Madrid v. Shryock
Citation | 1987 NMSC 106,106 N.M. 467,745 P.2d 375 |
Decision Date | 02 November 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 17199,17199 |
Parties | Vincent MADRID, Petitioner, v. Howard SHRYOCK and Myrtle Shryock, Respondents, and Steven Madrid, Respondent. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Plaintiffs Howard and Myrtle Shryock were injured in a two-car collision with defendant Steven Madrid. As a result of the accident they filed personal injury and property damage claims against Steven Madrid, joining Steven's father, Vincent Madrid, under the family purpose doctrine.
Official registration documents showed Steven and Vincent Madrid as titleholders of the automobile Steven was operating when the accident occurred. Evidence was introduced through deposition and affidavits, however, that Steven had initiated and consummated the sales transaction, furnished the down payment, obtained and paid for insurance coverage, made all monthly car payments, paid all vehicle operational and maintenance costs with his own personal funds, and that neither father nor son had requested the title to be applied for in both of their names. Steven was unable to obtain credit from the bank on his own; because of that circumstance, his father co-signed the note that secured the automobile loan.
Steven was twenty-two years old at the time of the accident and lived at the family home with his father, mother, and two sisters. He was employed at his father's business. There was evidence that Vincent Madrid drove the automobile once, that Steven's sister also drove it once, but that the vehicle was not otherwise available for the family's general use. On the day of the accident, Steven was accompanied in the vehicle by his sister and a mutual friend as his passengers.
Vincent Madrid moved for summary judgment, asking to be dismissed as a co-defendant and released from any claim of liability under the family purpose doctrine. The motion was granted, and an appeal was taken by plaintiffs to the court of appeals. That court initially upheld the grant of summary judgment but, acting upon plaintiffs' motion to reconsider, withdrew its earlier decision, reversed the summary judgment, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. We granted certiorari to review the correctness of the court of appeals' construction of the family purpose doctrine in its reversal of the district court's judgment.
The family purpose doctrine is well established in New Mexico. Peters v. LeDoux, 83 N.M. 307, 491 P.2d 524 (1971); Burkhart v. Corn, 59 N.M. 343, 284 P.2d 226 (1955); Pouliot v. Box, 56 N.M. 566, 246 P.2d 1050 (1952); Stevens v. Van Deusen, 56 N.M. 128, 241 P.2d 331 (1951); Boes v. Howell, 24 N.M. 142, 173 P. 966 (1918). The applicable section of the family purpose doctrine to be considered is set out in SCRA 1986, 13-1210:
If you find the motor vehicle operated by ______ was furnished by its owner for general family use and convenience, then the owner is liable for the negligent operation of the vehicle by a member of the family.
To hold the defendant liable, you must find that the driver [had authority to drive the motor vehicle] [and] [was using the motor vehicle for the pleasure or convenience of the family, or a member of it].
The family purpose doctrine found its genesis in the principles of agency and is based on the legal fiction that the automobile owner makes the pleasure and convenience of his family his business when he provides a vehicle for the use of his family. Annotation, Modern Status of Family Purpose Doctrine with Respect to Motor Vehicles, 8 A.L.R.3d 1191, 1196 and 1201 (1966). Under the agency theory and the doctrine of respondeat superior, the automobile owner becomes liable as principal or master for the negligence of a family member fulfilling the role of agent or servant when the family member negligently operates a vehicle in furtherance of a familial purpose. Id. New Mexico case law has recognized the theoretical foundation of the family purpose doctrine in agency law. See Burkhart v. Corn, 59 N.M. at 346, 284 P.2d at 227-28 ( ); Boes v. Howell, 24 N.M. at 148, 173 P. at 967 ( ); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duran, 93 N.M. 489, 491, 601 P.2d 722, 724 (Ct.App.1979) ( ).
We do not purport to overrule any of the prior New Mexico cases that have analogized the family purpose doctrine to the agency theory. In affirming the validity of the family purpose doctrine, however, we should recognize a more accurate justification of family purpose decisions than reliance upon fictional agency principles. See F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, The Law of Torts Sec. 8.13, at 597 (2d ed. 1986). Accordingly, the family purpose doctrine should not be perpetuated upon the notion that the pleasure of the family is the business of the head(s) of household, but rather upon a recognition of the public policy to require a responsible person to answer for damages caused by the user of the family car. W. Seavey, Handbook of the Law of Agency Sec. 88F, at 155 (1964). We are impressed with the comments of Professors Harper, James and Gray:
The appalling cost of accidents, steadily mounting, affords startling evidence of the hazards owing to the use of high-powered motor vehicles. The dangers to the public from incompetent and financially irresponsible drivers is a menace of such gravity that every precaution is necessary to reduce such perils to the minimum. It is not too much to demand that the parent who provides an automobile for the pleasure and convenience of the family insure society against its negligent use for such purposes.
F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, Sec. 8.13, at 597; see Paprocki v. Stopak, 213 Neb. 523, 525-26, 330 N.W.2d 475, 477 (1983) ( ); Staroba v. Heitkamp, 338 N.W.2d 640, 641-42 (N.D.1983) ( ); Hasegawa v. Day, 684 P.2d 936, 938 (Colo.App.1983) ( ); Bartz v. Wheat, 169 W.Va. 86, 89-90, 285 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1982) ( ); Lollar v. Dewitt, 255 S.C. 452, 456, 179 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1971) ( ).
Although many courts have continued a principal-agent or master-servant analysis in discussing the family purpose doctrine, others have noted that the doctrine is not founded on the law of agency but, rather, on "justice or supposed necessity" or "humanitarian principles designed to protect the public" from financially irresponsible drivers. E.g., First-City Bank & Trust Co. v. Doggett, 316 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Ky.1958). The theory is that the parent, as the person who has made the vehicle available for use and who is ordinarily the only financially responsible person who could be held chargeable, should bear the liability as a matter of public policy. Id.; 6 D. Blash field, Automobile and Practice Sec. 255.21 (3d ed. 1966); see Turner v. Hall's Adm'x, 252 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Ky.1952) ( ).
An automobile is not a dangerous instrumentality that would warrant holding an owner strictly liable, but as a matter of practical justice to those who are injured, it is a fact that a car is a heavy, powerful object, is capable of excessive speeds, can be dangerous to life and limb, and must be operated with care. King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 225-26, 204 S.W. 296, 298 (1918). In recognizing the...
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