoner to pay the costs of supervision as a condition of parole. See Taylor v. Rhode Island, 101 F.3d 780 (1st Cir.1996); cf. Alexander v. Johnson, 742 F.2d 117 (4th Cir.1984) (finding the State may require inmate to make restitution as a condition of work release). The Supreme Court of Virginia, in rejecting Petitioner's claim, has held that as a condition of mandatory parole, the state may require an inmate to live at a halfway house and pay his costs while residing there. There is no Supreme Court case holding or even hinting to the contrary. Accordingly, revocation of Petitioner's parole for failing to agree to pay costs while living at Onesimus House presents no cognizable constitutional grounds for relief. Claim one will be DENIED.

Due Process and Parole Policy Change

Next, Petitioner asserts the forfeiture of his GCA earned prior to his mandatory release violated the due process, equal protection and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. In fact, the Parole Board never ordered that Petitioner's GCA be forfeited, and it is doubtful that the Board has such power. See Va.Code § 53.1-189 (Michie 1998) (limiting the forfeiture of GCA to 1) violations of prison rules and regulations (not parole) and 2) for escapes from confinement).

What the parole board actually did was to order Petitioner to serve "the unserved portion of the term of imprisonment originally imposed upon him...." Va.Code § 165A (Michie 1998). In this sense, the powers of the Parole Board under section 53.1-165 are more extensive than those of the VDOC under section 53.1-189.⁶ The procedures necessary to revoke parole afford an individual more protection than those required for forfeiture of GCA. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 559, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Constitutional due process requires that prior to revocation of his parole and reinstatement of his unserved sentences, Petitioner must have received advance notice of the charges; a hearing with the opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence; and a written statement of the fact finder's basis for imposing disciplinary action. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, (1972) (articulating the minimum due process requirements for revocation of parole). See also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-567, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (establishing minimum due process standards for the revocation of good-time credits). Petitioner does not claim he was denied any of the required due process rights, nor...