Cathedral Academy v. State, 56557

• Decision Date: 02 April 1974
• Docket Number: No. 56557,56557
• Citation: 77 Misc.2d 977,354 N.Y.S.2d 370
• Parties: CATHEDRAL ACADEMY, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant. Claim
• Court: New York Court of Claims

Page 370

354 N.Y.S.2d 370

77 Misc.2d 977

CATHEDRAL ACADEMY, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant.

Claim No. 56557.

Court of Claims of New York.

April 2, 1974.

Davis, Polk & Wardwell, by Richard E. Nolan, and Thomas J. Aquilino, Jr., New York City, of counsel, for the claimant.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., by Kenneth J. Connolly, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

WILLIAM L. FORD, Judge.

By notice of motion claimant seeks summary judgment on its claim, filed pursuant to Chapter 996 of the Laws of New York 1972, in the amount of $7,347.29 as the balance alleged to be due and payable as reimbursement for funds expended by claimant as set forth in said Chapter and which had been provided by Chapter 138 of the Laws of New York 1970, for certain school related services, described in both Chapters, ¹ rendered in the second half of the 1971--1972 school year.

The defendant did not file an answering affidavit to claimant's motion. In its memorandum of law, filed prior to oral argument of the motion, and during the argument, it opposed claimant's motion and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the claim on the grounds that Chapter 996 is unconstitutional and that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 93 S.Ct. 2814, 37 L.Ed.2d 736 (June 25, 1973) requires dismissal. Subsequent to the argument, defendant requested by letter to the Court, that its cross-motion be treated as a motion to dismiss rather than as a motion for summary judgment. The claimant, by letter to the Court, stated that it had no objection to the request and the Court, therefore, considers the defendant's motion as one for dismissal of the claim.

Both parties came to court originally with motions for summary judgment, and there has been no evidentiary hearing requested or held. The only sworn statements are contained in the affidavit attached to claimant's notice of motion. The Court, therefore, finds that there is no factual issue herein.

The claimant contends, the defendant does not dispute, and the Court finds that claimant was one of the schools included within the provisions of Chapter 138 and in accordance therewith made application for reimbursement for services rendered in the school year 1970--1971 and was reimbursed by the State for that school year in two equal payments; that claimant budgeted for, relied upon and filed a similar application on or about November 5, 1971 for reimbursement for the school year 1971--1972 and the State reimbursed the claimant in January of 1972 for the first semester; and that the claimant rendered the required services for the remaining semester of the 1971--1972 school year and has not been reimbursed therefor.

The Court further finds as undisputed that on September 6, 1972 the claimant timely filed its claim with this Court pursuant to Chapter 996 which was approved and became effective on June 8, 1972; that this claim has not been assigned or submitted to any other court or tribunal for audit or determination and that Chapter 996 conferred jurisdiction upon this Court to hear, audit and determine the claim or claims of nonprofit schools, other than public schools, against the State for reimbursement of the funds expended by them in rendering certain school related services under Chapter 138, commonly known as the Mandated Services Act, which Act became law on April 18, 1970, effective on September 1, 1970, though its applicability related back to July 1, 1970, and which Act was held unconstitutional by a three-judge United States District Court, Southern District of New York in Committee for Public Education and Relig. Lib. v. Levitt, 342 F.Supp. 439, decided April 27, 1972, one judge dissenting, and was affirmed with opinion by the United States Supreme Court in Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 93 S.Ct. 2814, 37 L.Ed.2d 736, (June 25, 1973).

The claimant contends, in moving for summary judgment, that, as a matter of State law and equity, the legislature in enacting Chapter 996 on June 8, 1972, has properly and legally recognized that, upon the factual situation here present, the State was morally obligated to establish a procedure by which claimant could be reimbursed and to confer jurisdiction upon this Court to hear, audit and determine the claim or claims of claimant and other nonprofit schools located in the State, other than public schools, against the State for reimbursement of the funds expended by them in rendering services for examination and inspection in connection with certain school related services as described in Chapters 138 and 996.

Claimant argues that Chapter 996 is constitutional in all respects and that the situation in which it finds itself and which morally obligates the state to reimburse it, consists substantially of the following facts: that the State, by Chapter 138, represented and promised to claimant, and others similarly situated, that they would be reimbursed for expenses incurred after July 1, 1970 in rendering the services mandated by said Chapter 138; that the State knew that claimant and said schools were relying on said representation; that said representation was an effective cause of said expenses by claimant and other schools; that appropriations, known to claimant, were made to the Education Department to enable that Department to reimburse such schools for the rendering of such services; that based on the representation of the State that reimbursement would be made for such services, such schools already in fiscal crisis, by budgetary allocations and other methods, made available the necessary personnel to perform such services; that Federal courts, by various orders, enjoined payments to such schools and as a result, reimbursement for the full period July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1972 has not been made to claimant and such schools, although all such services were duly performed; that claimant and such schools during such period did incur expenses in rendering the mandated services in reliance upon such representation of reimbursement; and that the legislature has indeed recognized a moral obligation resting upon the State to provide, as it has attempted to do, a remedy whereby such schools may recover the complete amount of expenses incurred by them prior to June 30, 1972 in reliance on the said representation. Claimant argues further that not only do the foregoing facts exist but also that the State legislature in the very language of Chapter 996 admits all of them and states, upon said facts, its own conclusions that a moral obligation to reimburse exists and that said claim or claims are founded in right and justice, or in law or equity.

Any issues of Federal law and equity, claimant contends, in effect, have been decided already in its favor in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971, Lemon I) and 411 U.S. 192, 93 S.Ct. 1463, 36 L.Ed.2d 151 (19738 Lemon II). It argues that in Lemon II as in Levitt, supra, a group of taxpayers sought to thwart the legislative will through the filing of federal suits, without pursuing or obtaining preliminary injunction, thus allowing the legislative enactments to become and remain effective and allowing the states and the nonpublic schools to rely on such enactments; that in both cases, the constitutionality of the respective statutes was determined finally only after full review by the Supreme Court; that in both cases, judgment of unconstitutionality was made at or near the end of the school year; that in both cases, the nonpublic schools and the states had relied, in good faith, on the respective statutes and the nonpublic schools had incurred substantial financial obligations pursuant thereto during the time the federal actions were pending. Thus, claimant argues, to the extent that federal constitutional issues relate to its motion, Lemon II is controlling and supports its claim.

The defendant contends that Chapter 996 is unconstitutional in that, at the outset, the State legislature lacked the constitutional power to enact Chapter 996 authorizing this claim.

The defendant further contends that some act on the part of the State creating a moral obligation to reimburse is lacking in the instant claim and is necessary as a matter of law in order to overcome the constitutional prohibitions of (a) auditing of private claims by the legislature (Article III, § 19, State Constitution) or (b) making gifts of State money (Article VII, § 8, State Constitution).

In support of its contention the defendant argues that a moral obligation, such as to validate enabling acts, is created only in those cases in which has been an unjust enrichment of the State by virtue of benefits conferred upon it by private persons and, secondly, in those cases in which the claimant is injured by some act of the State or its officers and agents.

The defendant's position is that, in the instant case, there has been no benefit to or unjust enrichment of the State, nor has there been any injury or damage inflicted by anyone in the State's service. In fact, says defendant, the enabling act itself clearly demonstrates in Section 2(a) that prior to July 1, 1970 claimant was performing, at its own expense, the same services for which it now seeks reimbursement and that, therefore, any claim that these services were performed on representations of the State clearly is without merit and, in any case, it had no right to so rely.

Additionally, the defendant argues that since Chapter 138 provides no procedure to insure that State funds are not used for religious purposes, this Court cannot determine whether the amount claimed is subject to constitutional objections and, therefore, in purporting to allow claimant to recover the sum of $7,347.29 the legislature is auditing a private claim in contravention of Article III, § 19 of the State Constitution.

The defendant...