I.C.C. v. Alabama Midland Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 June 1896
• Citation: 74 F. 715
• Parties: INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. ALABAMA MIDLAND RY. Co. et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

74 F. 715

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. ALABAMA MIDLAND RY. Co. et al.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 2, 1896

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

L. A Shaver, for appellant.

J. D Roquemore, A. A. Wiley, and Ed. Baxter, for appellees.

Before PARDEE and McCORMICK, Circuit Judges, and BOARMAN, District Judge.

McCORMICK Circuit Judge.

Troy is situated between the Alabama and Chattahoochee rivers, 52 miles by the shortest railroad route from Montgomery, 80 miles from Eufaula, and 85 miles from Columbus. It is a city of 4,000 or 5,000 inhabitants. On June 29, 1892, the board of trade of Troy filed with the interstate commerce commission, the appellant, a complaint against the Alabama Midland and the Georgia Central Railroads and their numerous connections, which contained six charges of violations of the provisions of the act to regulate commerce. Those charges are as follows:

'(1) That the Alabama Midland and Georgia Central and their connections unjustly discriminate against Troy, and in favor of Montgomery, in charging and collecting $3.22 per ton to Troy on phosphate rock shipped from the South Carolina and Florida fields, and only $3 per ton on such shipments to Montgomery, the longer-distance point by both said roads; and that all phosphate rock carried from said fields to Montgomery over the road of the Alabama Midland has to be hauled through Troy. (2) That the rates on cotton established by said two roads and their connections on shipments to the Atlantic seaports, Brunswick, Savannah, and Charleston, unjustly discriminate against Troy, and in favor of Montgomery, in that the rate per hundred pounds from Troy is forty-seven cents, and that from Montgomery, the longer-distance point, is only forty cents; and that such shipments from Montgomery over the road of the Alabama Midland have to pass through Troy. (3) That on shipments for export from Montgomery and other points within the jurisdiction of the Southern Railway & Steamship Association to the Atlantic seaports, Brunswick, Savannah, Charleston, West Point, and Norfolk, a lower rate is charged than the regular published tariff rate to such seaports, in that Montgomery and such other points are allowed by the rules of said association to ship through to Liverpool via any of those seaports at the lowest through rate via any one of them on the day of shipment, which may be much less than the sum of the regular published rail rate and the ocean rate via the port of shipment; that this reduction is taken from the published tariff rail rate to the port of shipment; and that this privilege, being denied to Troy, is an unjust discrimination against Troy, in favor of Montgomery and such other favored cities; and that it is, also, a discrimination against shipments which terminate at such seaport, in favor of shipments for export. (4) That the Alabama Midland and the defendant carriers connecting and forming lines with it from Baltimore, New York, and the East to Troy and Montgomery, charge and collect a higher rate on shipments of class goods from those cities to Troy than on such shipments through Troy to Montgomery, the latter being the longer-distance point by fifty-two miles. (5) That the rates on 'class' goods from Western and Northwestern points established by the defendants forming lines from those points to Troy are relatively unjust and discriminatory, as against Troy, when compared with the rates over such lines to Montgomery and Columbus. (6) That Troy is unjustly discriminated against in being charged, on shipments of cotton via Montgomery to New Orleans, the full local rate to Montgomery, by both the Alabama Midland and the Georgia Central.'

The Alabama Midland and the Central Georgia and many of their connections, immediate and remote, answered the complaint with a general denial of the charge of violating the provisions of the act, supported by such special matter as their respective situations furnished. The only feature of these matters specially pleaded now requiring notice is the allegation that the circumstances and conditions affecting rates at Montgomery and at Troy are substantially dissimilar. After due examination, taking proof, and hearing argument of counsel for the respective parties, and considering the case until August 15, 1893, the commission made its report, reviewing all the evidence, the oral arguments and the briefs of counsel, the pertinent provisions of the act, the decisions on it theretofore made by them and by the courts, and concluding thus: 'In pursuance of the conclusions arrived at in this case, it is ordered that the roads participating in the traffic involved cease and desist (1) from charging and collecting, on class goods shipped from Louisville, St. Louis, and Cincinnati to Troy, a higher rate than is now charged and collected on such shipments to Columbus and Eufaula; (2) from charging and collecting on cotton shipped from Troy via Montgomery to New Orleans a higher through rate than 50 cents per 100 pounds; (3) from charging and collecting, on shipments of cotton from Troy, for export via the Atlantic seaports, Brunswick, Savannah, Charleston, West Point, and Norfolk, a higher rate to those ports than is charged and collected on such shipments from Montgomery; (4) from charging and collecting, on cotton shipped from Troy to Brunswick, Savannah, and Charleston, a higher rate than is charged and collected on such shipments from Montgomery through Troy to those ports; (5) from charging and collecting on class goods, shipped from New York, Baltimore, and the Northeast to Troy, a higher rate than is charged and collected, on phosphate rock shipped from South Carolina and Florida fields to Troy, a higher rate than is charged and collected on such shipments through Troy to Montgomery.'

A formal order to the same effect was made and filed among the records of the commission requiring compliance therewith on or before September 10, 1893, and a notice embodying this order, together with a copy of the report and opinion of the commission in the case, was forthwith duly served on each of the defendant corporations. The carriers, relying on the defenses interposed, did not comply with the order, and on January 20, 1894, this suit was brought. It progressed to the hearing, and on July 3, 1895, the circuit court delivered its opinion adverse to the ultimate findings and conclusions made and shown in the report and order of the commission, and made the decree, from which this appeal is taken, 'that this cause be, and the same is hereby, dismissed out of this court.' 69 F. 227.

It will be observed that charges 1, 2, 3, and 4, as made by the board of trade of Troy, allege departures from the 'long and short haul' rule of the fourth section of the act, and charges 5 and 6 present another form of alleged unjust discrimination or undue preference. Charges 4 and 5 are the two principal ones in the complaint, and to these the bulk of the testimony relates. Charge 4 is that, on shipment of class goods from New York, Baltimore, and the East of Troy and Montgomery, respectively, over the Alabama Midland as the terminal road, higher rates are charged to Troy than on such shipments through Troy 52 miles further on to Montgomery. Charge 5 involves the through rates on class goods from Louisville and other Ohio river points to Troy on the one hand, and to Montgomery and Columbus on the other; the complaint being that in their rates to these points, respectively, the carriers unjustly discriminate against Troy.

There is no substantial dispute as to the respective rates charged, the distances, the character of service, the classification of the freight, the volume of trade going to or through the respective points and of that originating at them, and the number of railroads reaching each that could compete for the carriage of goods. The commission insists that there is no actual subsisting all water route competition at Montgomery, Columbus, or Eufaula, and that there is practically no competition of any kind at any point within the field of this inquiry, because at all the points claimed to be competitive the rates are fixed by agreement between the carriers. The counsel for the commission contend:

'(1) That competition between carriers-- and there is none other attempted to be proven in this case-- does not constitute such a substantial dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions as will, under the interstate commerce law, without authority from the commission, where the rule of the fourth section is involved, justify departures from the rule of a relative equality in

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