Ball v. University of Maryland
| Citation | 137 Md. App. 229,768 A.2d 105 |
| Decision Date | 06 March 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 490,490 |
| Parties | Linda K. BALL v. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, College Park, et al. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Benjamin T. Boscolo (Chasen & Boscolo, Chartered on the brief), Greenbelt, for appellant.
Joan P. Adelman, Towson, for appellees.
Argued before SALMON, SONNER and JOHN F. McAULIFFE (retired, specially assigned), JJ.
JOHN F. McAULIFFE, Judge, retired, specially assigned.
We are here asked to determine the intent of the Legislature with respect to a provision in the Workers' Compensation Law that requires an annual cost of living adjustment of benefits paid to persons with permanent total disability. We hold that cost of living adjustments mandated by Section 9-638 of the Labor and Employment Article, Maryland Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol.), must be applied to cases of permanent total disability resulting from the combined effects of a subsequent injury1 and a pre-existing impairment as well as those resulting solely from one injury.
Appellant, Linda K. Ball, is permanently totally disabled as a result of both a work-related injury and a pre-existing condition. The Workers' Compensation Commission (the Commission) determined that appellant's disability status entitled her to a cost of living adjustment pursuant to Section 9-638. Appellees, the University of Maryland, College Park, et al. (the University), petitioned the Circuit Court of Prince George's County for review of that decision. The circuit court reversed the Commission, concluding that Section 9-638 does not allow cost of living adjustments to persons whose pre-existing impairment contributed to their permanent total disability.
On August 28, 1996, the Commission determined that Linda K. Ball (Ball) was permanently totally disabled, 75% due to a compensable accidental injury to her back, and 25% due to a pre-existing condition. At a hearing held on May 24, 1999, Ball requested that the Commission award her a cost of living adjustment (COLA), in accordance with Section 9-638. The Commission granted Ball's request in a June 16, 1999 order. The University appealed the Commission's order to the Prince George's County Circuit Court. The University claimed that a COLA may only be awarded to a permanently totally disabled person when the permanent total disability is solely the result of an accidental injury. A COLA may not be awarded, the University argued, when the permanent total disability is the result of an accidental injury and a pre-existing condition. The circuit court agreed and reversed the Commission's decision.
The University's argument to the circuit court, and to this Court on appeal, is one of legislative interpretation. Our disagreement with the University's argument and the circuit court's judgment is based upon the application of the canons of statutory construction that instruct us, inter alia, to construe statutes and their respective sections relating to the same subject matter together.
Statutes which relate to the same thing or general subject matter, and which are not inconsistent with each other are in pari materia, and should be construed together so that they will harmonize with each other and be consistent with their general object and scope, even though they were passed at different times and contain no reference to each other. Consistent with this established rule of statutory construction, we think all Sections of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Article 101) must be read and considered together in arriving at the true intent of the Legislature, as they form part of a general system.
Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Pennel, 133 Md.App. 279, 293, 754 A.2d 1120 (2000) (quoting Subsequent Injury Fund v. Chapman, 11 Md.App. 369, 375, 274 A.2d 870, aff'd, 262 Md. 367, 277 A.2d 444 (1971)) (emphasis added). The statute in question, Title 9 of the Labor and Employment article of the Maryland Code, is divided into subtitles. There are twelve subtitles in Title 9, listed below:
Md.Code (1999 Repl.Vol.) LAB. & EMPL., § 9-101, et. seq. Subtitle 6, or "Benefits," is further divided into parts. There are thirteen parts to Title 9, Subtitle 6, listed below:
Part VIII. Permanent Disability Due in Part to Preexisting Disease or Infirmity.
Id. Part V, or "Permanent Total Disability," is further subdivided into sections. There are currently six sections to Title 9, Subtitle 6, Part V, listed below:
Id. Subtitle 8, or "Subsequent Injuries," does not divide into parts, but instead, is directly subdivided into sections. There are currently eight sections to Title 9, Subtitle 8, listed below:
§ 9-801. Statement of intent.
§ 9-802. Compensation from Subsequent Injury Fund—Permanent disability.
Id. Subtitle 8 utilizes the Subsequent Injury Fund to protect employers and insurers by limiting an employer's liability, in specified cases of permanent disability caused by a combination of pre-existing permanent impairment and a subsequent injury, to only the costs of the subsequent injury. The Subsequent Injury Fund is responsible for payment of the remaining benefits. The policy underlying the adoption of Subsequent Injury Fund legislation was explained in Subsequent Injury Fund v. Pack, 250 Md. 306, 242 A.2d 506 (1968), where the Court of Appeals said, at page 308, 242 A.2d 506:
Its purpose was to persuade the employer to employ the handicapped individual by limiting the liability, which the employer may otherwise have incurred, in the event the previously disabled or injured individual sustained a subsequent occupational injury, although not of itself disabling, but which, coupled with previous impairment, rendered the individual permanently disabled, thus exposing the employer to liability for the cumulative effect of the prior and subsequent injuries. By the terms of the statute, if the employee sustained a subsequent compensable disability but the cumulative effect of the disability and the prior disability resulted in a permanent total or permanent partial disability, the employer and his insurance carrier would only be liable for compensation payable by reason of the subsequent injury.
Ball claims that because she is permanently totally disabled, she is entitled to a COLA under Section 9-638(a), which provides:
[C]ompensation paid under this Part V of this subtitle is subject to an annual cost of living adjustment.
The University, on the other hand, contends that Subtitle 6 is inapplicable to Ball because her compensation is fixed by Subtitle 8. The University directs our attention to Section 9-635, which states as follows:
A covered employee who is permanently totally disabled due to an accidental personal injury or an occupational disease shall be paid compensation in accordance with this Part V of this subtitle.
The University argues that "Section 9-635 is unambiguous: only permanent total disability that results from an accidental injury alone is covered under this part." (Emphasis added.) It is exclusively Subtitle 8, the University maintains, that addresses permanent total disability that results from an accidental injury combined with a pre-existing condition, and nowhere in Subtitle 8 is there any provision for the payment of a COLA. The University argues that if "employers who have hired employees with pre-existing disabilities now have to pay a cost of living adjustment [then it] will have a chilling effect and will deter employers from hiring such individuals."
Ball replies that reading Title 9 We agree.
We do not interpret Subtitles 6 and 8 so as to exclude consideration of one other. Instead, they are to be read together as they are subdivisions of the same Title. Simply stated, we agree with Ball's position that Subtitle 6 explains the benefits to be awarded to permanently totally disabled persons. Subtitle 8 explains how the costs of Subtitle 6 benefits are to be allocated in those particular instances when the permanently totally disabled person's disability is the result of a combination of an injury and a pre-existing impairment.
We arrive at this interpretation by first examining the language of the statute. Contrary to the University's argument, Section 9-635 does not include the words only or alone. There is no indication in the language of the statute that these words are even implied. The University claims that further evidence that its interpretation is correct...
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