Mason v. Snyder

Decision Date01 August 2002
Docket NumberNo. 04-01-0878.,04-01-0878.
PartiesMichael MASON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald N. SNYDER, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Michael Mason, Pontiac, pro se.

Justice STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court;

In August 2001, plaintiff, Michael Mason, an inmate at the Pontiac Correctional Center (Pontiac), filed a pro se mandamus petition against Donald N. Snyder (Director), Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC). The petition alleged that various DOC administrative bodies had either found him guilty or confirmed a guilty finding that he had violated DOC disciplinary rules, resulting in his loss of good-time credits and an adverse classification status within DOC. Plaintiff asked the trial court to issue an order of mandamus (1) expunging the disciplinary action taken against him by DOC, and (2) directing DOC to provide him a proper disciplinary hearing.

Four days after the petition was filed, the trial court sua sponte reviewed'it, concluded that it did not state a cause of action, and ordered it stricken.

Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's petition, which consisted primarily of a preprinted form with blank spaces for the insertion of specific information, stated that plaintiff was a Pontiac inmate serving a 60 year sentence for first degree murder. The petition alleged that the Director was responsible for "the Illinois Department of Corrections, Administrative Review Board, and Prisoner Review Board Disciplinary hearings on appeal." The preprinted portion then alleged that plaintiff had requested that "the defendants [sic] perform specific ministerial duties. The defendants have refused to perform such duties regardless of plaintiff's clear entitlement to performance of the specific duties[,] which are set forth as follows." The only thing plaintiff wrote in the blank space after this preprinted section was the following: "20 Ill. Adm.Code Section 504.80(k)(1)."

On the preprinted portion stating, "As a result of [d]efendant's actions, [p]laintiff will suffer irreparable damages and be subjected to ____," plaintiff wrote the following: "unlawful punitive segregation, loss of good-time credits, and loss of institutional privileges."

The section of the Illinois Administrative Code (Code) to which the petition refers states only that if the prison adjustment committee finds the inmate did not commit the offense charged, then the disciplinary report shall be dismissed and expunged from the inmate's master record file. 20 Ill. Adm.Code § 504.80(k)(1) (Conway Greene CD-ROM June 2001). Another section of the Code provides that a prison's adjustment committee shall decide in a disciplinary proceeding whether an accused inmate committed the offense charged based on all relevant information and evidence, and must be reasonably satisfied that "there is some evidence that the committed person committed the offense for the individual to be found guilty." 20 Ill. Adm.Code § 504.80(j)(l) (Conway Greene CD-ROM June 2001).

Attached to the petition was an untitled document (the document) that plaintiff apparently wrote out in longhand. The document contains five paragraphs, each of which plaintiff designates as a "ground," and provides the following allegations.

In March 2001, plaintiff was issued a major disciplinary ticket accusing him of sexual misconduct and insolence "which was based on a lie by a correctional guard[,] Josephina Williams." The institutional adjustment committee before whom plaintiff appeared on this charge was chaired by Benny Dallas, even though plaintiff informed Dallas that plaintiff had a lawsuit pending against him and requested Dallas to recuse himself from the hearing. The document asserts, "Dallas lied[,] stating he has no knowledge of such a lawsuit and denied plaintiff's request."

After the committee found plaintiff guilty, he filed an institutional grievance. However, the reviewing grievance officer (1) failed to provide plaintiff with a fair and impartial review hearing, (2) agreed with the committee, and (3) denied plaintiff's grievance. The chief administrative officer thereafter concurred.

Plaintiff then submitted his grievance to the administrative review board, but it denied him relief. He later forwarded his documents to the Director, who also concurred with the administrative review board.

The document then states that plaintiff appeared before the Prisoner Review Board regarding the revocation of his good-time credits, complaining that the Director, upon revoking those credits, failed to provide plaintiff with a written statement as to evidence relied on or reasons for the action taken against him. The document does not say that the Prisoner Review Board denied plaintiff any relief, but that seems to be the implication.

After plaintiff's petition was filed, the Livingston County circuit clerk referred it to the trial court, which entered the following order four days later:

"Court reviews filing of [p]laintiff; [c]ourt finds that [p]laintiff is complaining of the result of certain disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, [c]ourt finds that [p]laintiff has not stated a cause of action and accordingly [p]etition is ordered stricken."

The common-law record contains no indication that before the court sua sponte ordered the petition stricken, any summons was issued to the Director, DOC, or any other prison authority. Accordingly, no attorney ever appeared on behalf of the Director at the trial level.

Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

The gist of defendant's argument on appeal is contained in the following quote from his brief:

"Writer of ticket[,] Josephina Williams[,] made miscellaneous allegations against Mr. Mason[.] [A]t no time did Josephina Williams indicate she eye-witnessed [sic] Mr. Mason committing a violation of departmental rules, nor was she at Mr. Mason [sic] cell. The disciplinary report was insufficient to permit a conviction by the tribunal."

This appeal is unusual because appellant appears pro se and no one appears on behalf of appellee. However, because the record before us is simple—indeed, it could hardly be more so—and the claimed errors are such that this court can easily decide them without the aid of an appellee's brief, we will decide this case on its merits. Cf. First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill.2d 128, 133, 345 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1976)

(no appellee brief filed).

A. Mandamus Generally

Resolving this appeal requires us to review the law pertaining to mandamus. In Hatch v. Szymanski, 325 Ill. App.3d 736, 739, 259 Ill.Dec. 805, 759 N.E.2d 585, 588 (2001), the court discussed mandamus as follows:

"Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy to enforce, as a matter of right, the performance of official duties by a public official where the official is not exercising discretion. A court will not grant a writ of mandamus unless the petitioner can demonstrate a clear, affirmative right to relief, a clear duty of the official to act, and clear authority in the official to comply with the. writ. The writ will not lie when its effect is to substitute the court's judgment or discretion for the official's judgment or discretion. Mandamus relief, therefore, is not appropriate to regulate a course of official conduct or to enforce the performance of official duties generally."

See also Durbin v. Gilmore, 307 Ill:App.3d 337, 339, 240 Ill.Dec. 811, 718 N.E.2d 292, 294 (1999) ("The issuance of a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, discretionary in nature, and it is appropriate only when there is a clear right to the requested relief, a clear duty of the defendants to act, and clear authority in the defendants to comply with the writ").

B. Mandamus in a Prison Context

DOC inmates have been filing increasing numbers of mandamus petitions. This phenomenon hardly seems surprising when, as in the present case, preprinted mandamus forms seem to be available throughout Illinois prisons. As a result of these filings, a body of Illinois case law has developed dealing with mandamus actions brought by inmates against DOC officials. For instance, in Brewer v. Peters, 262 Ill. App.3d 610, 613, 198 Ill.Dec. 555, 633 N.E.2d 17, 19 (1994), the appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the inmates' mandamus petitions regarding good-conduct' time and explained as follows:

"For mandamus to be granted, there must be a clear, duty to act on the part of defendant, appellee here, and clear authority to act. (Orenic v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board (1989), 127 Ill.2d 453, [467-68, 130 Ill.Dec. 455,] 537 N.E.2d 784[, 791].) The award of goodconduct time and the decision to consider granting good-conduct time are discretionary under the statute; defendant is not required to grant the time or even consider it. A clear duty to act is not present here."

See also Helm v. Washington, 308 Ill. App.3d 255, 257-58, 241 Ill.Dec. 871, 720 N.E.2d 326, 328 (1999) (inmate's mandamus petition properly dismissed because decision to award meritorious good-conduct credit to qualifying prisoners is discretionary).

In People ex rel. Braver v. Washington, 311 Ill.App.3d 179, 185-86, 243 Ill.Dec. 759, 724 N.E.2d 68, 73 (1999), the court discussed principles of mandamus in a prison context, as follows:

"Mandamus, an extraordinary remedy, is awarded in the exercise of judicial discretion according to legal principles [citations]; it is appropriate when necessary to compel a public officer to perform purely ministerial duties, requiring no exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer. [Citations.] Mandamus will not issue to direct the manner of performance of an action requiring the exercise of discretion [citation], but `is available only when the plaintiff has set forth every material fact needed to prove that he has a clear, legal right and is entitled to the performance of the
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