David v. Sirius Computer Solutions, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–1125.,14–1125.
• Citation: 779 F.3d 1209
• Parties: Diane DAVID, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. SIRIUS COMPUTER SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

779 F.3d 1209

Diane DAVID, Plaintiff–Appellant
v.
SIRIUS COMPUTER SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant–Appellee.

No. 14–1125.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

March 10, 2015.

779 F.3d 1209

Danielle C. Jefferis (Darold W. Killmer, with her on the briefs), Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Ian S. Speir of Lewis Roca Rothgerber, LLP, Colorado Springs, CO (David M. Hyams of Lewis Roca Rothgerber, LLP, Denver, CO, and William D. Nelson of Lewis Roca Rothgerber, LLP, Colorado Springs, CO, with him on the brief), for Defendant–Appellee.

Before TYMKOVICH, GORSUCH, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.

Diane David sold computer equipment and she was good at it. She had a lucrative

779 F.3d 1210

nationwide client base. No surprise, then, that Sirius Computer Solutions came knocking on her door, asking her to take a job selling its equipment. The company promised Ms. David that she could continue to serve her existing customers even after she went to work for Sirius. On this understanding, Ms. David signed up. But soon enough Sirius backtracked, refusing to allow Ms. David to conduct business with her outside clients. So Ms. David sued, alleging that the company's recruiting promises negligently misrepresented the actual terms of employment—and that the company's misrepresentations took a toll on her both financially and emotionally. A jury mostly agreed with Ms. David, returning a verdict for her on the negligent misrepresentation claim and awarding damages of $231,665 in “economic losses or injuries” but declining any damages for “noneconomic losses or injuries.”

After trial, Ms. David filed a motion under § 13–21–101 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which guarantees prejudgment interest “[i]n all actions brought to recover damages for personal injuries.” Because the jury found Ms. David suffered only economic losses, the district court seemed to assume she had suffered no “personal injur[y]” and denied her motion for prejudgment interest. And that's the nub of the matter now before us. Ms. David argues that her suit was brought to recover damages for a personal injury and that the district court was wrong to equate personal injuries with noneconomic losses.

The statute's plain language suggests Ms. David may have a point. It focuses on whether the plaintiff “brought” an “action[ ]” to “recover damages for personal injuries.” And often enough in the law a “personal injury” is understood to mean “[a]ny invasion of a personal right.” Black's Law Dictionary 802 (Bryan Garner ed., 8th ed.2004). Indeed, in Colorado torts are classified as either involving injuries to property or persons and “[a] tort which is not an injury to property is” treated, by definition, as an injury to the person. Brooks v. Jackson, 813 P.2d 847, 848 (Colo.App.1991) (quoting Mumford v. Wright, 12 Colo.App. 214, 55 P. 744, 746 (1898) ). So the statute seems to focus our attention on the question whether the plaintiff's “action [ ]” was “brought” to recover “damages” for the invasion of a right belonging to a person rather than for the violation of a property right. Very much as happened here when Ms. David brought suit seeking damages for a misrepresentation made to her, not for any damage to property personal or real. Nothing in the statute's terms seems to require an inquiry into the particular type of compensatory damages (economic or noneconomic) the jury eventually awards. And it's surely the case that lawsuits aimed at vindicating “personal injuries” do often wind up yielding “economic”...