State v. Castro
| Decision Date | 17 May 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 12150,12150 |
| Citation | 69 Haw. 633,756 P.2d 1033 |
| Parties | STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael CASTRO, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The framers of the evidentiary rule governing the admission of evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts," Haw.R.Evid. 404(b), recognized that character evidence is of slight probative value and may be very prejudicial. For it tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually happened on the particular occasion.
2. The introduction of character evidence permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and to punish the bad man because of their respective characters despite what the evidence in the case shows actually happened. Haw.R.Evid. 404(b) thus reiterates the common law rule that the prosecution may not introduce evidence of other criminal acts unless the evidence is introduced for some purpose other than to suggest that because the defendant is a person of criminal character, it is more probable that he committed the crime of which he stands accused.
3. Even when the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts tends to establish a fact of consequence to the determination of the case, the trial court is still obliged to exclude the evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. For the use of the word "may" in Haw.R.Evid. 404(b) was not intended to confer any arbitrary discretion on the trial judge, but was rather designed to trigger the Rule 403 balance.
4. When evidence of other crimes, wrongs, and acts is offered by the prosecution, the problem for the trial court is one of classifying and then balancing, if necessary. If its purpose is only to show some propensity to commit the crime at trial, there is no room for ad hoc balancing. The evidence is then unequivocally inadmissible. If it is probative of any other fact of consequence in the determination of the case, the court must then consider whether the prejudicial impact of the evidence would be substantially greater than its probative worth.
5. In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice and the like substantially outweighs the incremental probative value, a variety of matters must be considered, including the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.
6. Where the identity of the defendant is not disputed, there is little justification for admitting evidence of other crimes, wrongs, and acts on the ground that such evidence is probative of preparation, plan, knowledge, or modus operandi.
7. The admission of expert accrediting or impeaching testimony poses a threat to the jury's function since such testimony may constitute an invitation to the trier of fact to abdicate its responsibility upon the questionable premise that the expert is in a better position to make such a judgment. Yet under certain circumstances expert psychiatric testimony may reveal to the trier of fact characteristics or conditions of the witness that may assist the jury in assessing the credibility of the witness.
8. The critical inquiry with respect to expert testimony under the Hawaii Rules of Evidence is whether it will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. The Rules make the testimony admissible only if it is based upon a sound factual foundation, any inferences or opinions are the product of an explicable and reliable system of analysis, and the opinions add to the common understanding of the jury. The Rules further condition admissibility on whether or not the probative value of the testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and the other factors delineated in Haw.R.Evid. 403.
9. Expert testimony respecting witness credibility is inappropriate in most situations. The common experience of the jury should suffice as a basis for assessments of credibility in most cases.
10. The admission of expert testimony on witness credibility was sanctioned by this court in State v. Kim because the common experience of the jury represented a less than adequate foundation for assessing the credibility of the witness, a child sex-offense victim whose claims were substantially uncorroborated. Child sexual abuse is a particularly mysterious phenomenon, often involving an unusual cast of characters who are involved in relationships that are seemingly inexplicable to most people. And we were convinced that expert testimony could reveal characteristics or conditions of the child victim of sexual abuse and further the jury's understanding of what in all likelihood was unfamiliar and mysterious.
11. State v. Kim, in the considered opinion of this court, was a rare case where the common experience of the jury was not likely to suffice as a basis for assessment of credibility. It was meant to deal with the problems posed when the testimony of a child sex-abuse victim is presented in the prosecution of the offense. If it is perceived as precedent for the allowance generally of expert testimony on credibility, the perception is erroneous.
12. Central to the right of fair trial is the principle that one accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced at trial. This does not mean, however, that every practice tending to single out the accused from everyone else in the courtroom must be struck down. For it is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings.
13. Trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants are vested with sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. And the Supreme Court has suggested a trial judge may bind and gag a particularly obstreperous and disruptive defendant or take him out of the courtroom. The defendant's behavior, however, must be of an extreme and aggravated nature to justify either his removal from the courtroom or his total physical restraint.
14. Even a partial physical restraint of the accused while he sits before judge and jury is not to be lightly ordered, for shackling unmistakably indicates the need to separate the defendant from the community at large. And it is the sort of inherently prejudicial practice that should be permitted only when justified by an essential state interest specific to the trial.
15. Where the accused is shackled at trial, the reviewing court must subject what happened to close judicial scrutiny to determine whether an essential state interest was furthered by the trial judge's order to have him shackled or whether less restrictive, less prejudicial means could have been employed.
16. Where the challenged courtroom practice is not one deemed inherently prejudicial by the Supreme Court, the reviewing court must determine whether what the jurors saw posed an unacceptable threat to defendant's right to a fair trial. If the challenged practice is not found to be inherently prejudicial and if the defendant fails to show actual prejudice, the inquiry is over.
17. Although courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of constitutional rights, a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.
18. Whenever a courtroom arrangement is challenged as inherently prejudicial, the question is not whether jurors actually articulated a consciousness of some prejudicial effect but rather whether an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play.
19. Where the courtroom arrangement is inherently prejudicial, as it is when the defendant is compelled to sit through his trial in shackles, the judge's assessment of jurors' states of mind cannot be dispositive. What is dispositive is the judge's assessment, after a searching examination of the circumstances, that the arrangement is justified by an essential state interest specific to the trial or not.
20. Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one crime depends in part on the intent and objective of the actor. The test to determine whether the defendant intended to commit more than one offense in the course of a criminal episode is whether the evidence discloses one general intent or discloses separate and distinct intents. If there is but one intention, one general impulse, and one plan, there is but one offense.
Susan Barr (Ronette Horie with her on the opening brief), Deputy Public Defenders, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.
Cynthia S. Nakamura (Ann H. Aratani on the brief), Deputy Pros. Attys., Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before LUM, C.J., and NAKAMURA, PADGETT, HAYASHI, and WAKATSUKI, JJ.
Michael Castro was convicted of attempted murder and assault in the first degree following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit. He asserts on appeal that the judgment of conviction must be vacated because of a score of errors committed by the trial court. 1 Reviewing the record, we conclude the court erred when it (1) admitted evidence of the defendant's...
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...The dispositive issue is the character of the defendant's requisite homicidal state of mind. As we noted in State v. Castro, 69 Haw. 633, 653, 756 P.2d 1033, 1047 (1988): The test to determine whether the defendant intended to commit more than one offense in the course of a criminal episode......
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