Heywood v. Tillson

• Citation: 75 Me. 225
• Parties: SEWALL L. HEYWOOD v. DAVIS TILLSON.
• Decision Date: 29 May 1883
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

75 Me. 225

SEWALL L. HEYWOOD v. DAVIS TILLSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

May 29, 1883

ON REPORT.

An action to recover damages for interfering with the plaintiff's tenement house and refusing to employ any laborer who rented the same. Writ dated February 24, 1879. Plea, general issue.

A P. Gould, for the plaintiff.

The facts are much stronger than is necessary to make out a case. It was a wrong done to plaintiff's property, for which he has a remedy.

It was held in Aldridge v. Stuyvesant, 1 Hall's R. (N Y.) 210, " that an action on the case lies in favor of a landlord against any person who so wrongfully and maliciously disturbs his tenants, that they abandon his premises, and the landlord loses his rent."

In Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1, the court say " one of the aims of the common law has always been to protect every person against the wrongful acts of every other person, whether committed alone or in combination with others; and it has provided an action for injuries done by disturbing a person in the enjoyment of any right or privilege which he has. Many illustrations of this doctrine are given in Bac. Ab. Action on the Case, F…. But as new methods of doing injury to others are invented in modern times, the same principles must be applied to them, in order that peaceable citizens may be protected from being disturbed in the enjoyment of their rights and privileges; and existing forms of remedy must be used."

In Marsh v. Billings, 7 Cush. 322, the plaintiff by contract with the proprietor of the Revere House had the exclusive right to carry passengers to that hotel from a certain depot, and placed upon his carriage and servants stationed there, " Revere House." The defendant was a hackman, and to get passengers adopted that badge. The court held him responsible in damages in an action on the case.

The defendant claims that he had a right to employ whom he pleased, and to get tenants into his houses if he could; but he forgets the maxim, " sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. " He had no right to entice away the plaintiff's tenant, even for the honest purpose of filling one of his own tenements, nor had he a right to use his power to dismiss his employees unless they would cut down the rent they had agreed to pay the plaintiff, or quit the tenement, for the purpose of rendering it of no value to the plaintiff.

It is actionable to entice away one's servant, so that his services are lost to the employer, even for the purpose of obtaining those services on the part of the enticer. There are many authorities to this effect. 2 Hill. Torts (2nd ed.), 585, and authorities. An action lies for seducing a journeyman to leave his employer. Hart v. Aldridge, Cowper, 54. So too, for enticing away a dramatic artist from a theatre where he is employed. Lumley v. Gye, 20 Eng. L. & Eq. 168; see Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555.

It was not necessary, in order that the plaintiff may recover damages for the loss of his tenant, that the lease should be for a definite period. Gunter v. Astor, 4 J. B. Moore, 12 (16 E. C. L. 357); Walker v. Cronin, supra; Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. 385.

The defendant is liable, not only for the injury sustained by the plaintiff in the loss of the particular tenant who was induced to leave, but he is also liable for the loss of rent occasioned by the conduct of the defendant, which was calculated to deter others from hiring the house. Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Exch. 243.

D. N. Mortland, for the defendant, cited: Bowen v. Matheson, 14 Allen 499; Com. v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111; Boston Glass M'f'y v. Binney, 4 Pick. 425; Greenleaf v. Francis, 18 Pick. 118; Chase v. Silverstone, 62 Me. 175; Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio 294; Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49; Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Penn. 528; Fernald v. Chase, 37 Me. 287; Fifield v. M. C. R. R. Co. 62 Me. 77; Bowlin v. Nye, 10 Cush. 416; Tucker v. Tarbell, 11 Allen 131.

APPLETON C. J.

This is an action on the case. The plaintiff in his writ alleges that on December 19, 1875 he was seized of a dwelling house on Hurricane Island of great value, yielding an annual rent of one hundred dollars which he should be receiving, were it not for the wrongful act of the defendant, and ought to receive from one Charles H. Sanborn and other tenants; that he leased the dwelling house and premises to said Sanborn for the term of one year, which sum said Sanborn was willing to pay; that the defendant was the occupant and owner of said Hurricane Island, and engaged in quarrying, cutting and working granite, and shipping the same to market; that there was no opportunity to lease any building, except to those in the defendant's employ; yet the defendant knowing this and to deprive the plaintiff of the rents and profits arising therefrom, did on December 29, 1875, order and direct the said Sanborn to pay him only twenty dollars a year, instead of ninety-six dollars, and threatened to discharge said Sanborn if he did not comply with his order; by means, whereof, the plaintiff received but one dollar and sixty-seven cents per month, instead of eight dollars; that afterwards on August 1, 1876, said Tillson ordered and directed said Sanborn to leave said dwelling house and refused to allow him to remain therein, and threatened to discharge him from his employment, unless he should leave said dwelling house; and that the said Tillson threatened to discharge any and all persons from his employment, and expel them from the island, who should occupy said premises and become tenants of the plaintiff,--by means of which orders, threats and directions, the said Sanborn was induced to and did leave the premises, and refused to pay for the use of the same, and to occupy the same,--whereby the plaintiff has been unable to rent, lease or sell said dwelling house, and has lost all benefit from the same.

The second count is in trover for the conversion of the plaintiff's dwelling house.

The evidence in support of the plaintiff's claim, comes entirely from him, and witnesses called by him.

The defendant is the owner of Hurricane Island, has extensive quarries there, doing a large business, having important contracts with the government, and six hundred men in his employ.

The plaintiff went into the defendant's employ as a stone cutter in 1873, and purchased the house referred to in the declaration, in the fall of 1874, for two hundred and fifty dollars, and was discharged in October, 1875. He testified that he " made no attempt to injure General Tillson, previous to his (my) discharge; " that he " had been taking notes in regard to the management of the job," and was, " going to keep the notes in case the job was ever investigated; " that he " furnished information to the newspapers in regard to the management of the government works; " wrote articles in the Boston Herald and The Rockland Opinion; that when the latter paper was indicted for a libel growing out of the articles, he was here two weeks in procuring witnesses for the publisher; that he said he considered the defendant a damned scoundrel, that he so testified, on the trial of the indictment, and that he " so considers him now."

The house was built on defendant's land, by verbal permission of his clerk.

Such is the relation of the parties.

The plaintiff claims to recover in trover, but he testifies that General Tillson told him, " that he would not interfere with making a disposition of the property," " that he has never directly assumed to him (me) any control over that house," " that he wanted me to dispose of my property there and go off the island; he said he should not interfere with my disposing of it," " that any man that rented my house should not work for him." Here is no conversion of the property. The plaintiff might live there. He might sell or lease his estate. He had full control of his property, leaving the defendant at liberty in fixing the terms and conditions on which he would employ those laboring for him. Whatever they might do, here is no conversion of the house of the plaintiff.

The first ground of complaint in the second count in the declaration is, that he " had leased the said dwelling house and premises to the said Charles H. Sanborn for the term of one year from the said day hereinbefore specified (December 29, 1875), for the sum of eight dollars per month, which sum the said Charles H. Sanborn was then and there ready and willing to pay." " Yet the said defendant, well knowing the premises,. . did on the said December 29, A. D. 1875, order and direct the said Charles H. Sanborn to pay the plaintiff only twenty dollars a year, instead of the ninety-six dollars per year, and threatened to discharge said Sanborn from his employment if he did not comply with such order; by means whereof the said Sanborn was prevented from payment to the plaintiff any more than one dollar and sixty-seven cents, instead of eight dollars per month."

The plaintiff's evidence disproves every material allegation as there set forth, and the above is the most tangible ground of complaint to be found in the whole declaration.

The house was not leased for the year. It was personal property. The plaintiff was not seized of it. Sanborn testifies that the plaintiff rented the house to him " for eight dollars a month, so long as he (I) saw fit to occupy it," that he went into the house in October, 1875, and left in August, 1876, and that the amount he " paid Heywood was in the neighborhood of eighty dollars." The plaintiff nowhere alleges that he did not receive the rent as stipulated from Sanborn. The only evidence of ordering out is, what is testified to by Sanborn; that " he said he did not wish to injure me (Sanborn), but the man that lived in Heywood's house could not work for him." But this...