Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 October 1896
• Citation: 76 F. 183
• Parties: INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. CINCINNATI, N.O. & T.P. RY. CO. et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

76 F. 183

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. CINCINNATI, N.O. & T.P. RY. CO. et al.

United States Circuit Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division.

October 8, 1896

Syllabus by the Court

The right to prescribe maximum rates for the transportation of freight is the right to dictate an indispensable and one of the most important terms of the contract between the carrier and the shipper.

As a legislative right it has been so long and so generally recognized as to be beyond question, and it results from the corporate existence of the common carrier, or from his quasi public relation to any and all who may come to him as freighters or passengers.

It can hardly be said to be within the recognized limits of the exercise of judicial right or power, because, while a court of equity may enforce specific performance of a contract, or correct mutual mistakes in it, it never makes a contract.

The interstate commerce commission is not invested, and cannot be invested, under the constitution, with either legislative power or purely judicial power. Its functions are necessarily restricted to the performance of administrative duties, with such quasi judicial powers as are incidental and necessary to the proper performance of those duties.

It is not an incidental right. It is not a right or power to be derived by implication or construction from general phrases in the first or other sections of the act to regulate commerce, nor can it be imported into the act by reference to or by reason of the necessities of the case. If found at all it must be found in express and specific language, among the powers and rights granted in direct terms, and there is no such language in the act.

The power of the commission to fix rates was denied by the supreme court in Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U.S. 196, 16 Sup.Ct 700.

Subject to the two leading prohibitions that their charges shall not be unjust or unreasonable, and that they shall not unjustly discriminate, so as to give undue preference or disadvantage to persons or traffic similarly circumstanced, the act to regulate commerce leaves common carriers, as they were at the common law, free to make special contracts looking to the increase of their business, to classify their traffic, to adjust and apportion their rates so as to meet the necessities of commerce, and, generally, to manage their important interests upon the same principles which are regarded as sound, and adopted in other trades and pursuits.

Cincinnati N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U.S. 184-197, 16 Sup.Ct. 700; Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U.S. 197-255, 16 Sup.Ct. 666; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 73 F. 409-429; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Northeastern R. Co., 74 F. 70-73; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland Ry. Co., 69 F. 227-233, 74 F. 715-723; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Lehigh Val. R. Co., 74 F. 784-788.

Harlan Cleveland, L. A. Shaver, and Geo. F. Edmunds, for complainant.

Edward Baxter, Harmon, Colston, Goldsmith & Hoadly, Geo. P. Harrison, East & Fogg, J. D. De Bow, Dorsey, Brewster & Howell, W. H. Henderson, Leigh R. Watts, and Lawton & Cunningham, for respondents.

SAGE District Judge.

The right of the interstate commerce commission to prescribe maximum rates for the transportation of freight was assumed by the commission, is contended for by their counsel, and is essential to their case. It is the right to dictate an indispensable and one of the most important terms of the contract between the carrier and the shipper. As a legislative right, so long and so generally recognized as to be beyond question, it results from the corporate existence of the common carrier, or from his quasi public relation to any and all who may come to him as freighters or passengers and it is generally limited to fixing maximum rates, although, doubtless, it might be extended to include-- what is probably as important-- minimum rates. It can hardly be said to be within the recognized limits of the exercise of judicial right or power, because, while a court of equity may enforce specific performance of a contract, or rescind it, or correct mutual mistakes in it, it never makes a contract. The interstate commerce commission is not invested, and cannot be invested, under the constitution, with either legislative power or purely judicial power. Its functions are necessarily restricted to the performance of administrative duties, with such quasi judicial powers as are incidental and necessary to the proper performance of those duties. This is a proposition which does not in the slightest depend upon the eminence, morally,...