Hollingsworth v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC

• Decision Date: 11 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. 95, Sept. Term, 2015.,95, Sept. Term, 2015.
• Citation: 448 Md. 648,141 A.3d 90
• Parties: Carville A. HOLLINGSWORTH, et al. v. SEVERSTAL SPARROWS POINT, LLC, et al.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

448 Md. 648

141 A.3d 90

Carville A. HOLLINGSWORTH, et al.

v.SEVERSTAL SPARROWS POINT, LLC, et al.

No. 95, Sept. Term, 2015.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 11, 2016.

Theodore B. Cornblatt (Cornblatt, Bennett, Penhallegon & Roberson, P.A., Towson, MD), on brief, for appellants.

James A. Turner and Robert C. Erlandson (Godwin, Erlandson, Vernon & Daney, LLC, Ellicott City, MD), on brief, for appellees.

Argued before BARBERA, C.J., GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD, WATTS, HOTTEN, and LYNNE A. BATTAGLIA (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

ADKINS, J.

This workers' compensation case between an injured worker's daughter, Heather Hollingsworth (“Appellant”), and the worker's former employer, Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC, and employer's insurer, Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania (“Appellees”), involves a dispute over survival of benefits in which we must decide which of two provisions—§ 9–632 or § 9–640—in the Labor and Employment Article applies. The Appellant seeks to collect benefits under the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act, Md. Code (1991, 2008 Repl. Vol.), §§ 9–101 –9–1201 of the Labor and Employment Article (“LE”) that would have been due to her father, Carville Hollingsworth (“Hollingsworth”), had he not died of causes unrelated to the accidental injury he sustained in the course of his employment. Under LE § 9–632, an award of benefits by the Workers' Compensation Commission survives upon the death of an injured employee. On the other hand, under LE § 9–640, an award of benefits survives upon the death of an injured employee only up to $45,000.00. Appellant argues that LE § 9–632 applies and Appellees contend that LE § 9–640 governs. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with Appellees that LE § 9–640 controls.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

The facts of this case are undisputed. In 2010, Hollingsworth sustained an accidental injury in the course of his employment with Appellee. The body parts involved in the 2010 injury included Hollingsworth's neck, right shoulder, back, and right hand. In November 2013, the Commission issued an award of compensation after determining that, as the result of the combined effects of the accidental injury and his preexisting conditions, Hollingsworth was permanently totally disabled. The Commission found that Hollingsworth had a 65% permanent disability due to the 2010 accidental injury. The Commission then found that the balance of his permanent disability, 35%, was due to his preexisting conditions, for which the Subsequent Injury Fund was responsible for paying compensation.

In accordance with these findings, the Commission directed the Appellees to pay Hollingsworth compensation at the rate of $798.00 weekly beginning February 7, 2013, not to exceed the sum of $345,534.00 allowable under the “Other cases” provision of the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act, LE § 9–627(k). The Commission also ordered the Subsequent Injury Fund to begin making payments to Hollingsworth at the end of the compensation to be paid by Appellees. The Commission ruled that these payments by the Fund would be made for as long as Hollingsworth continued to be permanently totally disabled.

Hollingsworth died in July 2014 from causes unrelated to the accidental injury. Up to the time of his death, Appellees made compensation payments pursuant to the Commission's award amounting to $52,166.54. Subsequently, the Appellant filed issues with the Commission seeking continued payment of the benefits provided in the November 2013 award.

Following an October 2014 hearing, the Commission issued an order in which it determined that Appellees were not obligated to make further payments under the award of compensation to Appellant because LE § 9–640 caps the survival of benefits at $45,000.00 and Appellees had already paid more than this amount to Hollingsworth at the time of his death.

Appellant petitioned for judicial review of the Commission's order to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The Circuit Court denied Appellant's motion and granted Appellees' motion, thereby affirming the Commission's ruling. Appellant then appealed the Circuit Court's decision to the Court of Special Appeals and filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court. Before the intermediate appellate court's consideration of this case, we exercised our bypass jurisdiction and granted certiorari under Maryland Code (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.), § 12–203 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article to consider the following question:

Does a workers' compensation award payable by an employer and insurer for the degree of permanent disability which resulted from an accidental injury survive the death of the injured worker under § 9–632 of the Labor and Employment Article, so that it is payable to his dependents, in a case where he was found to have additional disability due to preexisting conditions which caused him to be permanently totally disabled?

We hold that LE § 9–640 governs survival of benefits where a claimant is found to be permanently totally disabled irrespective of whether the claimant's permanent total disability is due solely to accidental injury or a combination of accidental injury and preexisting conditions. Because LE § 9–632 does not apply, we answer no to the question presented and affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In an appeal from judicial review of an agency action, we review the agency's decision directly, not the decision of the Circuit Court or the Court of Special Appeals. Hranicka v. Chesapeake Surgical, Ltd., 443 Md. 289, 297, 116 A.3d 507 (2015). In reviewing a Workers' Compensation Commission decision, we must respect the expertise of the agency and accord deference to the Commission's own interpretation of the statute it administers. Id. A court may reverse a Commission decision “only if the court finds that the Commission's action was based on an erroneous construction of the facts or law.” Baltimore Cnty. v. Thiergartner, 442 Md. 518, 529, 113 A.3d 627 (2015) (citations omitted). Although “ ‘the decision of the Commission is presumed to be prima facie correct,’ ” this presumption does not “ ‘extend to questions of law, which we review independently.’ ” Elms v. Renewal by Andersen, 439 Md. 381, 391, 96 A.3d 175 (2014) (quoting LE § 9–745(b) and Montgomery Cnty. v. Deibler, 423 Md. 54, 60, 31 A.3d 191 (2011) ). This appeal involves strictly a matter of law—interpretation of LE § 9–632 and § 9–640.

DISCUSSION

In deciding which provision of the Workers' Compensation Act governs survival of benefits in this case, we encounter a classic question of statutory interpretation. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General Assembly. McClanahan v. Washington Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 445 Md. 691, 701, 129 A.3d 293 (2015). “Under the plain meaning rule, we must give the ‘ordinary and natural meaning’ to statutory language because this language is ‘the primary source of legislative intent.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). “If the intent of the legislature is clear from the words of the statute, our inquiry normally ends and we apply the plain meaning of the statute.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

When interpreting the Workers' Compensation Act, “additional principles of interpretation enter the equation.” Deibler, 423 Md. at 61, 31 A.3d 191. The purpose of the Act is “to protect workers and their families from hardships inflicted by work-related injuries by providing workers with compensation for loss of earning capacity resulting from accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment.” Elms, 439 Md. at 399, 96 A.3d 175 (citation omitted). As a remedial statute, if the plain language of the Act is ambiguous or unclear, it must be “construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We may not, however, “stifle the plain meaning of the Act, or exceed its purposes, so that the injured worker may prevail.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, when the language is plain, we may not create an ambiguity that does not exist in order to interpret the Act more favorably to the claimant. Breitenbach v. N.B. Handy Co., 366 Md. 467, 473, 784 A.2d 569 (2001).

The Statutory Language Is Unambiguous

Subtitle 6 of the Workers' Compensation Act addresses benefits payable under the Act. See LE §§ 9–601 –9–689. Part IV of subtitle 6 encompasses § 9–625 through § 9–634. Section 9–625 establishes the scope of Part IV and provides that “[a] covered employee who is permanently partially disabled due to an accidental personal injury or an occupational disease shall be paid compensation in accordance with this Part IV of this subtitle.” LE § 9–625 (emphasis added). Accordingly, under the plain language of LE § 9–625, when an employee is determined to be permanently partially disabled, Part IV governs the payment of workers' compensation benefits. The provision governing survival benefits within Part IV—and the provision Appellant argues applies to this case—is § 9–632. Under this section, “[i]f a covered employee dies from a cause that is not compensable under this title, the right to compensation that is payable under this Part IV of this subtitle and unpaid on the date of death survives in accordance with this section.” LE § 9–632(b).

In contrast, Part V of subtitle 6 encompasses § 9–635 through § 9–642. Section 9–635 delineates the scope of Part V stating, “[a] covered employee who is permanently totally disabled due to an accidental personal injury or an occupational disease shall be paid compensation in accordance with this Part V of this subtitle.” LE § 9–635 (emphasis added). Thus, the plain language of LE § 9–635 dictates that when an employee is found to be permanently totally disabled, Part V...